Opposition to the excesses of rabid individualism, however, comes not only from social realists but even more often from ethical idealists. Indeed it is in this latter form that it is most vocal and emphatic. What age has not heard a cry for justice in the name of Christ, Kant or some other ethical prophet? When has not someone’s conscience, someone’s devotion to things invisible led to conflict with the social order? And yet both Hegel and Marx regarded abstract ethical idealism, whether it have its roots in Christ, Rousseau or Kant, as Utopian and unreasonable-as even more dangerous than any philosophy of social atomism. It involved the same denial of the priority of the group over the individual; the same acceptance of the natural rights, or conscience, ethics which lies at the basis of philo¬sophical anarchism. Because it endangered the stability of the state, Hegel stamped it as a revolutionary doctrine; because it hampered militant class activity, Marx condemned it as Incipiently counter-revolutionary.

The End Of History And The Return Of History

Philip Grier

Through the summer and fall of 1989, Hegel scholars in America were treated to the unusual spectacle of a debate in the mass media over the meaning and truth of Hegel’s philosophy of history, a debate running through the pages of major daily newspapers, the weekly news magazines, and the journals of opinion. The occasion for this unaccustomed attention devoted to Hegel was the appearance of an article by Francis Fukuyama in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest entitled “The End of History?”

Caught up in the spirit of the event, Irving Kristol, the publisher of the National Interest, generously announced in his comment on the Fukuayama article, “I am delighted to welcome G.W.F. Hegel to Washington. He will certainly help raise the intellectual level of the place…Hegel is unquestionably a genius—along with Kant, the greatest philosopher of modernity”. The last sentence is, however, followed by this: “In a sense, all of us have to decide whether were pro Hegel or contra, even if we have never read him, as not many of us have.” Alas, most of the contributors to this episode would seem to be carrying out Kristal’s injunction quite ligerally; as a consequence the recent extended public debate over “Hegel’s theory of the end of history” has had almost nothing to do with Hegel.

In his essay Fukuyama aspires to identify “some larger process at work, a process that gives coherence and order” to our understanding of the events of history. He claims to have found such a “larger conceptual framework” (3) in Hegel‘s thesis of the end of history: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (4). This first statement by Fukuyama of what he means by “the end of history” appears to contain all the essential elements of his view. The story of human history is the story of our ideological evolution; that evolution culminates in liberal democracy (“the Western idea” [3]); history ceases because “the basic principles of the liberal democratic state [i.e., the ideals of the French and American Revolutions] cannot be improved upon” (5); there are no contradictions in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of the liberal democratic state (8); all important nations will either turn out to be liberal democracies, or, failing that, at least abandon their pretensions to represent any alternative or higher form of human society (13).

This theory supposedly reveals the larger significance of the ob­servation that Western liberal democracy has now prevailed over every ideological alternative to it; “the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war” (3), have all been defeated. The twentieth century has turned out to lead neither to the “end of ideology” nor to “a convergence between capitalism and socialism ... but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” (3).

This triumphant Western liberal democracy is distinctly consumerist in Fukuyama‘s conception of it, focused upon technical, economic prob­lem-solving-“the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands” (18). At the end of the article, apparently forgetting his own dictum that this liberal democracy represents above all the achievement of the human values of freedom, equality and reason that “cannot be improved upon,” Fukuyama falls into a bout of despair: ‘The end of history will be a very sad time” (18). Instead of the “struggle for recognition or the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal [sic],” life will consist of end­less “economic calculation”: “In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history” (1 . Even sympathetic commentators immediately noticed that Fukuyama’s coda had much in common with Nietzsche’s idea of the “last man,” and no discernible connection with Hege1.² In a sequel, “A Reply to My Critics,”3 Fukuyama tried to restate his attitude toward the posthistorical condition of existence in a less provocative way without retracting his original remarks, leaving a certain ambiguity about his position (28). No significant changes were introduced in the sequcl concerning his general conception of the end pf history, nor was its attribution to Hegel qualified in any way.

Mainly under the spell of Fukuyama‘s article, one supposes, most com­mentators have seemingly accepted that his quick sketch of the end-of ­history thesis is properly attributed to Hegel. Fukuyama himself betrays no doubt on this score; but his claim of attribution is at least indirect: It is Kojeve’s classic but highly eccentric Introduction to the Reading of Hegel which always figures as his explicitly cited authority for Hegel’s views.⁴ Fukuyama describes Kojeve as, in essence, the last true Hegelian. He writes that most of us know of Hegel “primarily as Marx’s precursor, and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel‘s work from direct study …. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time” (4). He claims that it is Kojeve, attempting “to resurrect the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806 [sic]” (4) who is most responsible for this effort.

Searching for a clue as to why Kojeve, and not, say, the far more obvious candidate Hyppolite, should be accorded this honor, it emerges that Kojeve is being contrasted primarily with Marcuse as a contemporary German interpreter of Hegel who “regarded Hegel ultimately as an historically bound and incomplete philosopher” (5, n. 2). In this company it becomes more understandable why Kojeve might acquire this status as the last true Hegelian. But at the same time Fukuyama gives no particular sign of recognizing Kojeve‘s own pronounced Marxist leanings, especially in his use of the master-slave dialectic as the prism through which the whole of Hegel’s thought is to be viewed.⁵ The more fundamental puzzle, though, would be to explain the source of Fukuyama’s extraordinary confidence that Kojeve’s very eccentric reading of Hegel, especially on the theme of the end of history, could be accepted as an authoritative interpretation.

No serious reader of Hegel could fail to recognize that Kojeve is as much creator as interpreter of the system he ascribes to Hegel. Kojeve’s entire reading of the Phenomenology revolves about the “master­slave” (Herr-schaft/Knechtschaft) episode, treating it as a passpartout for I he whole. Kojeve works it particularly hard in his exposition of the notion of history. He declares that “History began with the first Fight. that ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave” (Bloom, 43). Kojeve insists that this fight is “a fight for pure prestige carried on for the sake of ‘recognition’ by the adversary” (Bloom, 11-12), that is, a fight not motivated by material or biological need, but a freely chosen one which puts everything at risk. The loss of the battle converts one of the combatants into a slave for the other, condemned to labor in confrontation with nature to satisfy the desire of the master. “History is the history of the working Slave” (Bloom, 20) articulated in a series of “slave ideologies” whereby the slaves seek to disguise their slavery from themselves. History comes to an end when the slaves eventually realize and assert their own intrinsically free being as citizens in a state in which all are equally free.

Kojeve’s end-of-history thesis has no obvious grounding in Hegel‘s texts, so the question must be asked: what led Kojeve to this extraordinary view? The answer is not far to seek. Kojeve himself declares (Bloom, 133­34; Queneau, 367) that “the source and basis of my interpretation of the Phenomenology” is to be found in an article which his fellow Russian emigre Alexandre Koyre wrote in the early 1930s on some of Hegel’s Jena period texts which had recently appeared. Kojeve gives no citation for the Koyre article, but there can be no doubt (on overwhelming internal as well as external evidence) that the article in question is “Hegel a lena,” published originally in 1934.⁶ It is evident that the source of Kojeve’s end-of-history thesis can be found in the final paragraph of Koyre’s article.

Koyre was examining Hegel’s treatment of time in the succession of manuscripts from the lectures at Jena in 1802, 1803-4, and 1805­-6 (Even though the 1802 date is no longer accepted as correct, the new dating does not materially affect Koyre‘s treatment of the texts.)8 Koyre treated those manuscripts (lecture notes) as the first glimpse into Hegel’s philosophical apprenticeship, our first opportunity to get behind the difficult and often obscure formulations of the mature system, to see the living process of its formation. At the same time he observed that there is a great risk in using these youthful works as an interpretive key to the mature system, namely the risk of “misunderstanding and misinterpreting” (150) the mature Hegel-and Koyre viewed the mature Hegel as above all the author of the Science of Logic, even more than of the Phenomenology (150, n. 4). On the other hand, Koyre was also inclined to treat the system of the Encyclopedia as problematic.⁹

The largest section of Koyre’s article was devoted to the translation and exposition of passages on time from the Naturphilosophie of the Je­nenserLogik, Metaphysik, und Naturphilosophie (i.e., sec. LA.A.; Lasson, 203­6). He focusses especially on remarks Hegel made there concerning the

relation of the finite to the infinite, time, and the relations of present, future, and past. 10 The present is described as an “empty limit” between the future and the past. ”The past is this time returned in itself which has sublated in itself the two first dimensions [present and future]. The limit, or the Now, is empty; for it is absolutely simple or the concept of time; it realizes itself in the future. The future is its reality” (169­70; Lasson, 204). Commenting on such passages Koyre remarks that it is not from the past that time comes to us, but from the future. “La duree does not extend itself from the past to the present” (176). “It is, on the contrary, from the future that it comes to itself in the present. The prevalent ‘dimension‘ of time is the future which is, in some way, anterior to the past” (177).1l

This treatment of past, present, and future was part of a larger argument by Hegel in the 1803 and 1804 versions of his Naturphilosophie dealing with the topic of motion in the solar system. Hegel treated the per­fect periodicity of movement in the solar system as an image of the “true infinite. “12 As Harris puts it, “Periodic motion is what Hegel characterizes as the temporalizing of space and the spatializing of time” (244). Hegel wished to exhibit the conceptual connection between the two, and his discussion of time is part of that endeavor. All of this belonged to Hegel’s attempt, presumably under the influence of Schelling, to treat nature as the realm of divine life. In this conception of nature, for example, Hegel depicted the aether as Absolute Spirit.^J3 Though this theme of nature as the divine life underwent a certain development (diminution) during this time, the 1803 and 1804 philosophies of nature “represent ,I continuous development of thought that broke off some time in the spring of 1805″ (Harris, 239). Harris also observes that the “system of 1805-6 proved to be the sunset of the Greek concept of nature as the divine life” (241).

Although Koyre, writing in 1934, did not have available the nu­merous scholarly investigations of the Jena period writings to which we now have access, and was not in possession of an entirely accurate chronology, nevertheless he correctly grasped the fact that the line of argument concerning time which so interested him disappears in the further development of Hegel’s thought. First, the 1803-4 notes lack t he corresponding section.¹⁴ In the 1805-6 version of the Realphilosophie there is a discussion of time, but the nature of the text, as well ,IS the argument, is quite changed. Space is no longer derived from time, but space is treated first, and time discussed afterward. The text is now divided into paragraphs, like those of the later Encyclo‘pedia, and t he style of writing is more public than private. Finally, in the. corre­sponding Encyclopedia passages, these rich speculations concernl11g the rity of the future over the present and past have entirely disappeared (Koyre, 187).

Notwithstanding the evidence that he himself has assembled of Hegel having essentially discarded the argument on time from the “1802” notes, Koyre goes on to declare that, “It is this insistence on the future, the primacy accorded to the future over the past, which constitutes in our opinion, the greatest originality of Hegel” (177). In his concluding remarks Koyre curiously seems to speak as though Hegel had not dis­carded his doctrine of the primacy of the future, and treats that doctrine as ultimately leading to the failure of the system. “It is thus, in the Hegelian conception, that the dialectical nature of the instant secures the contact and the co-penetration of time and eternity. But it is also this which explains, in the final analysis, the failure of the Hegelian system. For if time is dialectical and is constructed commencing with the future, it is­whatever Hegel may say about it-eternally unfinished” (188-89). Since this is true, according to Koyre, the Hegelian system can be constructed only if history has been terminated, if there will no longer be a future, if time itself has stopped.

In his concluding paragraph Koyre observes almost casually:

It is possible that Hegel believed in it [the end of history]. It is possible even that he believed not only that it was the essential condition

for the system-it is only at night that the owls of Minerva begin their flight-but also that this essential condition had already been realized, that history had effectively ended, and that it was precisely because of that that he could-had been able to-complete it [his system]. (p. 189)

Since Koyre is obviously convinced on various grounds that the (Ency­clopedia) system is a failure, and has just argued that the future cannot be foreseen, he has little interest in exploring the question of whether Hegel really believed that history had ended. (We must remember, of course, that the end of history is a precondition for the system only given Koyre’s reading of the discarded “1802″ passages on time as if they were a crucial element of Hegel’s mature thought.) This possibility, which Koyre mentions just in an off-hand fashion, seems to have struck Kojeve with the force ofa revelation; it became the cornerstone for his interpretation of the Phenomenology.

Kojeve reveals only a fleeting awareness of anything odd about his procedure for interpreting the Phenomenology, namely, taking an obscure set of passages on time from a very early version of He gel’s Naturphilosophie which Hegel certainly rejected prior to writing the Phenomenology, and

treating them as the basis for an interpretation not only of that work Ilut of the whole of Hegel’s philosophical position.1⁶ Kojeve (and to some extent, it should be said, Koyre himself) seems to have entirely disregarded Koyre’s warnings about the danger of applying these early and in some cases abortive writings of Hegel to the interpretation of the mature works.

Kojeve goes on to develop Koyre’s suggestions into an elaborate doctrine of the finite, empirical existence of time, history, and “man” (l‘homme). He quotes Hegel as saying that ‘Time is the Concept itself which exists empirically” (Bloom, 136),17 and argues that the empirical existence of time (history) entails that it must come to an end. IdentifYing the concept with work, Kojeve argues that “the existence of Work in the World is the existence in this World of Time” (Bloom, 145). He further concludes on the same page that “if Man is the Concept, and if the Concept is Work, Man and the Concept are also Time.” The empirical existence of time (history) thus also entails the empirical existence of work, and hence of man. Being empirical, each of these is also finite, hence corning to an end. ‘Therefore History itself must be essentially finite; collective Man (h umanity) must die just as the human individual dies; universal History must have a definitive end” (Bloom, 148). This end of history, according to Kojeve, constitutes the coming of the wise man (wisdom, Absolute Knowing). And this state of wisdom is eternal, posthistorical.

The article continues…

A first attempt to answer Kant’s Challenge lies in Hegel (and the other post-Kantians), and his grand philosophic effort whose appearance, timing, and unfolding is itself ‘eonically significant’, and almost spectacular, but our viewpoint is different, springing directly from Kant. A simple systems model has yielded a surprising new insight, hints, at least, into historical dynamics, the stock of Geist-design arguments suddenly plummets. What’s more this is matched with the expression of an exotically austere ethic of action. Hegel’s historical amoralism becomes problematic in this approach and should not be mixed with the analysis. We can no longer say, for example, that some teleological process justifies unethical action. The slaughterbench of historical progression all at once finds itself downgraded to micro-action.[i]

There are a lot of Hegelian Indians in the woods we are traversing, and we should be clear this account is different and therefore made no use of Hegel. Our account echoes the classic theme in Hegel of the emergence of freedom, but we have produced another approach to that. We cannot endorse any effort to graft the two together, which will create hopeless confusion. Once that’s clear we can appreciate Hegel on his own terms, as a classic moment of the eonic effect itself. The solution to the Hegel question for us is to declare his system eonic data! He is too classic for any other approach and we will examine the Hegelian archaeological site like the Sphinx of Egypt.

The issue of ‘historical dialectic’ never arises in our approach (although the oscillations in the degrees of freedom in our eonic sequence, by any measure, would seem some sort of dialectic), and we are left suspicious, since we can see that the eonic mainline does not follow a dialectical logic. It is not our business to produce hasty judgments of Hegel, but we are going in another direction, and after the confusions of dialectic that follow Hegel, we should do well to be wary of the kind of dialectical thinking that haunts Marxists. The irony is that our system showing oscillations of degrees of freedom shows a rediscovered meaning of the idea of a ‘dialectic of freedom’, but our sense is quite different.

Everyone, after Hegel, seems to wish to rid themselves of Kantian dualism. But we see how the issue arises all over again in a new form, and no dialectic argument will come to the rescue. That said, this is probably a better introduction to Hegel bar none, it is simply that we can’t vouch for muddled hybrids here. Austere Kantian-style thinking is as far as we get. The point is that you are on your own if you try to Hegelianize this model. It won’t work.

We should note that our approach sets straight the vexed question of ‘embedded rationality’ (we won’t use that phrase) that Hegel and Marx both struggled with, and keeping our distance is a better way to clarify a classic discourse that went awry, as seen in the confusions of the Hegelian ‘The rational is the real’, and the over-hypostatized concept of Reason in history. The relation of eonic determination to free action allows a decisive recasting in better form of that famous phrase that blew up on the launch pad.[ii]

We should let history do Hegel, rather than Hegel history, to reconstruct the spectacular moment to which he gave expression, next to his political and other discourse. Hegel is often dismissed, but one should be wary of the usual one-line dismissals that seldom ring true. Our ‘evolution of freedom’ seems to echo Hegel, but the thematic is different. Just a warning, you cannot create hybrids here with the eonic model. The problem is that you will ‘understand’ Hegel faster with the eonic model than with Hegel’s texts, even though our treatment is different. The eonic model gives us a way to restate the ‘evolution of freedom’ argument in a non-Hegelian fashion.

Hegel couldn’t see the eonic effect. And his mythology of ‘geist’ is a fairy tale, and not a form of explanation, plays with an extra queen against more sober labors of historical science, and Hegel has no way to connect his system to empirical history in our sense. Poised between Spinoza and Kant, Hegel is altogether provocative, the Dembski of German classical philosophy. Hegel applies the (Spinozistic?) argument by design to the evolution of freedom, but we claim that the better approach is to remain nearer to the Kantian version, if only because our empirical series is finite and not subject to universal generalizations. If you stoop to the design approach, the search for historical structure stops, and Hegel misses the eonic effect, the data still premature in any case. By grafting divinity onto the data, first with Spinoza, then with Protestant theology, he left a fairly bloodthirsty Big Devil in the midst of church services, and electrocuted a lot of Marxists. Small wonder the philosopher Schopenhauer saw a problem here.

The question, for us, is simple. The data we are dealing with is easy to analyze if we assume that we don’t see the mechanism. This suggests the noumenal/phenomenal approach toward our representations of history. But the point is that Hegel’s Spinozistic theology can force our back to the wall: he has taken up our offer for extensions to the nth god name sequence.

Our occasional use of the term dialectic follows standard historical usage as common parlance, next to the Kantian usage in his first critique, e.g. the ‘dialectic of illusion’. That is, a dialectical approach to an argument looks at its thesis and antithesis, and this often shows an historical context. We take ‘dialectic’ as an historical ‘debate’ in motion, etc,… An historical review, as eonic data, of dialectical thought, viz. Hegelian dialectic, is then appropriate, but the slight ‘meta’ in this is something different from adopting dialectical reasoning. To reject ‘dialectic’ would seem ill advised indeed. We will be quickly forced to reinvent such and we could call it ‘dialogical zigzag’, the branching of logical argument. Our synchronous spectrum in the Axial Age is as much ‘dialectic’ as we can handle, but we need a new terminology

We have a problem, and we are stuck with a Newtonian systems model, and the idea of freedom, but we will persist in our positivistic ways using only period analysis and dumb Aristotelian logic instead of some grand dialectic (a tactic that will backfire, to be sure). The discrete freedom sequence is an empirical object. A Kantian philosophy of history exists, but is concealed in other forms. Thus we might note that the philosophy of Schopenhauer contains an inverted ‘philosophy of history’ that gives a new a different clue to the mysteries of Hegel, and we see the difficulty of any strategy of advancing into the unknown with a new metaphysics. Why was Schopenhauer so critical of Hegel, and who got it right? Is it not odd that in the wake of Kant one fellow goes toward Christianity, the other toward Buddhism?

Hegel is beguiling, but many have often felt a sense of unease about Hegel’s method, something awry. Hegel can be mesmerizing, but the problem is not hard to find. A close look shows teleology mixed up with economic self-organization, the cunning of reason. That won’t work, and we see the clear differentiation of two levels, separating economic and another ‘universal’ history. Marx starts tearing his hair, what’s going on here? Hegel is clear on one point, divinities are dangerous devils, this one crushes millions under its boot. Monotheism is a dangerous genre. We can see the snafu arising in Hegel’s discourse on the ‘rational as real’. Follow the eonic model, but without this phrase, considering our two levels which preempt the endless problems Hegel ended up with using his phrase. Our distinction of eonic determination and free action will never allow us to either kiss the donkey of Prussian statism nor fail to see the splendor in slapstick comedy (tragedy).

We can see at once the problem in his teleological generalizations incorrectly matched to historical facts. Why are Julius Caesar and Napoleon world historical individuals? How connect them to world spirit? Something very basic is wrong with Hegel’s thinking here, and the indulgence in ‘geist’ has confused him. Caesar liquidated the very freedom Hegel seems to find germane to the core issue. Our model will clarify this example immediately. After all the trouble of challenging Newton on teleology, the results were fated to be ‘error’, which does not subtract from the interest in the attempt. But in the end Hegel resembles the design theorists and wishes to introduce a second queen onto the chessboard, making anything easy to explain.[iii]

One always suspects something ‘behind the scenes’ with Hegel. He is really an early traveler in an early version of the current New Age movement. His dialectic is a version (quite sophisticated) of primordial involutionary triadism, ‘something we’ve seen before’. Is there any indication in the literature? One casts about for some source. Whence does this come? A clue lies at the beginning of Karl Lowith’s From Hegel to Nietzsche, a reference to the Rose Cross. Does Hegel have any connection to something along these lines? The recent Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition has done our work for us. We see the exact correspondence to this occult tradition. So our wariness about dialectic is confirmed, and one can be a bit appalled Leftists are using ‘negation of the negation’ to plot against governments. Hegel’s system starts to seem suspicious thus. But then again Hegel, and this is significant, is far and away better at ‘involutionary triadism’ that those promoting the endless junk in this field. Later we will reference a Samkhya version of this. These traditions are sometimes very careful if they invoke the ‘spirit n’, where Hegel is content to construct a myth.

To conclude, this isn’t even criticism of the much maligned Hegel. One could wager the eonic model makes better sense of Hegel than Hegel himself. He is beautiful the way he is, and stands with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Marx as one of the Sphinxes cast in timeless granite left by our modern transition. Once we have set up a framework we can reopen the question of Hegel. A prime task of the eonic model must be to be good stewards of the evidence, and this episode of German philosophy so heavily correlated with the eonic effect is spectacular, but might lead to a loss of critical thinking in the name of critical thinking. Nothing in Hegel’s experience could have matched our discrete-continuous model, therefore the terms are not transferable. Our model T ‘idea for a universal history’ proceeds, coughing smoke, just by and by Hegel as we gaze on an archaeological monument of some magnificence.

Marx, self-enriching alienation, teleology There is a remarkable resemblance in some forms of Marxist historical theory to our idea of a discrete-continuous model, i.e. a series of stages of history (with a critical difference). The problem is that the stages are given labels, content, when what we find in the eonic model are simple stages, like computer cycles set by a clock, or recursions of one and the same process of ‘evolution’, like intermittent computational time. The transition from feudalism to capitalism in the rise of the modern was a great idea that turned out to not really work, and we notice from our data and model that transitions out of ‘feudalism’ seem to have happened repeatedly! Instead of stages we will have, once done, an ‘eonic’, i.e. on-off, series or ‘eonic sequence’, of no inherent content save what the locality of transformation has to offer in place. Whatever is in the mainline of the eonic sequence tends to transformation. Thus the ‘modern’ stage is simply a transition to a new era in which capitalism is transformed by the Industrial Revolution into a civilization with a particular economic timbre and industrial organization. This economic system is the characteristic of that stage, but can be changed at any time, since it is not a fixed stage. And a ‘capitalist’ economic system has no inherent status as ‘historical law’, i.e. ethical variations given to it by the individual void value-free mechanics. The difference in our model will be that the discrete series model simply switches off in the present and says nothing. Criticizing Marx can be tricky because he packaged a bit of Hegel into an economic model but with a claim on the future, teleology. Whatever our respect for Marx, his model is flawed, even as he struggles with one aspect of our eonic effect. But every time you refute him he floats back to the surface like a rubber duck in a tub. Each time that happens, bad theory gets in the way all over again.

This connects to the dangers of teleology in the Marx/Hegel thought systems. And Marxism has suffered fatal hybrid confusions here. For example, the ‘self-alienation’ of spirit in Hegel becomes the alienation of labor via Feuerbach. All well and good. The problem is that a series of assumptions seems to pass between the two systems, Hegelian fleas, and the mood of the slaughterbench sacrifice enters into Marx’s own account of the ‘stage of capitalism’, after the stage of slavery. And it seeps into the Marxist version with a cryptic use of teleological thinking. Finally the alienation seems to justify ‘alienation as self-enriching’ capitalism, exploitation is a necessary, perhaps permanent, stage of history. At the very least, we can demand the non-existent formal proof in a sound model for this kind of thinking that began with a myth about self-alienation of spirit. The answer to Marx is Marx. If you plan on a leap into freedom, don’t wait for the final stage. Start today, anyhow. There are no viable theories or religions of sacrifices man is forced to endure on the way to a better future.

Without being unreasonable about Marx’s essential point, it is an important quibble to suggest that Marx in one sense might be more ‘bourgeois’ than the bourgeoisie and in any case in principle indifferent to the issues raised by inexorable transitions between stages. Idealistic liberals with a fondness for Marx forget what he said, whether he meant it or not. It is undoubtedly a difficult question, but the issue that concerns us is the sloppy use of ‘laws’ without proof. There are no such stages. This is no small matter since at the point of Stalinist accelerated catch up development of a capitalist economy the justification of outright tyranny arises from assumptions about a system of stages in question.[iv]

The real issue in terms of the eonic sequence is to ask if the discrete freedom sequence actually produced freedom in the passage from macro-action to micro-action, and by what definition. Nothing in our model speaks of the mideonic outcomes of the general sequence. It is not a question of economic systems evolving but of the creation of democracies from republics. If Marx asks whether that democracy was genuine, then we can as easily consider the creation of socialisms (real democracies) from such republics.