

Last and First men

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1848+:

*Capitalism, Communism,
And the End of History*

John C. Landon

South Fork Books

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



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PREFACE...AND FUGUE

Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the Kingdom of God.

Matthew 19:24

This is the first edition of *Last and First Men: 1848+: Capitalism, Communism, and the End of History*, a companion volume to *Descent of Man Revisited*. The book is a complement to that text's perspective on human evolution, and amplifies some of the ideas from that book, and from *World History and The Eonic Effect* (WHEE). The echo of Olaf Stapleton is deliberate. A further book is projected, *Enigma of the Axial Age*, an abridged fifth edition to WHEE, to create a simpler introduction to the issues of history and evolution. *Last and First Men* will attempt to clarify the confusion over the 'end of history' ideology that has been a deceptive mainstay of the neoliberal age. The questions of revolution in the early modern, the emergence of democracy followed by the prophetic intimations of socialism and communism are immensely clarified when seen in the context of the new model of history proposed in the earlier books, and further developed here. We need to traverse a mysterious terrain: the connection

of historical dynamics to the emergence of freedom. The question of this dynamic, then, is not merely that of causality, but a 'dialectic', or dyad of causality and freedom. This makes the ideal of value-free scientific laws ambiguous. The Idea of Freedom is itself a dynamical object: its appearance shows mysterious timing. It is this kind of issue that animated the original Hegelian insight into the question of history. Fukuyama's camouflaged use of this idea behind a Nietzschean front was misleading. Sneaking in the historical inevitability of capitalism into this thinking falsified the whole idea.

This is not, then, and never was, grounds for a teleological endorsement of capitalism. The whole point of the socialist revision of democratic revolution was that if capitalism comes to dominate democracy, then it is no longer democracy at all, and fails as the 'end of history'! In the process we can





Fig. 1 Captain Nemo

critique the left's confusion over evolutionary issues, and connect this with the notion of 'last and first men' both echoing and challenging a Nietzschean idea of the 'last man'. The original insights of Marx/Engels need to be rescued from nineteenth century positivism. The question suffers a devastating clarity capitalist minds must repress. The record of 'primitive accumulation' in an extended sense makes nonsense of the idea of private property as plunder of the commons. The status quo is kleptocracy.

In fact the echo of Olaf Stapleton blows the Nietzschean phrase away. The terms 'last' and 'first' men should be exercised in multiple interpretations, to make a start on a difficult mystery, a future understanding. We will

constantly play with the terms, but then leave them alone, undefined. Evidently, *homo erectus*, *sapiens* are the first and last men, or else the other way around, the last and first hominids. Or else the first men have yet to appear. Our study of the macro effect is that of once and future speciation: the species Man has yet to appear. *Nota bene*: the term *homo sapiens* is a case of giving yourself an award. This creature may only be a spinoff of *homo erectus*.

This discussion is appropriate for the issue of capitalism's future, and the strangely prophetic timing in the appearance of 'communism'. This development needs to be seen in terms of the democratic revolutions, and



Prime Objective This book attempts to see what light the so-called macro model can throw on the emergence of the communist idea next to the democratic revolutions, with an expectation of creating a better model for the left than historical materialism, which, however, will be left as is, as an event inside the larger model as an outline of world history. The strategy is to replace theories with chronicles

that show empirical evidence of any given dynamic. This includes the dynamic that produced historical materialism in a meta-system that also generates ideologies.

This can help to see the larger context of modernity, and beyond that, world history itself. In addition a perspective of Postdarwinism should illuminate the result. The praxis of figures like Marx/Engels can remain intact, along with their critiques of class struggle, and economic ideology. There is no reason to suppress the spiritual dimension of communism in the name of nineteenth century scientism, positivism and materialism. The macro model is also very suited to an ecological critique in an extension of the idea of communism. The macro model transcends distinctions of spiritual/material, sacred/secular. As with its invocation of Prometheus by Marx, the left always had a spiritual instinct, and that myth is apt in the context of the rightist appropriations of the initially revolutionary religions of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.

their problematical economism. The capitalist machine on *laissez-faire* autopilot has been turned into the core of historical dynamism, and the perspective is false. Another choice of subtitle here was: 'Globalization, Postcapitalism, and the End of History'. But since we really mean a 'new communism' beyond the old the terms 'communism/postcapitalism' can serve as placeholders. We might take the warning of those who witnessed the birth of modern capitalism. The red light warning turned on almost immediately. For many the legacy of communism is too extreme. But if we do nothing else we can at least dispose of the 'end of history' sleight of hand that has been one of the most dangerous pieces of propaganda in the whole conflict of ideologies.

The book has its own website, last-and-first-men.com, and the blog, at redfortyeight.com, long used to showcase a notion of 'last and first men' in a figure of the year 1848 (originally a netbook by the same name, still online at history-and-evolution.com/lfm.htm), will be used as a book blog for this rendering, now completely rewritten, of that netbook. The family of blogs including, *Darwiniana*, animate the signatures of the 'Captains nemini/nemo' group, /nemonemini at [history and evolution.com](http://historyandevolution.com). As a youth every kid on my block was Captain Nemo: that shows the importance of team work, a job for the 'little rascals'. Nemini is the plural of nemo, in pig latin. Nemo and the sea-beast are sometimes archetypally made one and/or seen as alien messengers, the leviathan or c-beast at lightspeed. Diagnosis? hyparchic future shock! But what is hyparxis?

The book attempts to create a new model of history as a context for a new recasting of revolutionary communism.

Statement of the problem...

The path toward communism is considered to be a marxist project. But the two key components, historical materialism and value theory are theories with problems, and inhibit activism rather than implement it. They tend to detract from the cogency of the critique of political economy given by Marx, Engels and others. Leftists have better things to do than equivocate these theories. The solution proposed here is to step out of theory to a larger superset of a new historical model with a project of the philosophy of history mediating the issue of a science of history. In fact that was one of the original tracks from Rousseau-Kant to Hegel to Marx. Instead of a theory of history, we can adopt a simple chronicle of the visible epochs of world history. And this includes a warning about theories of evolution, beside those of history. The resulting model is useful in the background but not required to


If one of the First Men could enter the world of the Last Men, he would find many things familiar and much that would seem strangely distorted and perverse. But nearly everything that is most distinctive of the last human

“This book has two authors, one contemporary with its readers, the other an inhabitant of an age which they would call the distant future. The brain that conceives and writes these sentences lives in the time of Einstein. Yet I, the true inspirer of this book, I who have begotten it upon that brain, I who influence that primitive being’s conception, inhabit an age which, for Einstein, lies in the very remote future.”

species would escape him. Unless he were to be told that behind all the obvious and imposing features of civilization, behind all the social organization and personal intercourse of a great community, lay a whole other world of spiritual culture, round about him, yet beyond his ken, he would no more suspect its existence than a cat in London suspects the existence of finance or literature.

Olaf Stapleton, *Last and First Men*

Stapleton, as in the inset box, betrays the repeated feeling of sci-writers of communicating with the future. Nonsense?



Hyparctic Future Shock

The entirely apt (scratchpad) idea of hyparxis suggests a solution to the ‘eerie silence’ noted by the physicist Paul Davies. Bennett’s idea of action from the virtual future puts the ‘c beast’ into the ‘nemo zone’. Cf. the ‘tongue in cheek’ <http://darwiniana.com/2012/09/29/c-beast-and-light-speed/> “there is a solid rumor that the ‘aliens’ have already arrived, bypassed *homo sapiens*, and established contact with cetacean species: Moby Dick was a alien counterattacking against the predatory whaling industry.” Sorry, wrong number, ..some sort of cover story...

The other subtext, Hobbesian Leviathan...

The point: was emergent Christianity subject to hyparctic influence? The idea of hyparxis, if outlandish at first, can help to understand the confusions of ‘end times’ eschatology that pervade monotheism, and reenter the ‘end of history’ propagandas. Neo-communism will end up that category: catacomb revolt against insuperable empire...




Fig 3. World Map, figments

proceed as we graduate to a simple outline of world history, where free agents can master economies beyond the propaganda of their historical inevitability. There is no stage of history that is capitalist. However the model can clarify the ‘end of history’ nonsense as a teleological potential toward freedom in a system driven by cyclical recurrence. That says nothing about capitalism, which may decrease the freedom of the majority for a minority. A distinction of ‘system action’ and ‘free action’ allows human autonomy to become dominant as system evolution goes dormant in the emergence of ‘free history’. A model is not a theory but a work in progress based on an outline. Dynamical hypotheses can be assessed as advice to action. But action is according to circumstance, not theory.

Our basic account needs to be short. The original Chapter 3 is now an Appendix. The reader can therefore consider the *Preface* through Chapters 2 the core of the book.

Having created a model we will be wary of using it, and begin with an outline of world history as a practical and ultra simple default version that would make a robust philosophy of history for the revolutionary communist futurism that emerges in the wake of the French Revolution. The model can be kept in the background as a warning against the delusive tenets of ‘flat history’. But the model will roto-rooter historical materialism and leave a clear historical gaze beyond theories. The distinction of ‘system action’ and ‘free action’ is crucial, and the character of social action will change in the wake of the divide. Our model will make it OK to pass between ‘flat histories’ (now called ‘Big Histories’) and ‘Grand (meta) Narratives’.

The value of the ‘macro model’ is that it defaults to a robust outline of history with the dynamical argument subsumed into a chronicle. This makes it a useful tool to study world history with, or without theories. No political movement should commit to a brittle theory that will be subject to dialectical demolition. The macro model survives such treatment handily and has a robust ‘bounce’ factor.

No general theory is possible for world history. We can simply proceed with our chronicle, and bring in elements of the model as hypotheses, or




Fig. 4 The Factory

Marx's impact can only be compared to that of religious figures like Jesus or Mohammed...

Peter Singer, *Marx: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2001).

The problem is that 'historical materialism' is too one-dimensional to compete with the legacy of the religions founded by those two figures, whose work gestated in the wake of the Axial Age. The comparison thus backfires. But the problem is merely the momentary phasing of the age of the post-Hegelian Feuerbach.

A larger framework is required for a 'new communism', some connection with religion and spirituality, notwithstanding the powerful legacy of the era of Feuerbach: we can see that German classical philosophy and its climax in Hegel as an heir to the Reformation is the larger dimension to the question of religion and secularism. No pious strain is required for this: the crude dimensions of the scifi readers can feed the suspicions of the stranded materialist. Or a gaze cast on the recasting by Schopenhauer of the Upanishadic psychology. The spiritual mood of modernity, beside the cult of atheist scientism that claimed the generation of Marx and Engels, is better taken as a sprawl of ragged hypotheses, explorations, and conversions, from the sudden and timely flood of New Age formations to the 'roughage' of secularism in action, including the occult and science fiction. The questions of theology thus endure a post-Reformation and a passage to a new age of spiritual thought. The theism/atheism debate is intractable, and deserves a simple agnosticism.

A brief look at the sufi J. G. Bennett can be a reminder that theology has lost the question of the demiurgic powers embedded in nature. Man is destined to enter this phase of the cosmic, but is stalled, frozen in fake civilizations that control his consciousness. The issue is closer to science fiction than theology, and it is not an issue of faith or belief. Although the metaphysics of such things is intractable, the suspicion grows that man is converging on an extended science that can understand the spiritual hypotheses of the ancients. The issue cannot advance if man is unaware of his potential consciousness.

In any case, the issue of human evolution is beyond the capacity of current science, and a studied agnosticism with a brief of spiritual hypotheses can add some vitamins to the barren field of historical materialism.

even hunches. In this framework a new study of economic history can examine the emergence of economic systems, basically state economies, emerging market economies, and globalization effects. Peculiar constructs like 'feudalism' or 'oriental despotism' can be introduced on an *ad hoc* basis. The emergence of modern capitalism, paired with revolutionary communism in embryo, is a spectacular effect at the point of the modern divide. There is no stage of history that is capitalist. From the rise of the state in ancient Egypt and Sumer the situation is always a hybrid of external markets and state economies. We never see a pure stage of capitalism. The attempt to create one in modern times is a dangerous utopian fantasy, now reaching its endgame.

Thus, to this storyline we can bring a series of hunches, hypotheses, suspicions:

The evidence shows the smoking gun evidence of derandomization, and clear intermittency. Earlier history is misleading: we see an imbalance of scale: the Axial Age, and modernity transform the world in three century bursts. We must be missing something in earlier eras!

The model warns us that world history shows a teleological process, one that we cannot easily reify. The overall result suggests directionality, thence teleology. We cannot fully resolve teleological questions unless we are 'outside of history', or at its conclusion.

The rise of the modern has a larger context in world history as an 'axis' point. Its Eurocentric focus is illusory: the 'macro' effect is a global phenomenon. This era shows the cascade of democratic revolutions, then turning into a communist challenge to realize democracy in the context of capitalism.

This concludes the *Preface*: we can detour through a series of musings, before we begin in the next chapter, to which the reader might now turn.

Notes

The remainder of this preface will be the labor of a magpy, an attempt to see beyond the legacy of historical materialism, casting it in the context of religious, new age, speculative, postdarwinian, and/or fringe alien/scifi 'extravagance', thereby creating a superset of the somewhat frozen Marxist




Fig 5. Gothic ruins

The left is trying to replace religion with historical materialism. It can hardly hope to succeed. In reality it needs to 'get religion in a hurry'. But for such an endeavor haste would be the worst approach. As the blog *Darwiniana* suggested, the solution is to initiate the 'virtual church of the Holy Brick', trowel and mortar ready for the t-o moment of the 'foundation stone', with a Cancel button to the right of the high altar. Bad religions are dime a dozen. Be prepared to hit Cancel and try again. Pause and reflect, forever...That moment can be endlessly delayed to the far future as with the waiting of Sheherazade.

All that is needed to bypass religious fanatics is a project of historical study of religious history and anthropology,

a neutral dialectic beyond material/spiritual, but with, not a spiritual faith, but a spiritual hypothesis, a project of meditation in action, and a robust Kantian before Hegelian critique of metaphysics. As Hegel noted, the secular conclusion to the Reformation was German Classical philosophy, a useful resource, and 'tavern of ruin' in the sufi phrase. A spot of evolutionary science fiction might help, to see that *homo sapiens* emerged into a real yet still primitive spiritual state. All this is connected to the 'hyparchic' future which leads the tales of Sheherazade in a virtual conclusion...Or something to that effect. Christians spoke most cleverly with a 'revolutionary' political metaphor of the 'Kingdom of Heaven', mysteriously guided from the virtual future to...that final theocratic realization in time of a universal church. Perhaps that temporal realization of the ending was false. But the simple mechanics of this movement visible over time is spectacular, and a format with infinite potential: a secular version comes with a simple reshuffle of the deck. This 'religion' thus already exists and is already the case for the 'prophetic eschatological' left, now converging on a global Commune in a phase of postcapitalism.

Mix the mortar or press 'Cancel'

canon in a new descant on ‘universal history’. This flourish should occasion only the briefest outrage, and actually leaves that canon untouched, yet hopefully with a less hypnotic hold as dogmatism, at a time of crisis. Evidently we must resort to string theory to unify these subjects.¹

In a more sober vein the so-called ‘macro’ model can put the issues of marxism in a more sophisticated context than that of the anemic materialism of the generation of Marx. We should also consider the issues of religion in world history. No belief is required here, simply a sense of how misleading materialism can be. Spiritual metaphysics is usually worse. More directly, the larger context of the Reformation, the evolution of religion, and German Classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel, beside the Scientific Revolution and the rise of economics, is the larger dimension of the constricted ideology of the nineteenth century left. It is useful to consider the implication of science fiction in the ideas of the virtual future and this idea has a useful rendering in various new age sources, such as the writer J. G. Bennett’s idea of the hyparchic future.

More specifically, this book is the result of a number of requests/questions to clarify the ambiguities over the issue of democracy and communism as portrayed in WHEE, in the process suggesting how this new model of history could clarify the issues of evolution, revolution and modernity, and the place of emergent democracy and communism in that context. Reading the conclusion to WHEE, the question arose, could this approach to history create a new historicism for the communist project?

The basic question is easily answered: the ‘new model of history’ in WHEE would make a superb superset for an historicism of emergent communism in the wake of the revolutionary early modern. We can leave historical materialism as an event inside this model, and let the focus gradually shift to a larger context.²

This includes looking at the issues of religion, revolutionary action, and the Axial Age. An additional query was posed as to the idea of the virtual future, as in the hyparxis of the thinker J. G. Bennett. The idea of hyparxis

1 Brian Greene, *The Hidden Reality* (Vintage, 2011), Jim Baggott, *Farewell to Reality* (Pegasus, 2013).

2 We are deliberately using/redefining the old Marx-bashing term ‘historicism’ created by Popper, viz. in his *The Poverty of Historicism*: a treatment of history that answers to the deterministic fallacy.

Bennett on human evolution

Our study of world history and its relationship to human evolution is consistently pegged to a kind of 'systems' model, which is entirely neutral, in the end, on design arguments. So let us face the reality of 'design' arguments in human evolution. Here the New Age Sufi and mathematician J.G. Bennett hypothesized a new perspective on the evolution of man in terms echoing our brief statement on design in nature, demiurgic powers, and their influence on human evolution, and human history. There is so much crackpot literature here that Bennett's brand, almost sober by contrast, can be used as a lightning rod on the subject. The problem is the extreme difficulty of correctly depicting the human 'body-mind', let alone producing a theory of its evolution. The question of language, but one of the 'simpler' of the enigmas is in fact 'absolutely hard', and, in general, the consciousness of man is a complex instrument that arises as a potential for man to realize. That makes a standard theory difficult, and here we find Bennett's claim that between *homo erectus* and *homo sapiens* arises a new dimension of 'self-consciousness' related to a mode of 'creative action' and the 'emergence of mind' as more than brain, and that man's unstable and intoxicated manifestations of this consciousness, next to the stabilizing legacies visible in the primordial origins of such religions as Buddhism. And here Bennett claims the direct action of 'demiurgic powers', perhaps even emerging as 'avatars' among men to direct his early evolution. The relationship of evolutionary action and hyparchic futures is in general a new type of speculation, stumbled on by scifi writers, but generally absent in the lunatic fringe genres on this subject.

One thing is clear, the question of human evolution is related to the issues of consciousness in its extended sense, as a cosmic reality beyond bodies, the nature of mind and body, the existence or not of alien life, and some solution to the alien visitation mythology that animates fringe literature, and, in disguise, the Old Testament.

(never actually used in WHEE) is not properly founded in science, but can be usefully studied on its own by hypothesis, but will not be used beyond this preface. The point is that directionality suggests teleology which induces real insight or else hallucinations about action from the future. The emergence of historical materialism is then an emergent process in the larger model, and can be sublated to a larger system multitasking several outcomes of the modern transition. Teleology is a 'hard' problem: we should not presume its solution. But a finite transition model gives a unique insight into one approach. It satisfies an 'antinomy of teleological judgment': 'yes there is, no there is not a teleological x...'

However the so-called 'macro model' is itself controversial and will generate its own dialectic. All well and good. But a model is not a theory, but an insight/hypothesis. It creates a 'way of looking' at world history that can

uncover a suspected hidden dynamic, and, minimally, a focus on a bare empiricism. The user will quickly detect the lego blocks used to create the model, or alternates. You can let the model suffer being torn to pieces by critics, and the result is more or less the same: the model will remain as a simple outline/chronicle, and a set of questions, or hypotheses. It is never safe to introduce teleology into historical analysis. The only thing worse is its absence. We simply sideline the issue as a question about our historical chronicle. This model help to create a safe passage through such confusions.

Powerful but anonymous (witness the myth of Prometheus) spiritual forces have always stood behind the emergence of modernity, its democratic revolutions, thence communism, and wished to give it a new existence as a vehicle of the cultural future. We should not forget that the emergence of revolutionary communism was in the context of the Reformation, and the English Civil War. The postmodern or anti-modern reactionary views of too many spiritual groups are decidedly misinformed. And the secular humanism that took speed from the more anti-religious French Revolution



Fig. 6 Prometheus carrying fire

The Pseudoscience Wars, Big History, the Macro Effect

Michael Gordin in *The Pseudoscience Wars: Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe*, provides an important study of 'fringe literature', but the problem is that the standard of judgment cannot be 'scientific' if the 'pseudoscience' (as we will discover) of Darwinian selectionist theory, a notable crackpot theory, is taken as the measure. In fact it is worth comparing Velikovskysy's strange theory (of historical collision) with the evidence of the Axial Age and the generalization to the 'macro effect'. Is this 'pseudoscience'? The evidence is clear. In fact, the method lies in empirical demonstration. The attempt to give history a scientific foundation with Big History is thus problematical, although a good foundation for our study, if the method can be rescued from scientism. Spier, *Big History and the Future of Humanity* (WileyBlackwell, 2011).

Next to Bennett's claims of demiurgic intervention in human evolution, the genre of fringe literature falls into place as a set of distorted myths, on a par with the 'empirical content of the *Iliad*' as to historical figures: The 'fallen angels' thematic is misunderstood by its own proponents, and diverges into myth and the 'fantastic'.

Scott Roberts, *Rise and Fall of the Nephilim: the untold story of fallen angels, giants of the earth, and their extraterrestrial origins* (New Page, 2012) is a typical item in the fringe literature showing the obstacles to really understanding human evolution. We reject such books, but a theory such as Darwinism is not less crackpot.

To put these books in perspective consider the case of the figure with whom Bennett associated, Gurdjieff, who openly proclaimed his own 'demonic' cast, and told a thinly veiled tale of earthly reincarnations, symbolized by a rocket ship, and this gives us an idea of what these details are distortions of, perhaps. The ancient legends here are invariably distortions, but we can guess, with a good dose of skepticism, early equivalents of sufistic figures. Fallen angels are thus no myth. They have been spotted in the twentieth century, comnen with sufi credentials.

was too lame, and lost all sense in the coming of positivism.

Jesus made very clear that he was an ur-Communist. And the association of Protestantism with capitalism in the early modern, pace Weber, leads immediately to dialectical reversal. What stance should the left take to religions such as Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism? We leave the questions unanswered, but with a larger context created by the model that makes no distinction of material or spiritual. This will prevent the false conflict of materialist debunking of 'religion', which must be assessed on its own terms. The model, in the context of the Axial Age, suggests the descendant religions of that period will encounter the dynamics of modernity with difficult conflicts, but move to overlap the early centuries of a new age period. The process can be intuited from the immense laboratory of the Axial period, before, during, after.



Fig.7 Hobbes' *Leviathan*,
frontispiece

The connection to a spiritual dimension can degenerate into delusion, not least among monotheists. Man is not alone, but he has no simple connection to the spiritual domain. Historical materialism was a failed effort to clamp down the lid on Pandora's box. There is no reward, and much potential delusion,

for taking a spiritual dimension on faith, and a considerable penalty to its negation. A careful agnosticism is better than the futile effort to enforce atheism on those attempting to deal with economic issues. But historical materialism enabled an earlier generation to break the spell of reactionary religious forms. Until the blessed day that *homo sapiens* steps out of the superman comic into the overman as occult expert man's spiritual communications will remain nil, on the level with inklings of the spirits of the dead. The left cannot resolve the religions of this superstitious ape by materialistic fiat. That said, materialism is in part a reaction to the monotheistic extravagance that arose from the Axial period. In any case evolutionary accounts of man can't seem to grasp that *homo erectus* to become overman enters the dimension of soul, and ends up as *homo sapiens*, a superstitious ape. *Homo sapiens* was supposed to be the overman, the first

The Last Man of German Classical Philosophy:

Nietzsche, Darwin, and the *Genealogy of Morals*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Genealogy_of_Morality

Nietzsche's position in modern thought is hard to untangle, and he is often subject to overvaluation: he comes at the end of the phase of German Classical philosophy and steals the show in a very dangerous way, the last man with a literary style takes all. This fellow is misleading, and his fans may never read Kant or, especially, Schopenhauer, the direct source of Nietzsche's theme of the 'will', but in a reduction of the 'will' to the 'will to power' and in a framework of scientism. Nietzsche's mistakes mixed with his genius



Fig. 8 Nietzsche

make him an intoxicating 'poor devil' asking some good questions about the evolution of morality. But the answers he gives don't work, given the Darwinian context, and that of Lange, an obvious but strangely low-ball influence for such an intelligent thinker.

The effect is to 'demolish' Kant, but only for the last men! It is perhaps Kant that Nietzsche must reckon with, because the question of morality cannot find a resolution in scientism. Nietzsche is right, in one way: religion has not resolved the morality question, and Kant's is the first real attempt of any coherence! Kant's transcendental deduction is a truer measure of the evolution of superintelligence...

Our study of the Axial Age will help to see where Nietzsche is going wrong: behind it lurks the confusion over Indo-Europeans, intelligence (and its confusion with IQ), and a false evaluation of Israelite and thence Christian historicisms, with a disastrous misreading of 'barbarian genius'. The *Iliad* is a great masterpiece of 'barbarian' art, no doubt, but it was a production of the Axial transformation in parallel to the Israelite. His study of Greek tragedy remains a *tour de force*, but has he understood it? Perhaps Nietzsche has a point: is civilization degrading the intelligence of external peoples? Peter Watson in *The German Genius* (Harper, 2010) documents the spectacular flourishing of 'German genius', but note how much it is all timed to the 'modern transition, the 'great divide', to use the terminology of the 'macro effect'. Nietzsche is at the tail end of that, and his anxiety over 'decadence' is entirely apt.

Nietzsche's relation to Darwin gets more confusing with each book:

Dan Stone, *Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain* (Liverpool UP, 2002).

John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (Oxford, 2004)

Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor* (Cambridge, 2006)

Dirk R. Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* (Cambridge, 2010)

Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany* (McMillan, 2006)

And then the music stops:

Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology* (NYU, 1993). Abir Taha, *Nietzsche: Prophet of Nazism: The Cult of the Superman* (Bloomington: Author House, 2005).

man. Somehow his very original sins got in the way.

The connection of communism and religion is simple to describe, hard to realize: man must recover his captured 'will', and master the place of freedom in political totalizations, the *Leviathan* of Hobbes. Last and first men indeed. The reactionary character of religious formations is an anomaly. One might consult the New Testament on the rich to conclude the obvious. Spiritual sources are forced to seek new outlets to bypass frozen churches. The quite different symbolism in scifi (and sufi lore) of the alien Leviathan is clearly connected (we might guess) to the *Ichthus* symbolism in early (revolutionary) Christianity, and connects with the idea of the 'hyparchic future'. We should recall the brief appearance and rapid self-destruction of ancient democracy. It was pronounced a utopian failure. Let us learn the lesson here, and forestall this fate for the first born of democracy, the communist idea.

We must note also the multiple associations of the occult Leviathan nexus, of which there are several. The history of modern socialism turned fascist is one tale of the collisions of these 'cetacean' totalitarians. Who were the culprits in proto-nazi German occultism? Rogue buddhas? The idea of revolutionary Christianity emerging with a relation to the hyparchic future is one for which the author could not vouch, but it is nonetheless a compelling thought nexus. The unwritten history of the Buddhist movement is still another of these stealth svengalis.

Fishbowl of Leviathans A Hobbesian metaphor is apt, where a Hobbesian psychology may not work. The human individuality is not easy to define and is not a purely space-time 'material object' or biological organism and has a timeless component. The abstract sovereign threatens to be Capital itself. The era of postcapitalism requires a global federation of semi-autonomous entities, with an 'indifference' level below which a degree of anarchist free activity balances the overall system.³

The format of Leviathan misses the absence of any social contract in the formation of capitalist domination. Marx's idea of 'primitive accumulation' is a reminder that property relations based on plunder of the commons are finally void in the reestablishment of an endstate. The fiction of private property reduces capitalism to kleptocracy.

Armed with historical materialism the older left was willingly blind to the

3 C.B. MacPherson in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford University Press, 2011) highlights the narrow individuality of the man defined for classical liberalism. J.G. Bennett suggests the ogdoadic, or eight-term structure of 'individuality' beyond the purely biological. Leviathan principles down-dimension 'man' as a series of subsets of his real nature.

issues of occult mind control. Reactionaries have a dangerous opening to work the unconscious of leftists to induce them to murder their own comrades, a



Fig.9 Philosopher, possibly a dialectician.

The modern left is fixated on a version of the dialectic that produces confusion: a larger context of the 1848 era like a set of Chinese boxes can expand to include the crucial period of the French/Industrial revolutions and the apparition (phenomenology) of German Classical philosophy. This context can expand again to include the era since the Reformation, and then again to include the Axial Age, etc..

yet create a larger historical dimension that can mediate 'theories'. The connection between Marx and Hegel should hint at the larger context of German Classical philosophy, and that in turn to the Reformation and the question of secularism and belief that still haunts modernity. We should interpolate Spinoza into this picture, which is historically complex. Hegel with deep insight asked a question, what is the dialectic? And the answer is an ongoing project. One related to the occult ideas of his time. We might

phenomenon ominously visible in the phase of Stalinism. A new communism must make a sophisticated study of religion. And we should recall that the original Buddhism in Axial India was that of a revolutionary movement challenging the neo-Brahmins.

The issues skirt the exotic, before we begin. Since we have no answers, let there be no questions. But the modern left was always in the prophecy/eschatology business. Yet the historical materialist embraced a willful blindness that made him intolerant and an almost sitting duck next to the dark realities of spirit. If these ideas can be found clarifications, all well and good,the rest is silence, apart from the issue of rocket ships for whales. Let us be done with these musings, and be about our business. This is not a rejection of materialism. The modern mind must follow its theme. But like the ancient *Samkhya* the material can embed the spiritual.

The legacies of historical materialism, dialectical materialism, and the dialectic itself are problematical for the left, and the initiative towards a culture of post-capitalism needs a larger framework, one that our study of macroevolution in world history can provide. The context of the macro model can leave them alone,




Fig. 10 Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit

think in terms of a recoined notion of 'dialogical meta-dialectic' in a regress of 'dialectics', to apply dialectic to itself, as if to find the subject for the first time.

Phenomenologies: The mystery 'spiritual tome' of Hegel is a useful 'religious' plug for the left, as indeed we see in Marx's Hegelian gaze, strange for a materialist. At once a mystery and, pace Schopenhauer, his grave digger, (Zen) rubbish, the strange wonder of this world historical classic forces us to ponder Hegel's descant on the Reformation and the modern transition. Hegel is the only early modern to begin to sense the modern transition. Perusing strange commentaries on this book is also of interest (the

Casper Friedrich cover should work for Hegel's 'cosmic comedic' text, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*).

The issue of history can now be seen as a riddle of macro and microevolution in the action of a mysterious dynamic visible since the Neolithic. This mysterious design can be approached with a simple model, which can be taken under advisement. It creates a new context for the understanding of modern revolutions and the way they shifted gears into socialist and communist projections on the future.

Despite denials, the 'economic interpretation of history' still reigns in social science, and public ideology, even that of the left. If deterministic theories fail, then they fail for claims for the 'historical inevitability' by economic 'laws'. Marx said as much, but his version of historical materialism seems to have been cast in the mode of scientism, that of the nineteenth century. The task of the book is thus simple: make clear that economic systems, such as the capitalist,




Fig. 11 *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution*

Comay, 2011

On Hegel, 'dialectics' and the connection between the French Revolution and German Classical philosophy leading from the Reformation.

Casper David Friedrich: *Grave, Coffin, Owl*

"We watch the French Revolution as we watch a shipwreck at sea from the safety of shore." Herder

Monsters of the Market: The Global Crisis of Capital



Fig. 12 The Octopus,
Frank Norris

The world is now suffering the second major crisis of capitalism in 75 years...The crash that began in 2008 has exploded many beliefs carefully cultivated by academics and massively publicized by business and political leaders via the media subservient to them. The idea that capitalism was no longer subject to crashes with devastating social costs is gone. Richard Wolff, *Capitalism Hits the Fan* (2010).

We live in an age of monsters and the body panics they incite. The global economic crisis that broke over the world in 2008-9 gave an exclamation mark to this claim, with *Time* magazine declaring the zombie 'the official monster of the recession'. David MacNally, *Monsters of the Market: Zombies, Vampires, and Global Capitalism* (2011)

Ideas are long lived, often outliving their originators and taking new different forms. Some ideas live on because they are useful. Others die and are forgotten. But even when they have proven themselves wrong and dangerous, ideas are very hard to kill. Even after evidence seems to have killed them, they keep on coming back. These ideas are neither alive or dead; rather, as Paul Krugman has said, they are undead, or zombie ideas...John Quiggin, *Zombie Economics: How dead ideas still walk among us* (2012).




Fig. 13 “In addressing herself to the semi-paranoid anxieties of Britain’s rulers, Mary Shelley presents them with a Jacobin monster run amok, a microcosm of mass-plebeian upheaval, as the inevitable consequence of their system of oppression.” *Monsters of the Market*, p.100

are human inventions, and not the result of laws of history. We can also look at the classic left in the context of the so-called 'macro model' and its insight into the confusion over the 'end of history', proposed by the philosopher Hegel.

Mastery of the dialectic was to be the great hurrah leading to the New Man's entry to a cosmic logic, the dawn of cosmic consciousness and supermind. The reality is closer to Frodo/Gollum's tale of the 'one ring'. Triangulating good and evil has served only to turn the last men into...poor devils.

We should set straight this question of the 'end of history' (the phrase is almost without meaning), next to the Nietzschean confusions over the overmen, and their evolution. Most of that author's candidates are, strangely, his 'last men'. The current realm of Ayn Rand wannabees is a sad commentary on Nietzsche's ruthless design of setting up the 'last man' as a candidate for superman. Moral: don't be set up by Nietzsche. The predator/prey model applies very well to his fans, the last men. The scifi of the last man begins early, with Mary Shelley's *The Last Man*, already echoing, *L'Homme Dernier* from 1805. All thy titles thou hast given away: a last rewrite of this novel remains as a virtual book.⁴

Hegel never used the term 'end of history' in the sense Fukuyama used it, so the question arises if this term can be grounded in some semantics. The ideology backfired here: if one calls capitalism 'the' end of history, you instead seed the opposite idea, that is, postcapitalism. The hold of economic ideology ceases to be realistic in the extremes to which it is being pushed. As markets let loose begin to destroy a planet, the question may decide itself. The term 'end of history' should refer to some aspect of the teleological, but its meaning is a series of double entendres. The point is here is not the 'end of history' as a terminus, but the Hegelian idea, or a variant, that emerging freedom has a teleological aspect. In the macro model the 'end of history' can be transtemporal, as history approaches it briefly and then possibly regresses.

Clearly the 'end of history' theme is a variant of the 'end times' eschatological tradition which seems to enter Axial monotheism via Zoroastrianism, evidently during the Exile. It resurfaces at once in the modern transition in the thinking of Münzer. A transition to postcapitalism might well echo a pseudo-eschatological one-way ratchet effect, but the meme in general is almost pernicious in the

⁴ Mary Shelley, *The Last Man*: 1826, free Kindle edition, Jean-Baptiste Cousin de Grainville, *L'Homme Dernier*: 1805, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Dernier_Homme." De Grainville was inspired by Milton's epic poem *Paradise Lost*. Where Milton's work featured the first couple, Adam and Eve, de Grainville writes of the last couple – Omegarus and Syderia. Influences from the Biblical Book of Revelation are also seen..."

The work of Marx and Engels in the post-Hegelian generation up to 1848 is an absolute *tour de force*, but also a confusing history.

The tale is told in many works, such as *From Hegel to Marx*, Hook, 1934. Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* of this period have resurfaced...The larger framework of the Kantian revolution, and beyond that the Protestant Reformation, is essential background.

All of which is only another way of saying that...it is our affair... to participate in the redemption by laying aside our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam), and getting to know God as our true and essential self...

Hegel

The Self As God
In German Philosophy

The movement of thought from Kant to Hegel revolved in a fundamental sense around the idea of man's self-realization as a god-like being, or alternatively as God...

Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1964)

Many books on marxism behind the veneer of Cold War cavil actually have useful insights into Marx, as here with Tucker's attack which backfires and exposes the richness of Marx' thinking and that of the generation post Hegel to 1848

The number of critiques of Marx is large and it can be difficult to sort out the counterrevolutionary unconscious in the philosophic assaults on the legacy of 1848. In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels are thoroughly mid-fray. Robert Tucker's useful book is also indicative of the shallowness of much religious thought in the West, even as it raises a number of key points, 'The idea of 'self-

realization' is as old as the Upanishads, and to castigate it in the fashion of Christian theism misses the point that millennia of yogis have come to 'know god as the essential self', almost a cliché of sutric discourse. By contrast Westerners self-destruct in a Mephistophelean melodrama. The damnation scenario of Faustian hybris is altogether characteristic of the narrowness of the lesser Christian canon, which figures such as Kant and Hegel attempt to reinterpret. Kant's distinction of noumenon and phenomenon as aspects of the self likewise goes down in flames, but is as an almost primordial rediscovery of Upanishadic atman/brahman cloaked in the confusions of his ethical theories. But, as Tucker miscasts him, perfectly describes the 'desert of the ego 'in 'ethical' compulsive neurosis.

effects of delusive false prophecy that undermines all forms of temporal realization. What is needed is a genuine and practical postcapitalist globalization that has a temporal foundation. Note how the idea resurfaces in our notion of ‘hyparchic futures’!⁵



THE LION OF THE SEASON.

ALANER FLEMING. "MR. G-G-G-O-O-BELLA!"

Fig. 14. Lion of the Season:
last and first hominids

The future evolution of man is not a brand of capitalist survival of the fittest, in a regime of Nietzschean ‘social darwinist’ eugenics. A foundation of social communism, in a society of free men, must consider the self-evolution of man into man, and in that context the evolution of men as a species. The last shall be first, and the first shall be last. All for one, and one for all. A closer model to the reality of species evolution is something like the path of the bodhisattvas.

The fantasy of some superman superceding *homo sapiens* is not a viable idea, yet. You may transcend your own humanity, and pass beyond man, but that is not evolution. The question of spiritual evolution tends to confuse the terms involved.

A lot of New Age thinking tends to promote the idea that spiritual development or practice is ‘evolution’. But that is not the point. Evolution requires a species change, and a first requirement would be to understand the species change into *homo sapiens*. But we hardly understand that.

If evolution refers to speciation, a ‘new man’ must emerge from a ‘meta-evolution’ unknown to us, one that can transform planetary entities over long periods of time. In any case man as he is has the potential to realize a complex instrument of consciousness, and this came into being as he crossed the threshold of his speciation. Many ideas of ‘spiritual evolution’ are misleading indeed: there is nothing to evolve, and everything to be realized. Already ancient yogis and shamans in the Paleolithic rumored about the mysterious ‘fourth state of man’, turiya, perhaps in the discovery of the one-pointed state, or some extravagance of Paleolithic ur-tantra. It is not clear what new species is required if the potential is already fully evolved. But man as he is can barely understand himself, and much of his history is

⁵ Norman Cohn, *Cosmos, Chaos, and the World to Come* (Yale University Press, 2001).

the record of purely mechanical mind-states. Thus the question of a theory of evolution is a problem for man. The current brand of Darwinian ideology is a toxic legacy.

‘Evolution’ in light of the macro model suggests that a ‘technology’ of evolution must require an ability to act on the level of a planetary surface over intervals of tens of millennia, with the means to scan its results, and induce cultural/organismic changes in a teleological systematics. Current technology is a bit primitive, so far. Proponents of Darwinian economic competition might do well to fold their cards.

We can consider a provocative quotation from Olaf Stapleton’s novel, its intent being to create a background for the quite different focus of the book: the place of the modern left in the context of macroevolution. The mysterious connection to a larger dimension evokes at once the relationship of emergent communism to the format of Axial Age religion, and, at the same time, a reserved invocation of fringe literature, science fiction, design theory ‘noise’, next to the demanded sobriety of Kant’s challenge to the ‘visions of a ghostseer’. The point here is to recast communist ideological fixations in a new key, able to listen to a broader spiritual congress than current in the brilliant, but narrow, legacy of Feuerbach, that so influenced the work of Marx and Engels.

The New Man is a powerful leitmotiv emerging in the modern transition, with echoes in Paine, Godwin, the Marxists, Communists, and Nietzsche’s concept of the overman, a challenge to the ‘herd mentality’ of the Christians (a deeper source after the buddhist/Jain of the idea of the ‘born again’ New Man). The idea is a neo-buddhist keynote in the Rajneesh manifesto: *The New Man*.⁶

The question of science fiction should be a natural exercise for the left, and Stapleton’s ‘pulp fiction’ can invoke the questions of futures, virtual



Fig. 15 Skeleton of man of the future

6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Man_%28utopian_concept%29, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, *The New Man: The Only Hope for the Future, Communism and Zen Fire Zen Wind*, (Cologne: West Germany, The Rebel Publishing House GmbH, 1987, 2005). This discussion brings the Counter-Enlightenment to the surface in the discussion of modernity. Paul Monod, *Solomon’s Secret Arts* (Yale, 2013), J. Clarke, *The Oriental Enlightenment* (Routledge, 1997).

futures, and potential spaces. It is a counterpoint to the crypto-Nietzschean *2001*, a movie whose implications few in the popcorn balcony seem to have understood.

And we are confronted by a suspicion that ‘we are not alone’, in a universe



Fig. 16 Stone Age, Vasnetsov, ca. 1882

of ‘star wars’, and bug-eyed aliens fomenting democracy/communism across the galaxy. The point of science fiction is not that it is true, though it could predict some parts of the future, but that as a spinning of yarns it can warn us of the mysterious dangers of probable, and improbable futures, and carry the suspicions we have of A-life. The legacy of socialism and communism was and is to explore the realization of a form of the virtual future. Here the question of economic momentum, and a free intervention by man in his own mechanical culture, is challenged by the visions of future technology, culture and species of men. One should think, however, that Stapleton’s progression of multiple eras of speciate ‘men’ is too optimistic: the fate of *homo sapiens* is reaching a ‘now or never’ point, and, at the point of climate calamity, that creature may have no second chances.

Science, parascience: these sci-fi issues and intuitions are not grounds for belief as knowledge, but warnings of the extreme limits of scientism. Current public knowledge is blind to the larger universe, blind to real human nature, and beset with economic puppet ideologies.

The question of the virtual future evokes, as noted, the work of the New Age figure J. G. Bennett, whose *tour de force* *The Dramatic Universe*,

as science fiction trying to foresee the future of science, proposed a version of the nineteenth century idea of the 'six dimensional universe', with three dimensions each of space and time. This book out of the blue points to the emergence of the idea of communism at the dawn of a New Age of world history, 1848. The text takes up the nineteenth century idea, in the period of Abbott's *Flatland*, of the three-dimensionality of time which suggests we



Fig. 17. The Indian's Vespers,
acquired as LAST OF THE MOHICANS, 1847

consider time and eternity in counterpoint, their divergence bridged by a third dimension of time, what he called hyparxis, which is a rendering of the idea of the virtual future, save that it is in some fashion a real 'space'. This formulation is relevant not only to the subject of religions and civilizations evolving, but of the place of the left in the wake of the modern transitional phase of revolutions, concluding with its invocation of a last revolution to come. The idea of 'eternity', thence hyparxis, is derivable on purely logical grounds, despite finding no place, as yet, within science.

Bennett, most strangely, was also fixated by the year 1848 as the onset of a new era in world history, and noted the appearance of the idea of communism at that point. His work requires skeptical caution, but he confronts the obsessive postmodern and anti-modern tactics of religious traditionalism,

unable to grasp the era of secularism (which is not necessarily anti-religion).

Action from the future?? As Rupert Sheldrake notes in his *Science Set Free*, systems models with certain kinds of ‘attractors’ seem like they are acting from the future. The issue would thus be one of teleology. We should proceed with caution near ideas that we can’t do with, or without.⁷

Where science fiction writers are content with fantastic contortions of the human or animal frame as alien life, Bennett’s universe was populated by something after the fashion of the Platonic demiurge, but brahmanized from atmanized as a plural cohort of plural demiurges. In a modernist culture of Feuerbachians attempting to atheize secularism, the idea of the demiurge confounds skepticism with a ‘naturalistic’ being beyond life whose ‘body’ as of the tissue of light is not supernatural, nor a form of ‘god’. Bennett’s proposal that these beings are entwined with human evolution is a useful lightening rod for ‘design’ arguments that wish to take captive our theories of human evolution. Bennett’s version of this is cogently apt, and can help us, not to indulge in the fantastic, but to remain in a sober edition of human evolution, with the suspected hidden dimension given a dignified question mark.

The sufi writer J. G. Bennett gives an alternate view of human evolution, which requires the explanation of a complex transition to a ‘cosmic consciousness’ (normally called ‘self-consciousness’ in yogic-style discourses), that is, man evolves to be able to ‘receive’ the energy of complex consciousness, and this in the context of a still higher set of energies, beginning with the creative. It is a compelling argument, and suggests that this ‘new man’ emerging from *homo erectus* arose via the influence of demiurgic powers in nature, beings who exploit a superadvanced technology of light bodies. This indulgence in the fantastic can be, as we suggested, an avowed speculative model of human evolution by design, as guard against the flood of New Age speculations here. The sudden emergence of man with a ‘soul’, newly creative powers, and the complex instrument of higher consciousness does indeed look more like a software upgrade than a form of adaptation.⁸

⁷ Rupert Sheldrake, *Science Set Free: Ten Paths to New Discovery* (Deepak Chopra Books, 2012)

⁸ The references to Bennett are the result of a ‘sufi-leftist’ query on the subject of that thinker’s work as a resource for a spiritual radicalism. Bennett was in the clutches of complex spiritual reactionaries, thus dangerously hybrid, but contacted a spiritual resource that animated an indication of a revolutionary demiurgic affirmation. His work is entangled in the predatory occultism of sufi mafias. Use of his framework might result in rightist infiltrations and attacks. But Bennett’s systematics is an open resource, and a

This passage is from *Descent of Man Revisited*, and the question of evolutionary design arguments, next to the debates over religion, from Feuerbach to the current 'New Atheist' movement, have been confounded by theistic myths, and modern atheism's capture by reductionist scientism. Sci-fi writers, maybe, Hegel, almost, probably knew better long ago: the issue of the 'naturalism' of 'spirit'.

The design debate, design vs. natural selection, is destined to be deadlocked. The strategy of reductionist scientism has failed here. But so has creationism trying to use design arguments as proofs of the existence of god. 'God' cannot 'exist' inside space-time, and is 'outside' of 'existence' in a different mode, being, beyond knowledge. This makes the whole debate nonsensical. And we cannot speak of 'intelligent' design in predicates for 'god'. Monotheists have lost the distinction between 'supernatural' and the 'spiritual' inside the realm of the material/natural, but it is present in the Old Testament as 'elohim'. That then would be an empirical issue, a 'phenomenology' of 'spirits', the 'heavenly host' of the Christians, perhaps. Outlandish, but logical. In a sense the design argument should be a natural sideline to scientific research, since teleological machines are a staple of biochemistry, now confronting the epigenome. But this has nothing to do with theism, necessarily. The 'natural teleology' of Kant suggests that 'design' begins as a naturalistic phenomenon, whatever the mysteries of unknowable divinity. And there is a third possibility, as noted: a natural demiurge (plural?) acting within space-time, science fiction perhaps, but logical. The materiality of the 'spiritual' resolves the questions of material soul, short of the supernatural, which is beyond knowledge. The idea of a material soul (as opposed to an enlightened being beyond soul) is unknown to Christians, but is known in the Sufistic and Indic traditions. The problem with design arguments is, ironically, the way in which religious mythology has distorted the use of the term 'god', leaving it dangerously ambiguous, and design arguments fairy tales. The ancient prophets warned severely of the use of such terms of pop theism, reserving reference to a 'pointing to', as in the abstract referent IHVH. The strange record left by the Old Testament has actually lost the thread of its deep discovery of historical 'evolution', which can indeed impinge on design questions. But this record conceals a revolutionary discovery, which the creators of Israelitism did not yet understand.

Bennett explores a systematics of categories said to replace the Kantian ones, a doubtful exercise. But a useful experiment on its own terms. The influence of Whitehead and Schopenhauer leaves an ambiguity in the loss of the phenomenal/noumenal distinction. But the battle between the Kantians and the realists and/or Hegelians is a stalemate. It is an accident of British intellectual culture that Bennett jumped on the Whitehead bandwagon in the thirties. His book is practically the ghost of Schopenhauer in a box, forced to live among the realists.

But the battle between the Kantians and the realists and/or Hegelians is a stalemate. I think it an accident of British intellectual culture that Bennett jumped on the Whitehead bandwagon in the thirties. His book is practically the ghost of Schopenhauer in a box, forced to live among the realists, so stuck on Darwin, but brilliant in most other respects.

His 'categories' are twelve in number, reflect numerical sequences, are called systems, and begin as wholeness, polarity, relatedness (three term), tetrads (four term), potentiality (five term), six-term, seven term, etc, to twelve term. The issue is simple: a problem is defined beautifully, without the solution. So we can proceed in piecemeal research up the scale he foresees. A simple defense against crackpot thinking here. I was confused for a long time by this exercise until I realized, that, as Bennett hints, you can't go any further than step two unless you can transcend the pairs of opposites, and transcend contradictions in your head as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in one thought. Which means that almost noone could get past the second category, and therefore the whole remaining series is simply up in the air. So, the true comes out, we are in the foothills of a truly Himalayan question, nicely laid out by Bennett, and summarized with a toy model.

So it is a good mirror of our thinking, stuck in polarity, trying to get beyond that, and using dialectic as a substitute that never quite reaches the third term system stage. Hegel entry into this field thus prefigures complex future developments... From *Darwiniana* blog

From this we gain the interesting deduction that the 'individuality' of man is an eight term system poised on the boundary between the autonomic and hypernomic realms. This may explain dilemma of man's mind-awareness as a biological factor mixed with a cosmic energy of consciousness.

Bennett's thinking is too liable to the destructive labors of bad commentary that makes undisciplined use of triads, and pseudo-esoterica. These ideas are not science, and will remain in the *Preface*. But the issue of time/timeless domains goes a long way to resolving many of the issues

complex subject, between *Samkhya*, Schopenhauer, and unknown brands of sufism.




Fig. 18 The last man departing in space craft




Fig. 19 First cosmonaut, 1958

that constrict scientism. These chords of the 'nondual' are a fixation of man attempting to reach beyond mind in a future evolution. Advance requires some perspective on man's muddle here.

It is unclear if any direct use of the material of Bennett is viable on the left, given the clear signs of spiritual reaction hovering over this legacy. And one must separate the two components of the hybrid in his DU. In general the left should envision its

own versions of such things. The legacy world religions have become exploitations: the left without much trouble could do religion better than what history shows us! Nonetheless the legacy of *Samkhya* was always a radical one.

Bennett is interesting because his work shows the sudden later influence of a leftist spiritual source in the wake of the reactionary onslaught of the Gurdjieff sufis: it is no accident they suddenly appeared in the Russian Revolution, as if to seed a new form of postmodern rightwinger. The idea of the 'work' was a disguised equivalent to class warfare as a stealth master-slave routine. The left might well expropriate Bennett's work, as a resource for an alternate and very ancient version of 'dialectical materialism', with echoes in the Indian *Samkhya*. Its materialist 'spirituality' might serve the left better than the positivist brand. It is eerie that Marx stumbled on, but seems not to have understood, the gesture of the material dialectic. The attempt to fix *Samkhya* as a conservative ideology was a bit outrageous. It was always a radical subject in the lore of Indian religion, with its strain of

universal materialism, as the ‘gunas’. Sufi reactionaries are dangerous. Be forewarned. Bennett was a strange doubly hypnotized unconscious agent of unknown spiritual powers....

The idea of the ‘dialectics of nature’ finds a new meaning in the triadic cascade of Bennett, and the difficulties of the idea of dialectic applied to nature, often critiqued in Engels, mar the useful attempt to create an ecological marxism.⁹

The question of human evolution thus remains a mystery haunted by its own brand of design argument, and these are too influenced by theological confusions to stand. But the claim by Bennett comes home to roost the moment we try to mechanize human evolution with the methods of ‘evolutionary psychology’. The question of the evolution of man is connected with larger issues, all of them unsolved:

The question of mind and body, and soul

The existence of ‘alife’

The question of cosmic distance...

There are thus several jokers in the deck in our outstanding ignorance of the evolution of man. Our historical study can at least help us to put the question in the context of the so-called ‘macro’ effect.

The biggest joker in the deck is the Kantian wild card: we remain unsure whether a Kantian insight on the nature of space-time and mental faculty recreates spirituality in the context of science. The elegant version of this from Schopenhauer, to our astonishment, recreated the Upanishadic vision in the midst of a ‘science mess of pottage’. And it is no use ridiculing ‘design’ arguments, if the universe is advanced technology for beings of a kind unknown to us, more than just superadvanced. But in general the tactics of science in the pursuit of evolutionary knowledge have produced a starting point. How we go beyond that is still unclear. The questions of theism, atheism, and the issue of human evolution is a stew very slowly coming to a boil.

Religion, secularism, atheism The recent New Atheist movement has reanimated the tide of atheism in the generation of Feuerbach and Marx, once again with an insecure foundation, in a Kantian context.



Fig. 20 Ghost scene, Hamlet

⁹ John Bellamy Foster, *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (Monthly Review, 2002).

The puzzle of secularism remains unsolved by ‘atheist humanism’, and the recursions of religion in a ‘second Axial Age’ remain as still another of the ‘hyparchic future shocks’ down the road. The future of communism is inexorably bound up with the future of religion, it being perhaps that future. But there is no inherent association of postcapitalism with postreligion.¹⁰

When we look at the complexity of the human instrument of ‘consciousness’ the thesis of ‘evolution from below’ becomes a conjecture, as we contemplate, as Alfred Wallace did, the way in which potential emerges. This potential cannot ever have been the result of environmental influence, since it does not really interact at all with its exterior. This clue to something entirely missing in our accounts is met by Bennett’s audacious claim that the evolution of man, at the critical points of the emergence of *homo erectus*, and *homo sapiens* (if not the whole of evolution) is assisted by demiurgic powers in nature. We should note the proliferation of fringe



Fig. 21 Last and First Women

The finite transition model highlights the retreat of the Axial period and patriarchal age, and the advance of women, as with the appearance of Wollenstonecraft at the Great Divide, a spectacular timing we are now familiar with...

From *Descent of Man Revisited*

literature here, and the whole question, banished from consciousness by reductionist science, of alien contacts in antiquity can be disciplined by a stylized question mark nicely outline by Bennett, who unwittingly let the cat out of the bag: in a religious culture take over by reactionaries the existence of spiritual guides on the far left should be a shock to traditionalist muddle.

This new age classic is almost dangerous to use: it is a hybrid of two things and the issue of the cult thesis of the enneagram, and much else,



Fig. 22
Paleolithic
Venus

¹⁰ Victor Stenger, *The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason* (Prometheus, 2009), John Haight, *God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens* (Louisville, KY: WJK Press, 2008).

ends up muddling the basic discussion.¹¹

The issue confronting man is now the danger of unrestricted market globalization, and the real threat to the planet. A platform of 'Communism 2.0', a 'New Communism', must be rushed to the fore as the Faustian gambit of capitalist economics yields to its own karmic resolution in Postcapitalism.

Hegel is a fixture on the left and his reverence for the French Revolution, whatever his ambivalence and conservative tendencies, shines still through his immediate succession, the left Hegelians who burst asunder his framework in the progression to the 'unfinished revolution' to come, and reflected in real time in the revolutions of the year 1848. The Jacobin legacy (note the symbolism in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*) is the riddle, and contradiction, that haunts the far left in the nineteenth century, beside Burkean hysteria, and that other side effect, Malthus, the grandfather of Social Darwinism.

The poignancy, then, of the year 1848 is that it shows the sudden crystallization of communism, and this is ultimately a movement that can transcend the religious/secular divide, and inhabit a cultural future that is tuned to the whole of the human legacy. Confusion over the 'end of history' masks the simple fact of the 'logical', and soon climatic, inevitability of some kind of postcapitalism. It is important to see the Janus-faced character of the historically emergent movement, on the one hand in reaction to abuse of rights in the capitalist exploitations of economy, and the natural continuation of the democratic revolution visible in the generation succeeding the French Revolution, and the prophetic figure, Gracchus Babeuf. Hal Draper has an interesting book on the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and the semantic confusions that took the term from its moorings in the generation of the 'forty-eighters' to the period of Lenin. The term, if it can't be set aside, should be calibrated to the moment, as in the American Revolution, where the system has no controlling definition: it is not yet democracy, because the revolution of democracy is underway, in search of its constitutional finale.¹²

The tragic devolution of the American system of government, in the wake of the 9/11 episode, requires seeing the way in which the 'coup d'etat' has reached the invisibility of covert action, while the financial crisis of 2008 tokens the clearest warning of Marx of the 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie', Wall Street edition.¹³

11 J.G.Bennett, *The Dramatic Universe*, in 4 volumes (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1966).

12 Hal Draper, *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Monthly Review Press, 1987).

13 Thierry Meyssan, *9/11: The Big Lie* (London: Carnot, 22), Nafeez Ahmed, *The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked on 9/11* (Joshua Tree, Ca.: Tree of Life Books, 2002), David Ray Griffin, *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11* (Northampton, MA: Interlink, 2004).

Since 9/11 questions are dismissed as conspiracy theories we are thrown into the whole morass, from which there is no simple exit. The ‘howls of protest’ left and right over the *Illuminati* is a symptom of the ‘dis-ease’, but the issue of esotericism must ultimately be a leftist concern.



Fig.23 9/11

Typical fulminations against the *Illuminati* have missed the point that reactionary forces have wished to monopolize spiritual domains. The appearance of group of ‘Rosicrucians’ sympathetic to modernity and the democratic revolution was a gesture so appropriate the right nearly lost its mind in frantic paranoia. The crackpot literature here is unending. The point here is that the revolutionary tradition is not an

occult conspiracy: its basis in the macro effect will be our discovery. The issues of 9/11 raise complex questions about ‘synthetic terrorism’ and its history, going back to the nineteenth century. And what about Guy Fawkes, the first ‘artificial patsy’?¹⁴

Our navigation through the question of history and evolution suggests another alternative to the formulations of dialectical materialism, and the economic interpretation of history. The so-called ‘macro model’ tends to be perceived as a speculative theory of history, but in reality it is an empirically based map with a clear foundation in historical fact. The nature of the model created from that data may be open to challenge and refutation, but that model can then be set aside, leaving the situation as it was before: an empirical chronicle of world history in outline. This is the useful feature of the model suggested: it survives its own refutation. And it is thus something we already use without realizing why, as with our sense of the enigma of modernity and its discontinuity in relation to world history.



Fig. 24 Guy Fawkes

This method of getting beyond theories is useful, for the fate of theories of history is not generally a good one. As the Kantian take on the philosophy of history suggests, the stubborn persistence of the idea of freedom in the

14 Webster Tarpley, *9/11: Synthetic Terror* (progressivepress.com, Joshua Tree, Ca: Progressive, 2006).

context of the human chronicle beggars all reductionist claims to annex history. More, given the issue of freedom in history, we are forced to consider the issue of the ‘evolution of freedom’, and this bursts asunder the whole framework of standard evolutionary theory. The question of free will in the rise of the New Physics was a question the philosopher Kant made the object of a profound revolution in thought, and the result speaks directly to both the Hegelian and later Marxist canons.

Schopenhauer and 1848 In all the talk of ‘dialectic’ the contrast of Hegel and Schopenhauer remains untouched on the left, no doubt due to the latter’s reactionary views, and counterrevolutionary episodes in the year of revolution. His *petit bourgeois* idiocies mask the brilliance of his philosophical achievement: a version of the philosophy of history, beside that of Hegel’s could easily be adapted to leftist thinking, despite the rejection of history by that philosopher, whose works connect science, philosophy from Plato to Kant, and the riddle made plain of Upanishadic psychology.¹⁵

The devolution from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche produced a dangerous fixation for many secularists, in the decadent notion of the ‘will to power’. The question of Nietzsche thus only makes sense in the light of Schopenhauer, and the elimination of ‘idealist’ trappings backfires for those who fall into the trap of this clever reactionary.

But is not Stalinism a reactionary formation? The last trick of the bourgeoisie: state capitalism. This ground is explored, controversially, as a ‘defense of lost causes’ by the postmodern Slavoj Žižek. A new communism will, however, be a lost cause: there is too much at stake, and the old communism is long gone. The terms, therefore, refer to different things.¹⁶

The *Black Book of Communism* stalks the marxist world. The left must study the lore of the critics of the old communism. These critiques, such as the classic *Main Currents of Marxism*, can actually strengthen a neo-communist form of thinking. But there is a paralysis induced by the Burkean legacy, consider the difficulty of assessing history, e.g. the Terror in the French Revolution.¹⁷

15 Rudiger Safranski, *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy* (Harvard University Press, 1990).

16 Slavoj Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (Verso, 2008).

17 Stephane Courtois, et al., *The Black Book of Communism* (Harvard University Press, 1999), Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom* (Stanford University Press, 1995), *Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). Sophie Wahnich (*Foreword*, Slavoj Žižek), *In Defense of Terror: Liberty of Death in the*

The Arab Spring and the OWS have produced a new line of activism with insights needed for any renewed effort on the left. The anarchist ‘democracy project’ and the ‘Revolution 2.0’ emerge as powerful challenges to the failures of the old communism. Confusion over the ‘end of history’ masks the simple fact of the ‘logical’, and soon climatic, inevitability of some kind of postcapitalism.¹⁸

It is important to see the Janus-faced character of the historically emergent movement, on the one hand in reaction to abuse of rights in the capitalist exploitations of economy, and the natural continuation of the democratic revolution visible in the generation succeeding the French Revolution, and the prophetic figure, Gracchus Babeuf. Hal Draper has an interesting book on the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and the semantic confusions that took the term from its moorings in the generation of the ‘forty-eighters’ to the period of Lenin. The term, if it can’t be set aside, should be calibrated to the moment, as in the American Revolution, where the system has no controlling definition: it is not yet democracy, because the revolution of democracy is underway, in search of its constitutional finale.

The legacy of Gandhi requires careful study. The enigma has never quite been solved. The ‘impossible Indian’ was always a puzzle, as was the source, whether in European strains such as the Tolstoyan, or the legacy of Jainism.¹⁹

The left’s preoccupation with Hegel evokes the question of why the subject of ‘idealism’ is so castigated: the onset of scientism, and the nineteenth century brand of ‘materialism’ that overtook scientific culture in the generation of Marx made the phase of German Classical philosophy a saga of lost worlds, as indeed Marx and Engels noted in later years. But the entire generation of philosophy in the wake of Kant is the real heritage of the left, and there the duality of Schopenhauer and Hegel is an elegant puzzle.

Psychoanalyzing Marx? The puzzle of Marx is his heroic completion of

French Revolution (Verso, 2012)

18 David Graeber, *The Democracy Project: A History, A Crisis, A Movement* (Spiegel Grau, 2013). Wael Ghonim, *Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People of Power* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), Jodi Dean, *The Communist Horizon* (Verso, 2012). Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (Pantheon, 2002). Mark Bray, *Translating Anarchy* (Zero Books, 2013), Nathan Schneider, *Thank You, Anarchy* (University of California, 2013). Michael Lebowitz, *The Contradictions of Real Socialism* (Monthly Review, 2012). Douzinas, Zizek, *The Idea of Communism* (Verso, 2010), N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Picador, 2008).

19 Faisal Devji, *The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

a basic task, and the equal incompleteness of his major work, as analyzed from a psychoanalytical point of view in *Marx's Fate*. A failed effort, no doubt, that touches the 'Hamlet' question in Marx. What was the source of Marx's creative block, and why did the completion of prove impossible? But this attempt to apply psychoanalysis may fail, leaving the question in place. We should do better to psychoanalyze Freud, perhaps.²⁰

The question of Hegel (and Kant) and the philosophy of history next to the issue of revolution echoes in the background and the affinity of the left to that thinker is both inspirational and a symptom or sense of something lacking in the propositions of historical materialism. The resemblance of the question of 'dialectics of nature', next to the questions of Marx's position on Engels' views here, is evocative of the question of Indian *Samkya* and its *gunas*: the issue of the 'dialectic' in nature is very ancient. But the question lingers, is the Hegelian 'dialectic' a coherent subject? It is important to consider a 'dialogical metadialectic' which can study the issues of everything from non-dual *Vedanta* to the sufistic 'law of three forces' (again present in Bennett).



Fig. 25 Barricade, 1848, Courbet

This approach can put 'dialectic' under dialectical scrutiny. In any case, it is risky to wager 'serious money' on dialectical theories, and our approach via a model of macroevolution can provide a more general framework for the philosophy of history. The question of 'dialectic', revolution, and punctuated equilibrium needs a careful study. The macro model has a more robust take on the issue of 'revolution and historical dynamics'. Despite our critique

²⁰ Jerrold Siegel, *Marx's Fate: The Shape of a Life* (Princeton University Press, 1978).

the question of dialectic seems a genuine issue of the 'last to become the first men', in the context of the evolutionary future of man. But the current forms lack any foundation. We should put them on the backburner and be wary of theoretical uses.²¹

We see, then, that the question of human evolution impinges on the issues of a communist social organization to create a foundation for the biology of a new man. This requires something that doesn't exist yet, and which the world of scientism cannot foresee. There is a danger that crackpot Darwinism will claim the future evolution of man in its manner of theoretical reductionism. Combined with the ill-posed thinking of Nietzsche this Social Darwinist mania has already produced a catastrophe in the coming of Nazism.²²

At a time of planetary crisis, the profound praxis of Marx and Engels needs to be set in a new key, and to some extent set aside, and the macro model can taxi the legacy of those who first extended the revolutionary impulse of the French Revolution into the futures of capitalist economy, dissolving into the background like the Cheshire cat once its job is done.

21 Leonard Wheat, *Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics: What Only Marx and Tillich Understood* (Prometheus Books, 2012). We can critique Hegelian dialectic, but still use the term, to mean 'argument', 'counter-argument', and attempted 'third mediating argument, status unknown', the procedure of ordinary debate. The relation of dialectics and science is a longstanding pursuit, Woods, Grant, *Reason in Revolt: Dialectical Philosophy and Modern Science* (Algora, 2002).

22 Abir Taha, *Nietzsche: Prophet of Nazism: The Cult of the Superman* (Bloomington: Author House, 2005)

We have no compassion and we ask no compassion from you. When our turn comes, we shall not make excuses for the terror. But the royal terrorists, the terrorists by the grace of God and the law, are in practice brutal, disdainful, and mean, in theory cowardly, secretive, and deceitful, and in both respects disreputable..

Marx, Editorial in Final edition of
Neue Rheinische Zeitung (1849)

The greater Commune of Revolutionaries includes the many disguises and remorphs of Münzer: the great poet Milton is one the first of the orphans of revolutionary modernity. In Christopher Hill's classic, *Milton and The English Revolution*, T. S. Eliot is quoted: the Civil War of the seventeenth century, in which Milton is a symbolic figure, has never been concluded...The Faustian wager of the capitalist makes the 'primitive premodern' saga of that capital fellow, Satan, the tale of the reactionary, but of the revolutionary...?

Perhaps historical materialism generates an excess of contempt for morality, and the warning of Marx's father bears testimony to Marx's own 'demon'

Schopenhauer's behavior during the 1848 revolutions is that of the reactionary, yet his revolutionary brand of transcendental idealism would have made a far better framework than the materialism of the age, and in the legacy of Münzer and the Reformation, of that bourgeois revolutionary, Luther. Instead his thinking became of fad of 1848 disillusion, and tempted Nietzsche to a reductionist brand for the age of scientism and the men of the Iron Cage.

Dickens' *Hard Times* is an apt tale of the age of Capital, but that of *Little Dorrit*, that keen observer of class struggles, is even better...

Fig. 26 From the first edition of the Dickens novel



All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned ...

Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (1848)

In relation to our prime objective we can consider a host of additional issues, continued in the Conclusion, or a successor, based on a new perspective as to evolution and historical theory:

1. historical materialism is a brittle theory from nineteenth century scientism.
2. Darwin's theory of evolution with its social darwinist ideology is not science and should be challenged from the left.
3. The legacy of Stalinism must be renounced and a project of a 'new communism' must declare a caesura with that phase of the left.
4. An ecological perspective to balance the focus on developmental exploitation, left or right.
5. A better anthropology of religion, and an awareness of the enigma of the Axial Age, related to the latent 'secular' religion-formation in the modern transition. The 'materialism' of the 'spiritual' *Samkhya* of India might better inform the shallow materialism of the post-Hegelian era.
6. The rights legacy of the modern democratic revolution needs to be recast for a post-capitalist age. Nothing whatever in the strange subject of rights philosophy requires that Lockean property rights override industrial destruction of climate and ecology
7. Although the question of revolutionary tactics in the early modern never embraces a doctrine of non-violence, the latter begins to emerge in the wake of the era of Gandhi and Lenin. Mediating Gandhi's strategy in the context of future of social transformation requires historical context. Despite its success as a political innovation in, for example, the American Civil Rights movement it remains the case that modern freedoms did not emerge via Gandhian movements.
8. A production for future culture cannot downshift from the totality of the early modern to the Enlightenment, and must create a very large domain of discourse to preempt the Iron Cage syndrome. Using the macro model an 1848+ movement can sublimate multitasking sequences up to the 'Great Divide'.



INTRODUCTION

Capitalism is unsustainable from an ecological perspective, and...constitutes a form of structural genocide against future generations...

Garry Leech, *Capitalism: A Structural Genocide*

Capitalism was easy. Now comes the hard part. At a time of rising social crisis in the outcome of globalization, the place of capitalism is coming under intense scrutiny. It is ironic, and this has always been so, that at its moment of triumph, everything turns sour with the culture of markets, and its manic style. The defenses of capitalism, beside their mirror image in the debates over communism, have tended to seem irrefutable given the evidence of economic transformation, the mesmerizing ideology of *laissez-faire*. There the Hegelianized propaganda of the ‘end of history’ has created a powerful set of illusions. But now suddenly the prospect that we are all ‘dead by economy’ changes one’s view of the matter as the point of no return seems to have arrived in the form of the Faustian endgame in

the accelerating destruction of the ecological base, and the dire scenarios of global warming. All at once the charge of utopianism, so often applied to the communist idea, flips to capitalism itself.

The ideology of the 'end of history' in a finesse using Hegelian historicism disguised behind Nietzschean nihilism and sociological reductionism, with

We can take as a starting assumption that globalization via the capitalist market is threatening destruction of a planet. So therefore a non-capitalist aftermath is the only option, along with the prospect of no-growth economies. At that point, the debate tends to shift gears toward the failsafe: communism. This starting assumption could prove false, but the necessary work of a *gedanken* experiment should at least be the first order of business. At a minimum the 'end of history' delusion in favor of unlimited, eternal free markets must be dispelled to free thought in a crisis.

a hidden Social Darwinist diatribe hidden in the charges against the 'last man', dealt a teleological ace from the bottom of the deck. But the illusion of capitalist inevitability fades fast once we see that the last men are the monomaniac free marketeers, demented enough to pursue with '*apres moi*' indifference the destruction of a planet for the last ounce of profit, 'Who cares? One will be dead before the apocalypse'. The last nemesis of the profit obsession living in the eternal present of capital accumulation is degenerating into a kind of madness, losing contact with reality. One of the most dangerous aspects of the situation is the lunatic unreliability and deception of corrupted and confused economists whose theories we will have to sort out as external amateurs. The experts are in curious Wonderland of theory. We have a strange situation where the most intelligent are confusing themselves with faciles delusions erected from calculus. Outsiders are paralyzed by this situation, but must decipher mathematical propaganda alone.

The idea of communism, discredited by its totalitarian legacy, suddenly shifts gear in our minds as the ominous spectacle of totalitarianism creeping up on liberal systems suggests a second coming for a classic idea, as a question mark about the salvation of democracy, and a Bill of Rights finally done right, as Lockean property rights create a new peasantry for a burnt-out

planet. That requires a kind of reboot of the communist idea to its start in the lead-up to 1848. A recursion as ‘communism 2.0’ as a superset both informed by but sublated from its classic marxist wrapper can show how the




Fig. 1.1 The Greenhouse Effect

potential of the idea has barely been explored. The world-historical classic, *Capital*, was significantly an unfinished ‘work in progress’. But the analysis must shift to the realm of marginalist illusion, and the strange hypnosis of the economist breed before the clever swindles of mathematical economics.

We are also assuming that the standard compromises, such as those of FDR and the New Deal, and a robust alliance with labor by business, to ‘save the regime of capitalism’, are no longer available, speaking parochially about the USA. These elites are free to prove this wrong at any time. The elite capitalist class shows instead every intention of dismantling all such fixes with an extreme kind of Ayn Randian class warfare, a disguised Nietzschean project of the destruction of the ‘last men’, ordinary citizens of democratic cultures.

It seems they will never again allow a ‘New Deal’ style accommodation. The hidden fascist coup staged by covert agencies since World War II is rapidly undermining democratic polity, in the US. Instead, we should fear the blend of economic ideology and the myths of (Social) Darwinism are being stoked once again for forms of class warfare graduating to outright genocide, although they do not quite have the nerve for this, yet. But elites

have been fed a moral indifference based on ideological evolutionism leading to assumptions of class superiority demanding survival of the fittest up to final solutions. We know from twentieth century history that warnings of fascist evolutionist extermination are not alarmist.

We should note that the issue of crisis, e.g. a climate crisis, is one thing. But a postcapitalist system of economy, properly designed, is to be aimed for on its own sake: the project of communism must increase the

The most obvious catch in the ‘end of history’ argument is that free market action is the Trojan horse moving progressively to eliminate democracy, leaving it as a front behind which the reign of Capital expands to hegemonic and newly totalitarian control of subject consciousness.

The related phenomenon of democratic canceration in the expansion of covert agency action. The false flag interpretations of 9/11 suggest that a hidden coup d’etat has overtaken the ‘end of history’ with a fascist core. The degree of mind control to maintain the illusion is a democratic calamity.




Fig 1.2 The 9/11 conspiracy

freedom of the faux-democratic systems dominated by Capital. It is a hopeless disgrace, as in a recent incident, that two centuries after the Industrial Revolution, factories in Bangladesh can collapse, as if two centuries of labor activism had never happened. The system of capitalism is incurable, but at least it has made the context global. A new communism must study the Bolshevik era carefully to understand its mistakes, its capture of the socialist idea, its egregious violence, and the mismatch of class analysis applied to a system that had more peasants than workers. That critique is essential, and the tactics of non-violence are now an essential consideration, but the tendency to create a faux-spiritual mystique around Gandhi’s legacy, often in the name of a Christological pacifism needs to consider that the most violent period of the early modern was that of the Reformation/Counter-Reformation. Nothing in Bolshevism comes close to the violence of Christianity.

The ends of history and the first men

No coherent account of the 'end of history' exists, in part because the Hegelian source ideas cannot be grafted onto the tenets of scientism, Darwinism, and historical economism that tend to dominate sociological discourse. The work of Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, was a momentarily powerful set of suggestions arising in the wake of Bolshevik communism, c. 1989. But the confusions of the term 'democracy' including an implied endorsement of capitalism, are in practice falsifying themselves: we cannot propose a teleological system doomed to disaster. Democracy, so-called, is confused with the play of free markets, and these are showing their terminally destructive character. And the regeneration of class domination beggaring democracy. Surely the original suspicion of the first communists, carried further via Marx/Engels, was right to consider the prophecy of a system at the 'end of capitalism'. This was proposed as, in fact, democracy in a postcapitalist context. Sociology, in any case, cannot support teleological axioms, and it was the deft blend of Hegel (or Kojève) and Nietzsche, in the coin of economic sociology that made Fukuyama's thinking seem convincing. We cannot easily blend Hegelian intuitions of teleology, with Darwinism, and economic determinism. Further the question of the Last Man invokes an interpretation of evolution on top of that of history, and, once again, Darwin and Hegel won't mix. Nietzsche has a cogent idea, but his conception of evolution failed him, and we see a kind of Buddhist eschatology degraded to the brands of Social Darwinism.

We cannot easily solve these questions, but this work, by creating a new model of world history can resolve the dualism of evolution and history, contextualize economic systems as the creations of free agents (as opposed to deterministic systems of economic laws), and produce a suggestion about teleological theories by showing how a cyclical system can recursively approximate historical directionality. The endstate of such a system is unknown, but allows the possibility that future men in a state of high self-consciousness can exit their own historical passive historical/evolutionary dynamics to a technology of both civilizations, and human realization. That requires a transtemporal plan realized coherently over tens of millennia, a bit beyond the 'five year plan'. Such an endstate will hardly be realized by promoting greed in economies set on free market absolutes with a Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest applied to social darwinist eugenics.

A new form of communism must transcend its proletarian focus to champion a 'universal class' and be able to study the class formations in



Fig. 1.3 Barricades, Paris, 1848

place, and work with each of them for a new class of all.

In any case, there is no capitalist 'inevitable stage of history'. Read Adam Smith: capitalism emerges as a set of policy recommendations from a customs inspector tired of chasing smugglers, not a set of historical laws in motion. On the basis of

our starting assumption, we need to consider a death and rebirth of the communist idea, if only to stand up to the endless progression of half-solutions about to parade the last stages of overhyped capital mania. If Bolshevik Russia and Chinese communism don't really qualify, to what are we referring? The idea of communism suffered an accident in its progression toward totalitarianism, and we should aggressively recall its original lineage in the age of democratic revolutions.

But it arose as a critique of the abuse of the rights of property, industrial property. The democratic revolutions backfired, creating a new form of elite domination. Here is the Wikipedia entry on rights: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rights>. It's easy to find the flaws of Bolshevism as to rights. Now find the flaws of liberalism—as to property rights. They are rather clear in the current phase of globalization, and climate disaster. We must recall to ourselves the radical discovery that this rights legacy was a biased pastiche of ideological disguises. A system of rights is therefore still on the table. Locke can hardly be a foundational resource if he was unclear on the issue of property and slavery, and his period is that of counter-revolution in the wake of the English Civil War.

The classic phase of communism was a failure. But a tremendous irony is at work: the democratic foundation (for example, in the US) is rapidly progressing toward a totalitarianism in disguise. The communist idea, so far from its Bolshevik sublimation of the Tsarist secret police in the emergence

The symbolism of 1848
and...Ideas for a Universal History

This work will replicate some of the concepts from the author's *World History and the Eonic Effect* (WHEE) used to discuss the classic essay of Kant on history, *Idea for a Universal History*. Despite our critique of Fukuyama's seminal 'neo-con' text, *The End of History and the Last Man*, a text of considerable depth degraded to the level of capitalist ideology, discusses the Kantian framework in the fifth chapter of his work.

Kant challenges future historians to resolve the question of history with the demonstration of a pattern therein. But the confusing issue of the ur-Darwinian concept of 'asocial sociability' purports to suggest an answer. Perhaps Hegel is the first to attempt to answer Kant, and brings in an association of the idea of freedom in relation to historical dynamics. WHEE shows the clear resolution of this challenge by showing the existence of an embedded macro effect with an explicit driver visible in a set of transitions. Most ironically Kant and Hegel appear in association with this cyclicity at the climax to the modern transition.

This 'eonic' or macro effect is a much better answer to Kant's Challenge, but leaves us with a finite transition model of a system with 'locomotive' cycles driving stages or epochs. The classic instance is the phase interval of the Axial Age, in turn the key to the enigma of modernity. The model, however, cannot as yet be applied to earlier eras where the data is insufficient. But a system generating freedom would be unfree, a catch-22 for teleological systems. The macro effect shows the elegant answer in the distinction of 'system action' and 'free action': men are bound in directional history, yet must be the ones to realize the outcome on their own. The year 1848, ironically, is the endpoint of the modern transition, and the rough entry to a new era. Hegel's 1806 was roughly the same. Fukuyama, confronted with Stalinism collapsing, seems beyond challenge in his declaration about the liberal outcome of the collapse of communism. But now confronting the peril of free markets run amok we see that both alternatives are problematical. The first generation of socialists and communists in the period around 1848 seem suddenly to have stated the obvious: a higher freedom beyond capitalist domination must be the historical directionality of freedom. The issue deadlocks, but clearly the challenge is to find a resolution of postcapitalism as a liberal endstate in some form of communism.

of the modern leviathan of the covert agencies, must compute the dialectic of anarchism and authoritarianism, and achieve both a superstate on a global level, a new constitution of rights that checks the rights of property, and a system of decentralization in the midst of a global leviathan principle. The humble democratic revolution must provide the dna for this. The result must be republican, and democratic. It seems increasingly obvious that the




Fig. 1.4 Earth's annual carbon cycle

challenge to Bolshevism, in spawning the birth of the CIA, initiated the trend toward the covert *coup d'état* in the progression of the parallel neo-liberal take-over. A 'new communism' must attempt to roll back the covert annexation of government. The Bolshevik phase embraced it.

We are back at the year 1848 when the idea of communism began to enter world politics on the left (with a considerable history on the Platonic and Morean right, and a first birth in Münzer and the English Civil War). We must be clear that communism is not, as such, the same as the category of marxism, its vital carrier for generations. We can, if necessary, detach the idea to a new rendering as a new theory of history, economy, and politics. In fact, marxism kept the idea alive, and sent it into the future, our future. We can adopt or amend the original set of ideas if we can do that without cooptation. There is no cabal here: skeptical critics have the early moves

in advantage, and a large literature, so we can start with that. We need a theoretical re-examination of the ‘communist’ idea: let us project a ‘new communism’, to complete a discontinuity with its failed manifestations. The issue of revolution was that of the Founding Fathers who sensed the early or late demise of ‘a republic, if you can keep it’.

This initiative might seem (and as a thought experiment, is meant to be) more radical with respect to the current rise of such movements as the OWS, in turn springing from the Arab Spring: the rebirth of a global movement. The OWS has shown an anarchist strain mixed with an aspiration to Gandhian non-violence. The OWS is a moving reflection: ‘What is to be done?’ Without exception these movements equivocate the meaning of democracy under the reign of Capital, and reflect directly the mechanics of the 1848 revolutions. But these splendid developments have not yet played themselves out, yet we should explicitly apply a kind of dialectical thinking to the tactics invoked. Playing the anarchist card was a brilliant stroke that should give pause to socialist ingrained thinking. Small wonder an anarchist legacy should resurface.

One of the problems with the communist legacy has been its fixation in the marxist tradition, and the outcome of the era of Bolshevism. And bravo for that, despite a rising ambivalence, or, in a Marx musing, critical criticality of the critique. Marxism is a rich resource, and a dated ideology. It helped to carry the idea through a wilderness, and give it some foundation. But much of its theory is confusing its adherents. Historical materialism, the dialectic, the labor theory of value, the crisis theory of Marx (despite ample confirmation in the recent financial crisis), are endlessly the object of sophisticated argumentation for an intra-



Fig.1.5 The charge of ‘Utopia’ laid against communism now boomerangs in the wake of the extravagant claims for free markets. The tenets of neo-classical economics refer to abstract situations of no existence, ‘no place’. The parodist abuse of Lagrangian mechanics with utilitarian plugins is a mockery of science. Cf P. Smith, M. Max Neet, *Economics Unmasked* (Green Books, 2012)

cultic mindset, while the outer world disregards all of it, with reason. We can't do with it, and we can't do without. In fact, it is not a hard problem to solve, beyond the inertia of religious habits. A robust set of upgrades will set the legacy in motion.

Marxism has two languages at work, that of class, and the older



Fig. 1.6 Washington Crossing the Delaware

The American Revolution as the type of the 'bourgeois revolution', in the format of a colonial war at the onset of globalization. The process comes full circle in the emergence of the American Empire. The framework of a federal union of 'states' is prophetic of the future realization of a global community of federated states.

Our historical study will actually propose a viable meaning to the 'end of history' confusions. But then the immediate problem arises that if the 'end of history' is to be democracy, is it the democracy of Jefferson's age or the Gilded Age? A moment's reflection will show this to be a decisive objection, if not of the silliness of the whole idea. Our historical system attempts to produce freedom in history as 'democracy' so-called, and gyrates around the terms to find a communist attempt to rescue the operations. That's a pretty good description of the 1848 period.

revolutionary statements of principle. The proletariat as the basis for a new concept of revolution emerged powerfully in the period of the '48 revolutions. But the proletariat formations have shifted in the phases of automation,

and globalization, and are often a minority in many economies. The idea has created misunderstanding, an indifference to a greater majority of the potential revolutionary class, dismissed as *lumpenproletariat*, or petty bourgeois. What is needed is a new universal class, with the proletariat, where one still exists, as an emblematic core. This universal class could resolve class struggle to an end state of universal class inclusion as one *socius*.

The proletariat is very real on the planetary scale, but the tactics of Capital have discovered how to dominate the displaced former proletariats as associates of Capital, like the old Roman citizen, so faithful to empire. Elites have learned how to fracture and brainwash the proletariat, now a conservative force that often cannot grasp its own self-interest. The recent OWS speaks of the 99%. The proletariat should be redefined to a superset: all

The inspirational portraits of the American Revolution are in one way deserved. And yet the great experiment was flawed from the start by its genocide of the American Indian, the rapid drift toward empire, and the emergence of a capital-dominated oligarchy. And the system is beginning to suffer distortions of its basic constitutional foundations in the creation of a hidden government of covert agencies. The issue of democracy ceases to match state boundaries and becomes a de facto tyranny of indulgent consumers, e.g. their Iphone fetishism, and the hidden proletariats who create them in the coltan mines of Eastern Congo, and the 'industrial mills' of the Foxconn corporation. The American system is thus a de facto hybrid of capitalist and concealed statist communism, in its dependence on exploited labor in defiance of worker rights.

those who confront capital as wage earners. With an especial focus on the rapidly growing ranks of the 'non-working class', the orphans of outsourced exploitation and automation. To promote the proletariat against all other classes, sub-classes, and/or lumpenproletariats, was an unsuccessful strategy. The proletariat should be the focal point of a larger entity that can merge into a universal class.

Or the older language of revolution can focus not on class, but on the principles of equality, etc, creating a unified universal group as the set of revolutionaries from all classes. This might also help to create a dialectical synthesis of proletarian and bourgeois revolutions. The proletariat is an abstraction, and for contemporary Americans a phantom of distant more

easily exploited masses of workers, the sweatshops that make their iPhones, out of sight of the commodity fetishism at play. The communist revolution that we know was a bourgeois revolution of the party class. We should be honest and allow 'bourgeois' revolutions of a new universal class to create communism and equality by the book as ventures in revolutionary idealism. We are out of time and can't quite locate the proletariat. Lenin was tacitly right: the revolution must be that of the revolutionaries in place, a vanguard. If they betray the result, it will collapse, as did the Bolshevik. In any case the proletarian keynote is crucial, but needs to be understood. The one communist revolution that succeeded was that of a vanguard action in the context of Russia's long delayed liberal/democratic revolution.

The context of the nation state is passing, and the globalization of

The end of the end of history?

The idea of the 'end of history' is an oddity, yet our new model of history, despite a mismatch with Hegelian thinking, shows a once a partial solution to the riddles: in a distinction of temporal and transtemporal concepts. The notion of the 'end of history' is too ragged to work in the sense intended. Thus the apt idea of the 'end of the end of history' emerged to challenge the concept. This makes the confusion even worse, yet in our model we have a better explanation: after its last transition our system can simply go into decline and chaotify. The most probable outcome in the wake of the Axial Age shows not the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, but a religious vehicle, Christianity, emerging as a rescue vehicle for a civilization in decline, and deadlocked on slavery. The emergence of communism in tandem with the democratic and Industrial revolutions suggests just this prophetic anticipation of a rescue vehicle at the degenerating end of free markets gone amuck. The 'end of history' idea fails to consider that liberal democracy will simply go into decline as it becomes a fascist combination of Capital domination. The obvious corrective is to distinguish democracy from the reign of capitalism.

capital has been a factor. The American Revolution suggests the framework for a revolutionary action against global colonialism toward a communist federation of democratic/socialist states as republics.

As our model gives some meaning to the 'end of history' concept, it immediately exposes it as a hack, with a question about how 'nature'

could measure freedom. And we could hardly apply this ‘teleology’ to a system that degenerates over time and distorts ‘freedom’. It is worth noting that the first modern revolution in the ‘end of history’ dynamic, was the Münzerian version of proto-communism. The decay into ‘bourgeois revolution’ and democratic facade begins almost immediately.



Fig. 1.7

We will actually take the ‘end of history’ very seriously, more perhaps than it deserves, attempting to see this meme in the context of our study of history, which shows recursive action related to emergent freedom. We call this the discrete freedom sequence. The idea of democracy is in search of its full meaning, and thus generates communism. But communism is in search of its full realization, and thus wants to reinvent democracy.

It useful to study the American revolutionary war: a classic bourgeois revolution, and colonial revolt. But with a democratic uptide that took the result from republicanism to democracy, in the process creating a Bill of Rights. There are no rights in a revolution, save natural rights, for there is no government. But we should admire the wisdom of the Founders to have passed gracefully from revolutionary dictate to a democracy and a bill of rights (they were offered the choice of monarchy). The legacy of Bolshevism tends to imprint the suggestion that the revolutionary dictate should be permanent and disallow all forms of rights law in the building of socialism.

In fact token elements were present as fronts in the all presentations of constitutional dictate. But they were dead letters.

But the standard democratic framework has become a complete failure.

Fukuyama's discussion of the First and Last Men is not without interest, toss it the mix, but we have already simpler and more comprehensive interpretation starting with a simple question about what happened to the 'first man', *homo erectus*, as he became the 'men of *homo sapiens*', with a question again, is he the 'last

Kirkpatrick Sale in *The Last Eden: The Evolution of Human Domination*, exposes the environmental destruction emerging in the intoxication of the new breed of *homo sapiens*. These are the 'original sins' that the Old Testament senses but can't put in an evolutionary context.

man'? We can flip the terms again to pose Nietzsche's challenge to the 'last man' of the era of the Iron Cage, the hegemonic era of capitalism, etc...Who then is the first man? Nietzsche misses the point lost on Darwinists that survival of the fittest to produce a new man won't work because it cannot generate speciation, which must be a 'macro' process that operates on that species as a whole.

The system of global exploitation can have bogus local consent while being a tyranny of the now greater global majority. And the mental state of the voting majority is so perverted by propaganda and mind control as to be considered unfree. The system of finance has essentially taken control of governmental institutions, while the covert agencies, or unknown hidden factions of the MILIT-COMPLEX have created an organized campaign of global and home terrorism. It is significant that voter participation is so low: that is a symptom of the reality, democracy has disappeared. Moving toward a larger global framework the power of corporate fascism demands confrontation and final expropriation.

It is dangerous to wisecrack the classic canon, and leads to counterrevolutionary compromise, but thinking the unthinkable is inevitable at this point. It is not hard to solve this problem: shaking up 'marxism' simply reanimates its core insights. The irony here is that the Russian revolution did not produce communism, save in name only, so therefore its collapse is a step toward a truer 'end of history'. Does the term 'end of history' have any meaning, any longer? But its equivocations are a useful exercise. It seems that age of the Fukuyama interpretation has passed. The term has a

most alarming meaning for a new generation confronting 4C degrees of temperature rise. Fukuyama risked the ironic reversal of his term, supposedly Hegelian, lately neo-con. Nonetheless, a neo-communist initiative must face the questions of 'state capitalism', the failures there, and the anathema of *laissez-faire* fanaticism. In fact, the idea is *terra incognita*, and we should feel confident that this issue is resolvable to a robust postcapitalist type of economy.

Speaking for oneself, one must confess to have learnt much about marxism from its critics. Those critics would be appalled to think they converted someone to the 'ism'. The canon is too much sophistry. so the doubters make useful reading. One was dutifully attentive to the many, often excellent, critiques of the canon, consider Kolakowski's *Main Currents of Marxism*, but now these exposes seem stale. These works are protests against Bolshevism. The communist idea can actually thrive under such critiques. Too many converts in the cadre have never read the critics. A similar criticism might attend the histories of, say, the Russian Revolution. An outside view is needed, but the faithful don't not read such works, and have a fictional account in mind. On top of this the monumental sophistries of marginal economics elude those steeped in defenses of the labor theory of value. A new critique is needed. Indeed, Marx took up the study of calculus as he became aware of Jevons.

If our starting assumption is right, we don't care at this point if communism is less efficient as a system of production. In a situation already complex enough, the very basis of the growth economy is under scrutiny. Many of the institutions of capitalism need new versions in a new society, viz. the communist entrepreneur innovating for motives beyond profit, etc... The idea of communism needs a kind of Ctrl Alt Del to reboot. The lineage of the idea is that of liberal modernity: it must both fulfill and transcend that legacy in the traditions of the democratic revolutions of modernity. But somewhere in the wake of the 1848 period the hatred of liberal capitalism generated a detestation of the newly won rights legacies of the democratic revolution. Not surprising. Capitalism thrived on the ambiguities of rights logic turned on its head, beside the 'libertarian' corruption of the idea of freedom.

It is a tricky question. World history shows the revolution for the state, and then the revolution against the state. The Bolshevik phase shows the revolution against the state turning into the revolution for the state. A confusing, yet understandable failure: the revolution against capitalism will

not be anarchic utopia: the last phase of globalization is a global revolution for the global state, which may not mean world government. Ironically the American Revolution shows a primitive model for a new global revolution against American imperialism/colonialism, moving toward a global Federation of socialist democracies.

One of the problems with the marxist legacy has been a confusion of theory next to a critically acute expose of ideology and class. The praxis of Marx and Engels was brilliant, while their place in the world of post-Hegelian philosophy was ambiguous in its embrace of scientism, and this matched with a confusing rendition of the dialectic. The result has been a series of confusions that have never come to any stable theory of the subject. The issue of history in the versions of historical materialism has reflected the reductionist world of nineteenth century positivism, and the result seems to have been another tale of the Man in the Iron Cage.

Beside this the legacy of Darwinism by the left of the era of Marx has been the disgrace of Social Darwinism seemingly unchallenged. It can be shown that the left's defense of this brand of evolutionism has ignored, if not suppressed, Marx's acute insight into the ideological character of Darwin's

Consider the tenor of the American revolution, before the mystique of theory took hold. Revolutionaries without theory proceeded to create a republic, a democracy, with a system of rights. Intelligent men yet often short of literacy were quite able to comprehend what was to be done. If they had been confronted with a theory of what they were doing, they might have failed. A new democratic revolution for a system of communist postcapitalism similarly requires no 'theory', rather a robust set of principles to be realized, as a course correction to the original betrayed democratic revolutions of the early modern.

theory. But his first intuition seems to have been filtered out. It is useful at this point to consider the need for a new perspective on history and evolution, and this work can help to set a new foundation for the study of the emergence of civilization. Those who embrace Darwinism will end by adopting class warfare as an evolutionary imperative, based on a bogus theory.

Nietzsche got one thing right: we seem to have become a civilization of 'last men'. But what does that mean? His thinking, while a seductive siren call to intelligent beginners, is dangerous terrain indeed. It is surprising to realize that audacious fellow was locked in the Iron Cage with the rest. His basic conception was wrong, a sort of buddhist parodism, and the recipe

for the overman must have been late nineteenth century gothic, a grotesque hybrid of Conan the Barbarian and the blond beast. The dawn of the Age of Frankenstein movies was at hand. Still, he forced the issue of an idea that was to become an orphan near the New Age movements, and the religions of India. It is the last men who must create a global commune, to stage a foundation for the New Man.

It is hard to trace Nietzsche's thinking, cleverly Darwinist and anti-Darwinist (there are opposite-named books on this subject), but it appears that the components of a reductionist version of Schopenhauer's theme of the Will in nature has produced a false crypto-Darwinian model of the first man to come after the last man. Man shall not live by the will to power alone, and the confusion here, mixed with the Darwinist toxin, helped to seed the eugenic calamity of the Nazi movement. The world of 'cute Nietzsche' produced in the wake of the world war by such scholars as Walter Kaufman is misleading. Here the future evolution of man as a species must spring from a true communism of cooperative men. It is not a competition of economic degenerates plying Ayn Rand and the mantra that 'greed is good'.

The dislike of idealism lurks nearby. If Schopenhauer's notorious reactionary sentiments in full evidence during the year 1848 seem to discredit the idealist (in reality the quite different 'transcendental idealist' of the Kant legacy), the reality is that the notion of the 'Kingdom of Ends' points to a brilliant foundation for both liberalism and communism. Indeed, the Kantian socialists were strong fellow travelers of the Second Internationale. But the pointless compromises of Bernstein give the appearance of conservatizing the basic idea. The reality is that a true culture of communism must embrace the 'dialectical full spectrum of philosophy' and be wary of downshifting into a 'one track mind', whether materialist, or idealist. In any case, nineteenth century positivism and materialism, pitted the one on the other, make a useless foundation for a project that must integrate global cultures. The innings of idealism and materialism are a permanent stalemate. Why choose?

The question of the future evolution of man is an issue of critical importance, but it is essential to face the reality that man as he is cannot yet produce a correct theory of his own evolution. Darwinism has been overpromoted on the basis of poor science. And the issue of design is being forced on scientists by proponents of (religious) design arguments. Human society is not yet mature enough to really resolve the question. And it may be that the emergence of *homo sapiens* is something beyond our grasp, so far. If that is the case we need to at least stop the idiotic fiction of economic

survival of the fittest logic as a form of the evolution of higher men. One of the ironies of Nietzsche's thinking is that the 'last men' are, it seems, his greatest fans, and imbibe the nuttier versions of the genre in the superman comic, and the idiotic philosophy of Ayn Rand.

We should remain wary of the issue of evolution: we can make a strong case that world history shows the resolution to the riddle. And we cannot rule out 'design' arguments near the emergence of *homo sapiens*. A look at the sufi writer J. G. Bennett's claims that forms of mind exist in nature beyond the 'life' principle, yet able to tutor and 'evolve' sentient life to the threshold of 'consciousness', can teach us to be wary of the evolution question, not excluding the view of New Agers like Bennett. The reality may have been glimpsed by writers of science fiction: between bodies of light (or pure consciousness), computers flying at the speed of light and able to dispense information in biofields, the plot thickens, and, well, we are still a primitive species of ape. The evolution of mind, consciousness (in reality, the term 'self-consciousness' should be used), and language have clearly stalled the development of a true theory of human evolution. And the threshold of mind, first glimpsed in the early primates, perhaps, may be a crossing as discontinuous as that of the onset of life, another unsolved riddle.

Here, in fact, a society founded in a form of a new communism, a work in progress, can begin to 'relax into posthumanity' in the long, very long, quest for the New Man. The idea that capitalist overdrive will lead to a higher species of man is one of the most dangerous poisons produced in the era of scientism. And if you market such things your fan base among the last men will buy it. And now the Randian parody is actually threatening to become public policy.

The world crisis needs something more than a *gedanken* experiment. But it is useful to pause and confine our study to the theoretical. And that includes the theory of revolution. That theory warns us that all the achievements of liberty in the early modern were due to revolution, next to the Burkean hysteria nonetheless warning against revolutionary chaotification. The Russian revolution has confused the issue, because, say conservatives, communism replaced democracy: its character was different, why? Our situation is different: revolutions are transnational now. The power of the state may already be too far gone to challenge as free market totalitarianism overtakes the scenes of freedom. The question of revolutions and their strategies is, as we run out of time, confronted with the irony that revolution is already in existence from the right in the emerging leviathan of covert action in the seemingly insuperable consolidation of capitalist powers. And after 9/11 the perception of massive criminal behavior in the governmental

complex raises the issue of state legality. The question of legality is thus ambiguous, given the behavior of coopted politicians complicit in the erosion of democracy. Further the imperialist crimes of the American system remind us that 'we the people' refers to a global public, with de facto rights against the oppressor. We can see that when the 'end of history' propaganda is understood as false, the public will see the dangers of their position. A project of 'neo-communism' is a useful exercise in any case, and refers to a global system of federated entities. Capitalist 'end of history' ideology is a dangerous and mesmerizing fixation that could imply the social darwinist destruction of billions planetwide. The thesis of unchecked 'free markets' resolving a planetary crisis is the thinking of lunatics.

Notes

The prime objective of this work is therefore to examine a new historical framework for the idea of communism, in the process looking at the place of revolution in the rise of modernity. The symbology of the year 1848 is a powerful one, and we can attempt to decode the mysterious logic of that seminal year, in which the *tour de force* of Marx/Engels began to take form as one version of the emerging idea of communism.

The 'end of history' propaganda confronts the suspicion that the first projections of the modern revolutionary transition were proto-communist, and the democratic revolutions were the coopted brands of bourgeois revolution.

It is time to face reality on the left: the legacy of Marx/Engels will not get a second coming. Strangely, it is also true that the legacy is fine the way it is. In this kind of situation, it is the mechanized format that stalls. Changing a set of mental habits can create that second to third coming. It simply needs a recasting. We can and must create a new version of that legacy, and nothing in that run of innovation requires abandoning the original, as an historical inspiration. But the idea of a 'new communism' has to be sure it is not a Stalinist hallucination. We have delayed this rethinking too long, seduced by the endless half-measure solutions on the way, from social democratic to the issue activism of splinter groups of engaged radicals. It may seem that we have already lost the game, and that the world of Capital and its elites is too powerful now to challenge. It is easy to argue that a social democratic compromise is more realistic, but we have heard this strain over and over



Fig. 8 Engels on
Müntzer: he believed
in “a society with no class differences, no private
property and no state authority independent
of, and foreign to, members of society”
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Muntzer

Some material brought
forward from Ch. 2



Fig.9

The modern transition begins with a ‘reformation’ (as did the Israelite and the Indic) and this leads rapidly to an emergent ‘secularism’ still under definition. We should not forget this ‘reformation’ began with two religious movements, that of Luther and that of Müntzer. The latter gives the first prophetic glimpse of a potential communist society.

Important and essential discussions of the tactics of non-violence, often in the name of religion, need to correctly assess the strategies that earned the modern realm of freedom. It is also important to consider that the most violent confrontations of the early modern were the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. This violence was almost unending up to the conclusion of the Thirty Years War. And the earliest phase of the Reformation shows the onset of a communist realization of Christianity, rapidly and violently suppressed by the Lutherans. We may suspect that the bourgeois revolution was born in the destruction of the Müntzerian movement. Thus the whole of the modern revolutionary movement shows evidence of being coopted from the start. The modern marxist movement seems intuitively aware of this ‘modernity manque’ phenomenon as it moves to reassess the democratic revolutions.

for half a century, and our situation has suffered a further erosion, in the midst of many technological and economic successes, of the basics of sane government. We must at least suspect that social democratic way stations are proving to be mirages.

The legacy of historical materialism, beside the mystifications and obscurities of *Capital*, is a drag on the creative action needed to create a new Communism. The legacy is useful if attempts to define a new communism derail in false compromises. The book can only make a small contribution, and gives a useful exposition of a new way of thinking about history and evolution, a new context for the powerful critique of ideology given by Marx and Engels, with an exit strategy from historical materialism, remaining with much of the content of that theory. The book is arranged so that you can 'start immediately' with a new model of history, as nothing more than an outline, and then proceed to create a new program of action in the context of that history. It is unnecessary to try and reduce sociological history to economic categories. Economies are not the fundamental issue of history, and have no natural laws to demand passive allegiance. Capitalism as a stage of history is nonsense. When will the end to that stage come? When the planet reaches mean temperature rises of two to six degrees of warming?

The confusion arises in part because the latent capitalism present since the Paleolithic trade in obsidian underwent a virtual phase change to capitalism all over again in the period of the modern transition, in a complex upgrade, and this from the way a whole series of factors came together at a significant moment: the proto-Darwinism and *laissez-faire* thinking of Smith, the Industrial Revolution, the financial revolutions of capital manipulations, and the revolutionary context of emergent democracy, beside the technological revolution in the background. It was hard not to see this tidal shift as an epochal fixation. But somehow the idea arose of the historical inevitability of this stage of history. The reality is that Adam Smith himself has been quietly displaced by the cabal of Capital domination.

Marx and Engels fought this idea, that capitalism was an inevitable phase, but in some ways succumbed to it. But we can already see the basic ideas gestating in Archaic Greece, and elsewhere. If there is a stage of anything, it is the 'new age' of modernity, and its immense spectrum of innovations, among them the combinations of industrialization via finance capital. Well before Darwin, the reactionary Malthus gave birth to the kind of 'social darwinism' that matched to the nostrum that 'greed is good', from Smith,

or Smith's successors, that was to infect the putative stage of capitalism, and the novels of Dickens.

The book is designed to be a short book inside a longer book: the *Preface* through the second chapter, with the original Chapter 3 turned into an Appendix amplifying the historical model developed. In fact, the reader is ready to go after touching on Chapter 2. We must analyze situations, not theories. And neo-classical economics is a fraud that simply pretends to refer to reality. Those theories are vacuous and tell us nothing. We can simply disregard them.

The purpose is not to inflict a new theory on the left, but to dismiss theories. However, the 'macro' model points to what a real theory would be like, given the full dataset needed. Endless possibilities of study, theory, and analysis are there, but the basic objective is to walk within an hour with a simple and coherent outline of history, with a set of hypotheses on the side. Marxism has tended to produce confusion due to its complexity, and ambiguity, and Marx's failure to complete his project. The many critics of that set of theories are unread by most leftists, who defend the canon sophistically.

Theories of history are not possible after the fashion of physics. The phase of scientism embraced by the generation of Marx and Engels could, after all the labors of Kant, find no place for free agency in history. Are such theories really needed? The historian's art is a 'story' told about 'free agency' and its agents. It is virtually impossible to produce a theory of such, although, again, the generation of Kant discovered the remotely abstract 'in principle' starting point for that in conceptions of the 'causality of freedom', the trick play of a new form of the philosophy of history. But it is very hard to produce a practical theory of this.

Those who wish to do so can try to create a theory from our new style of model, but the bottom line is that we cannot produce a theory of history without a foundational theory of human evolution, which we lack. We will instead move toward models, which can be a series of hunches about historical dynamics. And world history has a most mysterious 'answer' to the question of dynamics, ironically discovered as we pass beyond 'cliche' scientism. But a more useful approach is to use the model as an outline, to study the chronicle of civilization by 'bare noticing', an empirical set of issues, with a set of conjectures about possible theory.

The theme of the Last Man, and the First, is finally one of human

If our historical thesis to be useful it should be almost immediate in its application—as an outline, summary chronicle, or even a Table of Contents. This outline carries a concealed model of a new way of looking at history. But the issue of the outline is simple:

We see world history since the invention of writing as a simple progression of epochs,

the succession to the phase of Egypt, Sumer, with the Neolithic succession to lead up to this

the succession to the phase of trans-Eurasian classical civilizations, often called the Axial Age

the incipient epoch called ‘modernity’ as a ‘new age’ trigger for a rapidly forming global oikoumene...

That’s it. We are ready to go. But this outline contains an extremely complex deep structure that we can study incrementally with our outline. We can reinvent ‘historical materialism’ as the study ad hoc of the economies at each of these stages. But a deterministic theory won’t really work for world history. No general theory is going to work. If we relax the obsessive hold of economic fundamentalism we suddenly see a fuzzy version of historical materialism spring to life as the study of class and ideology under ‘economic determination’, but not determinism. The real value of this is that we see that we are free to create a post-capitalist system, ASAP. There are no historical laws preventing this. And this method is useful in the way it points beyond Eurocentrism, transcends material/spiritual interpretations, adopts a robust secular futurism even as it both explicates and contextualizes the place of the world religions not just in antiquity but in the proximate present.

This outline contains a host of implicit properties, best expressed by a finite transition model of a series of transitions. The significance of the year 1848 is that of the conclusion to the modern transition and the onset of a new era generated in the early modern. Just at this point the framework of communism emerges in the mix, and tokens the kind of ‘chase plane’ rescue vehicle we see in antiquity in the wake of the Axial Age.

evolution. And the achievement of a communist society should be one of an intelligently relevant perspective on human evolution, beyond the social darwinist reign of the Darwinian theory. Human evolution remains a mystery, and the potential dangers of the survival of the fittest ideology are already an historical fact. The collation of economic ideology and evolutionary pseudo-science is a core illusion of capitalism.

The issue with our chronicle in outline is that we can see by inspection that capitalism is not a stage of history, It is present from the beginning in the impulse to truck and barter. But the overall pattern of economic function, since the Neolithic is a combination of state control of economies mixed with degrees of freedom in economic formations of civil society. Only in the context of the last phase of our chronicle does the anomaly of absolute freedom of market economies come to the fore. It seems at first like a new stage of economic history, then it is claimed as something that was always so. But a closer look shows an artifice of the cabals of finance and a libertarian obsession to worship market anarchism as an absolute. Such an extreme evoked immediate revolutionary challenge. If the first wave failed, the next wave will follow apace. The system will tear itself to pieces at the conclusion, which is rapidly approaching. Better, especially given the evidence of real planetary damage created by this over-hyped mentality, to foresee the endgame, and choose a path of rationality. It will revert to the norm, mercantilist hybrids, or else to a truly rational potential, perhaps a renewed idea of communism. But the irrationality of capitalist logic is content to trash a planet, and expect to find another, as a result of too much science fiction, it seems. The reality of a failed species snuffed out at the dawn of cosmic contact is extinction.

The project of a 'new communism' is both a continuation of the democratic revolution, but also a kind of cultural integrator and post-religious meta-religion at the last phase of globalization, our present. Real globalization is visible in world history as more than economic. A new world culture is coming into being to surpass the barbarism of pseudo-civilization.

This task requires something more than nineteenth century positivism. This phase in the emergence of science was seen at once to be problematical by many, such as Kant, and we should consider the full complement of emergent factors that make up modernity. The idea of freedom, one of the most revolutionary manifestations of modernity, is a stumbling block for scientism, as the cult of reductionist literalism attempts to make free will a superstition. The taboo on voluntarism in the marxist cadres, next to a preposterous flourish of the dialectic, are evidences of the ad hoc character

of the outcome of the modern transition. Our historical model can help to explain this sudden downshifting in the wake of the larger transition beginning in the sixteenth century.

A project of cultural reformation must address the most difficult



Fig. 1.10 *Cottonopolis*: Manchester, England

and controversial of issues, that of religion. Here, it seems clear that the generation of Feuerbach, in the wake of the era of Hegel and German Classical philosophy, produced an oversimplified version of the more robust secularism of the Enlightenment. It was this legacy that overtook the marxists of the later nineteenth century. The combination of an illusory materialism, de Holbachian atheism, Darwinian fundamentalism, produced a combination of issues and ideas that was in turn cryptically conservatized by that clever reactionary Nietzsche whose spell has produced a mysterious strain of thought often charged with some influence in the coming of fascism. This situation has actually reseeded the religious formation of pre-modernity, unable to digest this 'lately modern' brand of contracted secularism. We might remember that the Reformation commenced the dawn of the modern age, that the Puritans played a direct role in the English Civil War, and that Quakers quite before the revolutionary left of the era of Marx, ignited the struggle for abolition. We must conclude from the evidence of the Reformation onward that secularism does not equate to anti-religion.

That said, the context of our larger study which will explore the

phenomenon of the Axial Age will suggest the reasons for the 'secular' challenges to the 'religions' inherited from that seminal age. We can foresee the transformations of these religions in the cauldron of modernity. It does not follow that dogmatic atheism equates to secularism. To have required of two billion monotheists that they embrace atheism to found socialism was a thorough confusion. A simple agnosticism, and a historical study of religion, might be more practical here. In any case, the rise of the modern ignited what we see now as the far flank of secularism: the tide of New Age movements precipitating a more robust secular post-religion. Whatever the case, we can see that modernity is almost like a second 'Axial Age', which we should note gave birth to more than religion: in Archaic Greece we see many of the seeds of the modern secular era in gestation. The modern transition is confusing in this regard because it seems to proceed beyond the category of 'religion' in order to possibly reinvent it.



2. 1848+: THEORY, IDEOLOGY, AND REVOLUTION

Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.

The Communist Manifesto, 1848

2.1 The Crisis of Globalization

As the world system reaches a point of crisis, in the environmental endgame of globalization, the collision of market economies with planetary ecology once again forces questions about the status of capitalism as a vehicle for the social forces of production. The phenomenon of economic ideology, with its paralyzing effect on the public discourse required for emergency action, reignites the classic debates that attended the birth of modern market capitalism. The crisis of 2008 evokes the classic legacy of Marx and Engels.

Confronted with climate change the self-regulating market has clearly broken down, its mythology seen as delusive. We must wonder if the collapse of Bolshevism was not inevitable on the way to a communist end of history. *Homo sapiens* is on the verge of destroying a planet. The failsafe starts to look downright predestined. But ‘historical inevitability arguments’ have



Fig. 2.1 Steel Works, 1907

confused the issues. If the coming of postcapitalism is inevitable, we must adopt the thought experiments of a ‘new communism’ to forestall the high-tech barbarism of the coming of socialism for the 1%.¹

The mesmerizing effect of the immersion in the artificially created world of markets now reaching a final planetary expansion of scale has blinded its participants who seem to have lost contact with reality, including a distorted perspective on the larger context of history, and beyond that of evolution. The now classic Leninist question, What is to be done? haunts the regime of ‘*laissez-*

faire’, as we equivocate the passivity implied in that term, the stream approaching a falls.

But it does not require a crisis to advocate a postcapitalist projection. As in the gloom of a Dickens novel, the capitalist frenzy was always on its way to a true beginning of an economic system as the outcome of modernity. Advocates of the temporary phase of hi-tech barbarism have nearly frittered away the possibility. The question of economy remains unsolved by modernity.²

1 V.I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?* (www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/) Bill McKibben, *The End of Nature* (Random House, 2006). Michael Mann & Lee Kump, *Dire Predictions: Understanding Global Warming - The Illustrated Guide to the Findings of the IPCC* (New York: DK Publishing, 2008).

2 The Faustian economics behind the 2008 crisis is detailed in: *The Devil's Derivatives: The Untold Story of the Slick Traders and Hapless Regulators Who Almost Blew Up Wall Street . . . and Are Ready to Do It Again*, Nicholas Dunbar and Michael Hudson, *The Monster: How a Gang of Predatory Lenders and Wall Street Bankers Fleeced America- and Spawned a Global Crisis* (St Martin, 2010).



Fig. 2.2 View
From Apollo 17

Globalization, Postcapitalism, and the ‘End of History’

The modern period shows the emergence of the phenomenon of revolution, from the sixteenth century onward, with the French and American revolutions at the climax, ushering in the era of democratic republics.

This phenomenon immediately passed into a prophecy of a ‘next and final’ revolution to complete the creation of democracy in a phase of post-capitalist communism.

This strange conjunction of elements makes sense in our own time as the crisis of capitalism demands a rational response on the level of global civilization. We can see the prophetic omens at the start in Münzer, and the *Utopia* of More.

The idea of the ‘end of history’ has been wrongly understood, and emerged in the wake of the Hegelian philosophy of history and became a staple of economic ideology as legitimation. The term, however, was never used by Hegel who nonetheless seems to point to a ‘teleology of emergent freedom’, and we see that, rightly understood, the term ‘end of history’ can be understood in this sense. As we study the macro effect we will see that indeed the appearance of democracy and the associated socialism/communism are part of a larger macroevolutionary process, as remarkable as that might seem. A powerful model is required to see the relation of emergent freedom and teleology.

We can see that the short term history of ‘communism’ has distorted its meaning, and discredited its application. But this failed history was never truly relevant as an instance of communism, whose meaning is simply that of stable postcapitalism in a framework of democracy. This is by definition an aspect of the ‘end of history’.



Fig. 2.3 Proletarian scene

In an ideological ‘*walpurgisnacht*’ of Nietzschean ‘last men’ aping the overman, evidently, via free market competition, the cult of Ayn Rand threatens to remake the culture of capitalism into the cult of a superman comic.³




Fig. 2.4 ‘What is to Be Done’, Chernyshevsky’s version of Lenin’s classic, 1906

Economics, with the fine trappings of mathematics, purports to be a science, but the field seems pervaded by phantoms of theory and is confusing the issue: a closer look is needed to assess its claims on the chronicle of civilization. Is economic evolution the core process of world history? If we take the long view we can see that it is not, and that our situation, whatever the primordial birth of incipient capitalism, came into the existence in the early modern period, most especially at its conclusion in the period of the Industrial Revolution. And at that point the new ideology of market economies came to the fore, with a classic exemplar in the figure of Adam Smith. That Smith issued ‘policy recommendations’, not statements

about economic laws, is a reminder that the economy we ‘should’ adopt is a question of the values we should adopt. Beset with the speculative theories of economic stages of history, marxism has tended to equivocate over the inevitability of a capitalist phase playing itself out. But the mythology of stages is not really born out by the evidence of world history, and, as Adam Smith noted well, advocacy of markets can be delusive, and the core issue is not stages of the inevitable, but doing economics right, from the start.⁴

It is of interest that evolutionary thought emerged at about this time, as with the work of a revolutionary figure, Lamarck, but ended with Darwinism reflecting the core ideology of capitalism in a conservatized rendering. Here the fallacies of Social Darwinism were an accident waiting to happen, and this confusion in the parallel rise of the Darwinian age, continues to stalk economics, often as tacit set of assumptions justifying inequality. And this has ignited a brand of class warfare that threatens the democratic balance achieved in the rise of modernity. The mythology of economics has overtaken our understandings of both history and evolution itself, with an

3 Jennifer Burns, *Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

4 Duncan Foley, *Adam’s Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology* (Harvard University Press, 2006), Nicholas Phillipson, *Adam Smith, An Enlightened Life* (Yale University Press, 2010), Steve Keen, *Debunking Economics - The Naked Emperor Dethroned?* (Zed Books, 2011).

Michael Harrington begins his *Socialism* with a sense of the virtual future:

Socialism has known increments of success, basic failure, and massive betrayal. Yet it is more relevant to the human construction of the twenty-first century than any other idea...This book is about the future of the socialist past ...

If, then, socialism is to have any meaning-past, present or future-a way must be found to distinguish between the various, and often murderously hostile, claimants to its name. And this is particularly important in the 1970s when one is confronted by Russian, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Israeli, African, Cuban, Chilean, Indian, Arab and other "socialisms." In the Tower of Babel that is the Left, is there any empirical test that can establish the difference between the authentic and the spurious socialisms? It was one of the many accomplishments of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to demonstrate how this can be done. One must, they said, go behind the socialist rhetoric of a

Between Marx's death in 1883 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 a mighty labor and socialist movement emerged, and it seemed that the Marxian prediction of working-class revolution was being inexorably fulfilled. Then, in the supreme hour of trial in August, 1914, the socialists betrayed their most fundamental principles, as the workers of Europe, who had solemnly pledged to oppose any bourgeois war, joined their various national armies to slaughter one another. European socialism has not yet recovered from that moment and it may never do so, for it raises the most basic questions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat.

given movement and discover who is making the decisions and what interests are being served. Using those criteria, they realized as 'Young men in the 1840s that the times were giving birth to two new movements: to socialism and to "socialist" anti-socialism. In *The Communist Manifesto* they pointed out that there were reactionary and conservative "socialisms." They told of aristocrats who hated capitalism because it was anti-feudal and wanted to march back to medievalism in the name of "socialism." And there were small businessmen who wanted the capitalist giants who threatened them to be controlled; intellectuals with

blue-printed panaceas; and even utopians among the bourgeoisie itself who dreamed of a harmonious capitalism free of conflict. They all called themselves "socialists."

Harrington raises a key point, but shows the inaccurate valuation of the 'proletariat' which can't be hypostatized as an 'agent of history'.

underground motive echoing an unspoken Nietzschean mythology of last men. This preposterous situation is fed by an ideology of scientism that has misread the meaning of evolution entirely.⁵

Playing the ‘ace’ of the ‘last man’ at the ‘end of history’ evokes the classic propaganda of Fukuyama in his transmission of the legacy of Alexander Kojève to the American neo-cons. This trump played well for a generation,




Fig. 2.5 Newcomen Engine

in the wake of the Bolshevik era, but has turned on itself. The Hegelian mystique, or mystification, plays on the unspoken suggestions of the teleological. But does Hegel have a viable model of historical directionality, one that can place capitalism in the ‘end times’? This plays with, seeds its opposite. The too obvious suggestion is the bad habit of remorphable Hegel ‘plastic’. Can a serious scholar locate the relevant quote? In still another play on the term, the ‘rebirth of history’ is foreseen in the emergent radicalism in the wake of the Great Recession. The thematic of these

neo-cons backfires: the ‘dialectic’ of ‘capitalism’ spawns its ‘communist hypothesis’ with unnerving logical force.⁶

We should zoom out to the scale of world history as a whole to see the artificial character of modern capitalism against the backdrop of a larger cultural evolution. And on that scale the issue of human evolution impinges on the analysis. A grand muddle of class warfare, Darwinian competition, economic ‘survival of the fittest’, and pretensions to superman status for the vulgar rich, has seeded the legitimation tactics of economic processes designed to perpetrate inequality. Here the confusion of democratic freedom, and the economic freedom created in the tide of bourgeois revolution has

5 Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Beacon Press, 1992), Robert Frank, *The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), Barry Werth, *Banquet at Delmonico's: The Gilded Age and the Triumph of Evolution in America* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

6 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (Free Press, 2006), Kojève: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/kojevel>, Alain Badiou, *The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings* (Verso, 2012), Jon Stewart, *The Hegel Myths and Legends* (Northwestern University Press, 1996).




Fig. 2.6 Karl Marx

When Volume I of *Capital* was first published, capitalist industry, though predominant in a few Western European countries, still appeared as an isolated island encircled by a sea of independent farmers and handicraftsmen which covered the whole world...What Marx's *Capital* explained was above all the ruthless and irresistible impulse to growth which characterizes production for private profit and the predominant use of profit for capital accumulation. Since Marx wrote, capitalist technology and industry have indeed spread all over the world...The concentration

of wealth and power in a small number of giant industrial and financial corporations has brought with it an increasingly universal struggle between Capital and Labor.

Ernst Mandel, *Introduction to Capital* Vol I. 1976

The existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. ... This I call the Fetishism ... of commodities.

Marx, *Capital*, Volume I, Chapter One (1867)

It is no accident in our thinking about the 'end of history' (cf. the Notes to this chapter) that *Capital* comes a generation later and has a different character from the classic *Economic-Philosophical* manuscripts

Das Kapital.

Kritik der politischen Oekonomie.

Von

Karl Marx.

Erster Band.

Buch II: Die Produktionsweise des Kapitals.

Zur Kritik der Volkswirthschaft und des Nationalökonomie.

Hamburg

Verlag von Otto Meißner.

1867.

Zwei-Yuki: L. W. Schmidt, 24 Beutler-Str.

created a confusion of terms.⁷

The question of history, and its relationship to evolution, remains an unsolved problem of science. The theory of history remains dominated on the one hand by Darwinian assumptions of human evolution, and on the other by economic ideologies that postulate the action of markets as inherent natural systems. These assumptions are controversial, and under suspicion of contributing to the unfolding crisis. A still larger framework, history since the Big Bang (sometimes called 'Big History') shows the right context for human evolution, and the emergence of history. But the result suffers the fallacies of the 'science of history' genre. Here, in a kind of descant, the philosophy of history poses the question of freedom in history, in a subject more than physics, and ends with the realization that we ourselves have chosen a form of economic determination, resulting in a kind of alienation of our proper self-consciousness. We have means to resolve the economic fixation with a more balanced view of the historical process.⁸



Fig. 2.8 Marx and Engels

The classic symptom of the problematical relationship of history and evolution is the phenomenon of Social Darwinist 'applied evolutionism', with eugenic overtones, which has injected the mythology of natural selection into the questions of social class. Rogue evolutionism is rampant in the borderline fascism of elite economic presumption, and the legitimation of increasingly harsh class division is a tacitly enjoined as the survival of the fittest. This outlook, disguised behind a claim for science, and matched with an often unstated, or denied, set of assumptions about economic inevitability, is pressed to justify the dominant view, which is creating the crisis.

The term 'economic inevitability' is an echo of the famous challenge to the Marxist from Isaiah Berlin as to the application of determinism to historical events. This critique, made on the left, has endured as the unstated shibboleth of those who find the nature of markets to be conveniently determined by what seem like laws of nature. The critique was all on one

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⁷ David Graeber, *Debt: The First Five Thousand Years* (Melville House, 2011), Rondo Cameron, *A Concise Economic History of the World: From Paleolithic Times to the Present* (Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁸ Cynthia Stokes Brown, *Big History: From the Big Bang to the Present* (The New Press, 2008), John Landon, *World History and The Eonic Effect (Civilization, Darwinism, and Theories of Evolution* (NY: South Fork Books, 2012)

The Invisible Hand

The part of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) which describes what future generations would consider to be Smith's invisible hand, ironically, does not use the term. The process by which market competition channels individual greed is most clearly described in Book I, Chapter 7:

By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.

Joseph E. Stiglitz notes:

Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, is often cited as arguing for the “invisible hand” and free markets: firms, in the pursuit of profits, are led, as if by an invisible hand, to do what is best for the world. But unlike his followers, Adam Smith was aware of some of the limitations of free markets, and research since then has further clarified why free markets, by themselves, often do not lead to what is best. As I put it in my new book, *Making Globalization Work*, the reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is often not there. Whenever there are “externalities”—where the actions of an individual have impacts on others for which they do not pay, or for which they are not compensated—markets will not work well. Some of the important instances have long understood environmental externalities. Markets, by themselves, produce too much pollution.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_hand/

side. The principle illusion of the globalization crisis is a set of assumptions not about how markets should operate, and that their very existence is a natural phenomenon. The crisis of rampant marketization imploding as a crisis of climate change that is threatening planetary survival should jolt us out of this compliance with the inevitable: we are free to step out of economic passivity. An underground, and unspoken, Social Darwinist prejudice has come into existence as class ideology.

These spurious generalizations litter the foothills of the much sought for historical science. Here, beside Berlin, the work of Karl Popper, a disillusioned leftist of an older generation, produced a critique of what he called 'historicism', and this was not unlike the challenge of Berlin to produce an account of freedom in history. It is perhaps indelicate to point out that these views, as critiques of the revolutionary left, apply equally to the capitalist fantasies of the increasingly rightist capitalist factions. Thus the critique of ideology is itself ideology, capitalist historicism. But it should be granted that the Marxist theory of historical materialism is as problematical as the economic interpretations of history that it sought to replace. The issue is not historical materialism, but the embedded character of economies inside a larger matrix of culture. In fact the lineage of Marx's 'historical materialism' was one and the same, and many of the confusions of economics are carried over into that theory. However, its attempt to see through the ideological miasma of the world of Adam Smith makes it the correct starting point, if we can assess its own history, theories of revolution, and cantankerous dispute between materialism and idealism.⁹

The insights of Marx and Engels into ideology seem more relevant than ever, but are marred by the venture into historical theory in the formulations of historical materialism. A new historical model might wrest the great first achievement of Marx/Engels and their predecessors from its positivistic reductionism, which seems now like the trappings of fashion around a deeper insight we should conserve, in the process engaging the sources of economic and evolutionary ideology masquerading as Darwinism. We can leave Marx's theory as is, inside a superset of quasi-dialectical expansions of context. A tendency toward reverence toward a prophet has made a canon out of a piercing insight, and a better approach might follow the path of the continual upgrade. The materialism of the early positivists seems out of date now, and is not essential to the core insights of that prophetic duo,

⁹ Isaiah Berlin, "Historical Inevitability", *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford University Press, 1969), Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, (Routledge, 1991).

The Invisible Hand: Neo-classical Economics

Just as Marx was completing his work, the ground shifted toward the mathematical versions of marginalist economics, with their equivocal steps toward reductionist science... We see the onset in the central idea of Walras' theory: the analogy between the functioning of a system independent of independent markets and the equilibrium of a system of bodies in mechanics...

The legacy of this 'pseudo-science' from Walras to Debreu is told in: Bruna Ingraio, Giorgio Israel: *The Invisible Hand: Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science* (MIT, 1990), Steve Keen, *Debunking Economics - The Naked Emperor Dethroned?* (Zed Books 2011), Philip Mirowski, *More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics* (Cambridge, 1989).

Those who have even casually passed through regions of capitalist extraction and / or industrial production have seen that capitalists have almost never been forced to bear the costs of capitalist production ... After depleting resources and causing ancillary destruction capitalists have historically simply moved on to as yet un-depleted and un-destroyed territories. The 'tragedy of the commons' used in capitalist property theory would be a minor inconvenience next to the 'tragedy of private property' perpetrated by capitalism, even if it weren't already a cynical lie (see the last fifth of Marx's *Capital*, Vol. I for context)...Nor is global warming an accident of history for which none bear responsibility...The 'rational individuals' of capitalist theory have aggregated to collective insanity. And as history is in the process of demonstrating, Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' is an illusion—a world of people acting in their own narrow economic interests has resulted in ... collective suicide.

The Political Economy of Climate Change: Why the Free Market Can't Save Us <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/01/11/the-political-economy-of-climate-change/>

Also: <http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/11/04/conservative-intellectuals-and-the-invisible-hand/>

Engels and Marx. The Darwinian theory has been the object of endless critiques, and not just from the camp of religion. It was Marx himself who first wondered if the theory of natural selection was up to the job it was given, and he certainly smelled a rat, the concealed application of (British) economy to nature, and thence the subsequent reapplication of that natural scene back onto economy.¹⁰




Fig. 2.9 Factory Scene, 1875

The resulting incestuous confusions of markets, animal competitors evolving, and the injunction to play the game of the survival of the fittest, in both arenas, has brazenly claimed the mantle of science, with the blessings of many subsequent leftists. But the question of evolution remains unsolved. And by the same token that of human emergence stands equally as an enigma awaiting solution. In fact, it is considered that the question of evolution was solved by Darwin, and that, somehow, the question of history is a lemma to the main thesis. We should wonder rather if the intractable nature of historical theory is not an omen of an equal failure of the theory of evolution claiming to be the gateway to its solution.¹¹

“The Tragedy of the Commons,” Garrett Hardin, *Science*, 162(1968):1243-1248. <http://dieoff.org/page95.htm>. “The rebuttal to the invisible hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketched in a little-known Pamphlet in 1833 by a mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852). We may well call it “the tragedy of the commons,” ...The tragedy of the commons

10 Harold Mah, *The End of Philosophy, the Origin of ‘Ideology’* (University of California Press, 1987), Bhikhu Parekh, *Marx’s Theory of Ideology* (The John Hopkins University Press, 1982).

11 Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (Verso, 2012), Christian Parenti, *Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence* (Nation Books, 2011), Michael Hudson, *The Monster: How a Gang of Predatory Lenders and Wall Street Lenders Fleeced America--and Spawned a Global Crisis* (Henry Holt, 2010), John Foster & Robert McChesney, *The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China* (Monthly Review Press, 2011),

Published the same year as Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, the classic of Polanyi comes full circle in the nemesis of the neoliberal generation....

Nineteenth century civilization has collapsed...This book is concerned with the political and economic origins of this event, as well as with the great transformation which ushered it in...Our thesis is that the idea of a self-regulating market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society...

Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 1944

The discussion of Speenhamland, and destruction of welfare, in the creation of labor markets, resonates with the constant theme now very much in evidence in the Randian sadism wished on the welfare publics. This theme, which goes back to Elizabethan times, or before, becomes toxic in the legacy of Malthus, whose work echoes in Spencer, and then covertly in Darwinian theory.

The legacy of Malthus makes explicit the conjunction of counter-revolutionary ideology, economic class warfare, 'social darwinsim' before the fact, and the hatred and castigation of the poor, a syndrome resurfacing in the cult of Ayn Rand.

Harold Boner, *Hungry Generations: The Nineteenth Century Case Against Malthusianism* (King's Crown, 1955).

develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day

of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy..."



Fig. 2.10 Slavers throwing overboard the Dead and Dying — Typhoon coming on (“The Slave Ship”), Turner.

2.2 The Riddle of Modernity

The question of modern economic organization is part of the larger question of the rise of modernity. It is helpful to see the problem of modernity in a larger perspective, in the context of the philosophy of history, and, as we

will see, evolution. Then the clustering of rapid transitions such as we see in that greater history, and the rise of the modern, is seen as the representation of a teleological process as set of finite stepping intervals, or cyclical recurrences. This approach can free us from the speculative confusion about the modern anomaly with an hypothesis we can take on provision. Then we can set theory aside and return to an empirical account of the rise of modernity as a clustered explosion, like a punctuated equilibrium of the biologists. We may not be able to explain it, but the reality of sudden discontinuity, and massive sudden transformation seems less miraculous. Questions of teleology degenerate into ideology, and can lead to misunderstanding, so we can be wary of this kind of thinking. But it has entered the whole question of the promotion of capitalism, precisely the worst outcome of teleological propaganda. Proponents of postcapitalism should renounce such delusive abuse of teleological thinking.

In any case, economic fundamentalism has failed as historical explanation, and the larger process we discover leaves ‘economies as scripts’ so to speak. The scenario of capitalist inevitability is delusive and false. The decrees of pharaohs about grain storage or the machinations of elites ‘making the rules’ remind us that economies can be modified by men, and don’t determine a larger History, although they may overwhelm it. The progression, village,

World History and The Macro Effect

The issue of economic histories has been powerfully influenced by the imposed ideology of capitalism, and this has tended to be seconded even by leftist challengers to the rise of market culture. But the evidence of world history suggests the secondary character of economic dynamics, and shows how an evolutionary macro driver is at work at a deeper level than the economic. This macro effect in the emergence of civilizations belies the assumptions, from Adam Smith to Darwin of the efficacy of *laissez-faire* and its offspring in theories of random evolution. The emergence of capitalism is a subprocess, or 'emergent nexus' in this larger framework, and was never intended, leastwise by Adam Smith, to be a fully autonomous process of uncontrolled growth.

The macro effect with its finite transition models is a reminder that market-driven globalization is not the full dynamic, visible in the 'macro' globalization of higher civilization.

The confusing ideology of the 'end of history', said to be an Hegelian version of a philosophy of history, has become the football of neo-liberal propaganda, now with a new twist in the claims for the 'return of history'. The meaning of the term has been lost altogether, where it should refer to a purported teleology of freedom, with no connection one way or the other to the question of capitalism. The 'end of history' is thus a reference to some 'end' or goal involved the dynamics of civilization. Taking the long view we can see that there is a spectrum of such processes, and these have no direct connection to economic questions.

The emergence of capitalism in its modern form came with a prophecy of its transient character and passing away as 'communism' as the 'end of history', by definition, in the undefined reference to postcapitalism as an endstate. No law of history entails the 'economic inevitability' of market alienation. Free activity within the system maintains the potential for meta-economic decision, including the decision to exit capitalist implication.

town, city, then states, state exteriors as empires, trade, and technical advance, suggest that the thesis of stages of economic history is false: it is all the same: given the transitions, village, town, city, states plus empires: the trend toward globalization is implicit in state formation.

History is more than brutal materialism. There is an ideal aspect that damps out perhaps, but is real. Slavery is not present at birth in 'grand history'.

Finite Transition Models

A close systems analysis of world history shows the existence of a set of properties best recounted with a finite transition model of a system in sequential alternation, driven development... Historians are constantly stumbling on this without seeing why:

Jacques Barzun in *From Dawn to Decadence* asks, "Granted for the sake of argument that 'our culture' may be ending, why the slice of 500 years [from 1500 to the present]? What makes it a unity?"

It is a vice of history that grows progressively worse. We barely see it in Sumer, and early Egypt, where the first pyramids were constructed, not by slaves, but patriotic farmers conscripted for a sacred task. A millennium later all that is gone, and the 'historical materialism' of slavery has displaced all that with the expansion of brutality. It is thus a fallacy to see the inevitability of a stage of history that requires slavery.¹²

The Roman system, we should note, was a degenerate society, beyond repair, and it was the revolution of the Christians, slow but rising, and soon coopted, that built a new civilization that could escape slavery. That the rise of the modern shows a sudden regression, as the slave ships reach the New World from Africa, seems grounds indeed for the cynicism of students such

¹² The Great Pyramids: a test case? A false kind of unconscious teleological thinking often enters into our thinking about slavery. We have a feeling that it was an inevitable stage of civilization, that the amount of labor involved required this as a sacrifice of the ages, or an inevitable condition of man prior to the liberation of the Industrial Revolution. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking even permeates the assumptions of Karl Marx whose theories of historical materialism are affected by it, as he stripped his system of all forms of 'sentimental idealism'. It is thus remarkable to consider the very early example set by the building of the Great pyramids, which were not built by slaves but a kind of conscript labor or corvee, as with military service in later societies. This instance puts to shame the later emergence of the slave institutions as degenerations of elite exploitation, not stages of techno-economy, and is a liberation from the implicit cynicism of too much elite legitimization of the forms of economic domination as forms of historical inevitability.

Modernity: A Second Axial Age?

The rise of modernity has been the object of many theories, but confounds analysis until it is seen in the larger context of world history, and without the Eurocentric focus on units of analysis such as the 'civilization', as in the 'West' of 'Western' civilization.

The larger picture shows the phenomenon of the Axial Age, a massive global 'evolutionary' leap forward stretching across Eurasia in the middle of the first millennium BCE. The explanation of this mystery requires an expansion of scale, to include the clear evidence of an earlier epoch and 'Axial' effect in early Egypt and Sumer, and in the process of this analysis we see that the rise of the modern world is a miniature Axial Age occurring in the clockwork fashion of mysterious world system. The long backward fringe at the far end of Eurasia was a strategic focal zone for igniting a global transformation.

As we survey this larger picture we see the incomplete evidence for a progression of epochs, 'axial' intervals and 'medieval' or middle periods, and the suggestion is that of our macro effect as a directional driver of civilization.

We can see that this macro process operates beyond the unit of the civilization, and, as the Axial period makes especially clear, operates on differential time slices of civilizations. This clue to modernity shows us a differential transformation in a local region igniting a phase of rapid globalization. This convergence has been confused by the economic factor that came to the fore with the Industrial Revolution and the explosion of market capitalism. But this market-driven globalizer has never been able to create a true global oikoumene, and threatens to outlive its usefulness as it threatens ecological Armageddon, in the fictional world of the 'last man' as rapacious capitalist.

The larger reality of globalization, ongoing since the Neolithic, is that of our macro effect, and its 'Gaian' scale, and metahistorical, if not 'spiritual', progression.

as Marx. But we also see the touch point of the ideal, and, as we will see, the miracle of abolition occurs with the mysterious timing of the modern revolution. It is not a riddle that can be understood without an attempt at 'macro' modeling. It is this regression inside advance that is so puzzling to students of the dynamics of modernity, and it is the very confusion taken up by Marx in his seemingly contradictory perspective.

The sudden rise of the modern world seems to begin in the sixteenth century, with the revolutionary action of the Protestant Reformation, followed by the Scientific Revolution and the birth of liberalism, and the first hints of communism, in the seventeenth century. A three century transition, climaxed by the period of the Enlightenment, and the democratic revolutions escalating towards the end of eighteenth century, seems to pass a threshold initiating a new era in world history, with the explosive take-off the nineteenth century. The onset of modern capitalism is a relative judgment of starting points, and it is either said to have always existed, or to have begun in the sixteenth century, or else to have been born with the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. An idea of 'relative transformations' can help to clarify this 'relativity'.¹³

One of the great confusions of historical analysis is the banishment of ethical idealism. We cannot discuss the issue of politics or revolution in value neutral terms, or via the standard of the Borgias, the world inhabited by Machiavelli. And yet the increasing nihilism of the politician is a notable feature of political history. This passage from WHEE (6.1.1 *From Reformation to Revolution*) suggests the contradictions of the pre-modern legacy of Machiavelli:

Machiavelli is often said to initiate the modern era of politics, but he is a perfectly Janus-faced figure, looking backward and forward at the same time. As our eonic system starts uphill on Mount Improbable, the world of the Borgias, and the anemic 'renaissance', are left behind, and the counsel to the Prince ends in ambiguity. Machiavellianism has no real status as an 'eonic emergent' except as a token of post-Christianity, but becomes a de facto pseudo-standard. But his classic reflections on republicanism will resurface in timely echo at the onset of the American Revolution and the complexity of the integration of separate components of that great new beginning of democracy, or republicanism, both echoes

13 William MacNeill, *The Rise of the West* (University of Chicago Press, 1963), Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence*, (HarperCollins, 2000), E. L. Jones, *The European Miracle* (Cambridge University Press, 1961), *Rethinking World History* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), Marshall Hodgson, Edmund Burke III (ed.) (1993), Ch. 4, "The Great Western Transmutation".

Modernity and The Macro Effect

We tend to think of modernity as of the nineteenth century, but most students of the phenomenon of modernity clock its onset to the sixteenth century without quite knowing why. The evidence is clear in the way the Reformation, and the gestating Scientific Revolution initiate a new era. A study of the macro effect will clarify this phase of the early modern as a kind of transition, concluding at the end of the eighteenth century. Note the way the economic revolution is secondary, comes late, and then proceeds to dominate everything. But modernity is an immensely more complex and subtle phenomenon than the onset of capitalism.

Sixteenth century: Reformation, Copernican Revolution, German Revolution

Seventeenth century: Scientific Revolution, birth of Enlightenment, English Civil War, birth of liberalism

Eighteenth Century: Flowering of multiple Enlightenments, English, German, French, American. Industrial Revolution, French and American Revolutions

The Great Divide: the climactic conclusion of the modern transition

A New Age Begins The onset of a new era of world history rapidly shifting from its frontier jumpstart zone toward globalization

Five Centuries of Modernity We are already by this measure two centuries into a new era, and we begin to see the omens of a decline from the early modern's still primitive, but highly innovative creative energy.

The Question: why is development discontinuous and clustered in a Eurozone, between 1500 and 1800, and how can we define 'secularism'? The model shows the precise sequence of localizations with its transient step in 'Western Eurasia'.

and transcends any interpretation of horizontal politics. Observe how Machiavellian *realpolitik* is outsmarted by the end of the transition as it touches the ideal, even as the politicians reclaim control of state systems, having learned nothing, but mouthing a different set of slogans.

The democratic revolutions would never have occurred under Machiavellian assumptions (although Machiavellian republicanism was an important influence on the early modern). The macro effect has its own unknown evolutionary logic, but always in relation to the ideal. System action and free agency are distinct, and the latter may devolve rapidly into political amorality.

It is a standard confusion to equate the rise of the modern world with its first born, the distinct capitalism, the reign of ‘capital’, that came to the fore in the wake of the revolutionary era of the American and French Revolutions. The achievements of freedom and right that created a new era of freedom also produced an revolution of economic liberty that the participants of the revolutionary transition saw as a contradiction in their premises: the triumphs of economic liberation were paradoxical in creating a new form of social domination, and class division. And it is here that the first challenge to the emergent character of modern economy begins, with the successors to the French Revolution, who saw its failure to complete its essential task, waiting on the true realization of democracy in socialist and finally communist secondary revolutions. The logic of this unfoldment is transparent, or would be, if its outcome in twentieth century confusions



Fig. 2.11 Among the Ruins

and failures had not instead produced a seemingly endless prolongation of the reign of economic fundamentalism. But the issue was clear if the context of ‘bourgeois’ revolution could yield to that of the proletariat.

A first clue to the solution of the problem is the realization that modernity is far larger than the economic stepchild of capitalist domination it bequeathed to its succession. We should avail ourselves of the ‘macro model’ used in the author’s previous works to show that world history contains its own set of answers, to historical dynamism, and evolution, both. The issues of modernity were seminal in all fields, from religion, to science,



Fig. 2.12
Thomas Müntzer

It is clear from the record that the modern world shows the phenomenon of revolution behind all its innovations. From the Reformation and German Peasant Revolution to English Civil War to the American and French Revolution that strange hybrid of active and passive turbulence, at once a sociological tempest, and an engagement of human freedoms, has staged the manner of advance, giving the lie to the hysteria of the Burkean upholders of that phantom, conservatism as an ideology. We have the answer: modernity

is itself a revolution, history a series of such modern moments embedded in a more constant stream, and evolution their totality. Human evolution, at least. In fact, this has been stated from the other direction, in terms of 'axial' ages, or 'axis' points. One of the incidents of modernity is the explosion of historical awareness, and there the discovery of the Axial Age stands out as the symptomatic indication of the nature of historical evolution. And in that canon is to be found the definitional terminology for the 'modern revolution', and its progeny of revolutions. The modern 'Axial Age' is suddenly transparent, as a New Age of Revelation, or, at least, of revolution, if it lack that issue of the more ancient case of spawning in full force the seeds of world religion.

A new model of history can distinguish not just 'macro' and 'microevolution', but 'macro' and 'microrevolution', and 'macroeconomy' and 'microeconomy'. We can see that the macrorevolution of modernity generates a cascade of microevolutions.

"The 1848 uprisings in Germany put Engels in mind of the last great peasant rebellions of the 1500s. As he would later write:

"The parallel between the German Revolution of 1525 and that of 1848-49 was too obvious to be altogether ignored at that time."

Freidriech Engels' *The Peasant War in Germany* is a classic about the gestating 'communist' idea in the early modern.

But his emphasis on historical materialism, while correctly isolating the aspect of class struggle, misses the point that Communism begins as a spiritual movement, echoed still again in the English Civil War, with Gerrard Winstanley.

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/peasant-war-germany/index.htm>

and politics, in an extraordinary tide of innovation that was independent of the gestating forces of economic development, still far short of the level of industrial production, in the regime of capitalism. It is ironically just at the end of a spectacular period of transition that the figure of Adam Smith begins to sense, and explicate, the new form of economy emerging. It is balanced reflection on the spontaneity of markets in relation to state that attempts to achieve perspective on the chronic logjam of economies that characterized the stunted development of civilizations. This mixed message was soon a form of speculative metaphysics claiming the aura of a dynamical myth, soon to pass over into the felicities of Darwinian creationist magic.

If the later apostles of capitalism claimed the achievements of modernity for economy, the leftist challengers to this coup perhaps shared some of the same confusion, with a sense that capitalism must be endured as a phase in a grand sequence. But could not capitalism be simply a tool of man's own devising, open to a swift exit from its confusions in the case of its dangerous outcomes? Economic fundamentalism, left and right, has persisted into last century with its postmodern complaint against modernity itself, in a species of cavil with its basic achievements, as if the whole game were a variant of capitalist misdeeds. The question of postmodernism has ironically forced the question of what modernity really is, how it emerged, and whether some 'new new age' can replace its clear delineation of an epochal transition.

The question of modernity requires an expansion of scale, and the larger context of world history can provide a clue to its strangely evolutionary character.

2.3 The Evidence of World History

The rise of modernity begins to evoke its essential meaning if we expand the scale of world history to the dawn of civilization in the Neolithic, and thence to the origin of man in the Paleolithic mystery of his essential evolution. In fact, the context of world history since the invention of writing suggests the answer. The question itself of modernity is set in contrast to the medieval world it replaced, and this dynamical jumpstart from that phase of 'middling something' is the source of endless speculations, and much debate over the nature of historical continuity and discontinuity. It is hard to avoid the clear evidence of discontinuity beginning in the sixteenth century, and the parallel emergence of so many independent cultural factors makes analysis by sociological causation problematical.

There have been, of course, many efforts to try and show the sources

Revolution: macro and micro?

One implication of our historical model is to distinguish 'macro(r)evolution' from 'micro(r)evolution': the continuation of the revolutionary project in the post-transitional period can become chaotic as the elusive macro yields to micro. This is an artificial implication of finite transition models, but the facts seem to reflect it. The reason is not difficult to understand: implicit teleological action becomes explicit recursive action, but in imitation of the wrong event. There is no need to imitate the 'French Revolution'. A future revolution must replace macro action with detailed projects of social construction. The Russian revolution shows the confusion of intention and predicted futures colliding. Revolutionaries actually stood by, to let a predicted future precede their future expectation. Theory has gone awry.

Thus, we should wonder if, just as the perception of this phenomenon of revolution became conscious, as it clearly did in the wake of the French Revolution, it did not also begin to subside, or else to become something other. Marx and Engels in the tumultuous year 1848 give testimony to the explicit hypostasis of 'revolution' and, ironically, witness the last aftershock of the earthquake of the early modern. All this means is that a revolutionary project for the future will be different from the unexpected eruptions of revolution in the early modern. They require careful deliberation.

That strange year of defeated hopes seemed also to token the onset, onset completed, of a new era. Some will point to the Russian Revolution to contradict this. But it merely illustrates the point: the clear superposition of the two different modes, in a Chaplinesque contortion of historical happenstance and revolutionary intent. The birth of 'intent' from the flood tide of historical supremacy was a difficult, perhaps, aborted one. The seeds of this doubloon of Janus effects was surely present from the beginning, witness the birth of utopian thought in the Reformation of Thomas More, or the near Zoroastrian prophecies of Thomas Münzer. These points are bit obscure, but were clearly stated over and over during the Russian Revolution by many who completely failed to understand what they were exclaiming, and their sense of the active and the passive confounded their whole scheme of action, until that muddler Lenin muddled through with active intent!

of modernity in the medieval period, but too often these arguments betray a traditionalist perspective. The result is a great deal of sophisticated argumentation about the way Christian theology somehow generated the birth of science. None of this is very convincing. Some social factor can show continuity over world history, yet also some form of accelerated motion in a particular context. And the rise of science is beset with the paradox that it seems to have been born twice, the first 'scientific revolution' clearly occurring in the world of the ancient Greeks in the classic period of its great flowering. Indeed, the evidence is clearly there to suggest that the dynamic of science shows a clear waning, if no dying out, despite the efforts in both medieval Christian and Islamic civilizations to stoke the embers.

If we examine this question along the spectrum of culture we see the same effect at work: something born in antiquity, often in the Greek period, is reborn in modern times. The most classic instance is that of democracy: we see the spectacular, yet brief, birth of democracy in the classic period of Greece, followed by its disappearance and rebirth in the modern period. The effect we are seeing has in fact been the object of considerable study: our sense of the medieval, that is, of a 'middle' period, springs from the way that classical antiquity is the source of so many of our traditions, and this occurs in independent areas of emergence, suggesting again the action of something larger than purely local cultural influences.

The question has been ascribed to the action of the so-called Axial Age, the extraordinary interval in the first millennium BCE when, not only Greece, but a whole spectrum of civilizations across Eurasia demonstrated a kind of discontinuous advance, with a bewildering range of prophets, sages, and, in general, innovations of all kinds. We thus discover, as we examine the modern discontinuity, a second one in antiquity, with an instinctive sense of a 'middle' period in between them. We have the hints to the solution of our problem in the examination of the larger framework of the history of civilization. The scale of this set of transformations suggests a sequence of such periods in an unknown progression. As we examine the era prior to the so-called Axial Age, we find still another case of the 'medieval' in the middle of something, and we begin to suspect that our discussion has crossed the boundary of the evolutionary in its scale, and suggestion of a kind of high level dynamic.¹⁴

The evidence of world history is clear: the factor of discontinuity is present in the sudden eruption of transitional periods, with the Axial Age as the prototype of modernity.

14 Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (Yale University Press, 1953).




Fig. 2.13 Primate Worlds

History and Evolution

The mysterious appearance of transitions in a sequence is on a scale that wishes the 'evolutionary' rubric, and challenges conventional, i.e. Darwinian, understandings. In fact it is easy to produce a derivation of this

phenomenon by looking at the relationship of evolution to history: what is their connection? We can see that if history as free agency emerged from evolution in which agents were still passive, then this would not likely happen all at once, but would require a considerable interval of transition between the two. And it would make sense to see this transition broken down into many transitions. This has the remarkable implication that 'evolution' and 'history' might overlap and that the process would stretch into the phase of civilization, which is just what we see.

It is remarkable that something like this appeared first in the thinking of Lamarck, the first real theorist of evolution. He considered that evolution would occur on two levels, a drive toward complexity, and a lower level of adaptation. This double aspect explains at once many of the problems created by Darwinian theory.

Evolution has to 'evolve' the 'free agency' (which can be a term for 'almost free will') which brings individuals to the creation of history. The two conditions can overlap, and there is the possibility that the process gets 'stuck' or stalled, as evolution recedes and leaves agency to initiate, but nothing happens! There is an interval of uncertainty, active/passive confusions...

2.4 History and Evolution

The mystery of modernity would seem to be connected to the larger pattern of the Axial Age and this in turn to the whole evolution of civilization



Fig 2.14 **The Haitian Revolution**

For a descant on this theme: *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History*, by Susan Buck-Morss; also

Teshale Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History* (Syracuse University Press, 2011).

from the Neolithic onwards. We must stop to examine the term 'evolution', and its relation to history, to consider what we mean by the term, and how we can apply it to historical subjects. There is no mystery here: the term 'evolution' is simply a dictionary entry that we use in multiple contexts for developmental situations, but then again, with no sense of contradiction beside these 'metaphors', for the development of species life, and man, taken as 'evolution' in as sense often ruling out all others, save these other cases demoted to

slang. As we examine world history, however, the sense of the evolutionary seems to compete with this application of the term to earlier, and, we should note, relatively unobserved periods where we assume that we know how this dynamic occurred, the Darwinian theory of random evolution, by the process or natural selection.

The question arises, how do we consider the relation of evolution to history? And what unity can we find in the apparent separation of subjects. The problem is that history, as the action of free agents, has no clear beginning, save in those artificial depictions such as that 'history begins with writing'. Surely history begins when human agents begin to create living stories, as opposed to being the passive objects of purely physical causation, mere events.

The relationship of evolution to history can be seen in many ways and has a score of deductions. If we make assumptions about free will in man, then we must assume this factor has evolved from passivity to activity. But where is this to be found, and is this process complete? The intermediate phases of this process may be in low gear throughout world history as 'degrees of freedom as self-consciousness'. This issue more than any other illustrates the need to make 'evolution' a concept

**Marx's ambivalence to Darwin:
he sees through natural selection**

Marx's attitude to Darwin was one of ambivalence, and he spotted at once the problems with the 'struggle for survival', an idea that, before even the onset of Social Darwinism, was present in the reactionary views of Malthus. As early as 1865 Marx gave away his distrust of the theory of natural selection, evidenced by his interest in a now forgotten book by Tremaux, his *Origin and Transformations of Man and Other Organisms*, which challenged survival of the fittest, and natural selection. This rapid penetration of the illusory theory is a credit to Marx's insight, and this shows that he snapped out of the Darwinian speculative thesis. The issues were first systematically researched by Richard Weikart, in *Socialist Darwinism* (cf. online edition):

Upon reading Darwin's *Origin of Species* for the first time in December 1860, Marx triumphantly proclaimed to Engels, "Although developed in a coarse English manner, this is the book that contains the foundation in natural history for our view." Over a year later Marx read Darwin's *Origin* again, but this time was not nearly so enthusiastic. Darwin, he complained, views the natural realm as a reflection of contemporary English society:

It is remarkable how among beasts and plants Darwin rediscovers his English society with its division of labor, competition, opening up of new markets, "discoveries" and Malthusian "struggle for existence." It is Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes*, and it is reminiscent of Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, where civil (*bürgerliche*) society figures as 'spiritual animal kingdom,' while with Darwin the animal kingdom figures as civil (*bürgerliche*) society.

<http://www.csustan.edu/history/faculty/weikart/sd-toc.htm>

of the past, yet of the present and future. And this has nothing to do with Social Darwinism.

But here, of course, the new attempted definition is relative, for there is a stage of passivity leading to the birth of activity, the active force of organismic, then human, 'action'. We see that while history must therefore be the evolutionary outcome of evolution, the separation between the two is not really clear: there must be a kind of overlap between the two. In fact we should think that the transition between evolution and history could not occur in any sudden moment of activation: there would be a transition that is gradual. But this gradual passage must itself, we should think, shows a series of such transitions, where the relative overlap of evolution and history takes the form of transitional periods set against a more general stream of less active periods. We have derived in the abstract, as we will see, the rationale for the striking suggestions of historical discontinuity that we see in the most visible periods of world history. And we have the basis for a new approach to defining evolution as a developmental series of transitions. That this definition might apply not only to cultural, but to organismic evolution, or that the two are really two aspects of one and the same evolution, will emerge from our discussion as we go along.¹⁵

2.5 Darwinism: Suspicions and Falsifications

The debate over evolution has endured since the modern discovery of the fossil record in deep time, with its strong indications of development over time. Our brief discussion of world history leaves us with a set of suspicions about the current theory of random evolution. World history shows suggestive evidence of the non-random at work in the hint of discontinuity. And as we examine Darwinism we begin to see an ideology at work, leaving us to suspect the 'science' claimed.¹⁶

And it is ironic that in the age of Revolution the controversial radical Lamarck produced what was probably the first theory, but his views were displaced in the tide of Darwinism that came with the publication of *Origin of Species*. It is no accident that we consider Darwin the founder of a science of evolution, while the figure of Lamarck tends to be marginalized in the histories of evolutionism. To this day the associations of evolution/revolution,

¹⁵ John Landon, *Descent of Man Revisited: World History: The Hidden Clue to Human Evolution* (South Fork Books, 2012)

¹⁶ Jerry Fodor & Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, *What Darwin Got Wrong* (MacMillan, 2010).



Fig. 2.15 French Revolutionary battle

In the prismatic view of Dickens, it was the 'best of times, the worst of times...' When asked what he thought was

the significance of the French revolution, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai is said to have answered, "It's too soon to tell". The era invokes a field of potential, against which relative free action passes between hypothetical eonic determination, and the realizations of new forms of society. Francois Furet, the historian of the French Revolution and its ideological history, has declared that the 'Revolution is over'. It is also true that the Revolution has been repeatedly been declared over, from almost its first phases, and continually spills over into future incidents, 1830, 1848, and finally the Russian Revolution. Perhaps what is not 'over' is the lesson learned, after so much passivity, that man must make himself, and not endure the posture of civil or religious slavery. Between the American and the French Revolutions we see the spectrum of historical dynamic pass from Freedom to its reality, cost, and full-scale imposition against inertia, in the drama of Equality, the price of freedom, and a field of change pass from its radicals to its conservatives. The note comes due. Every aspect and stage here has already been prefigured, seminally, in the English Civil War, and the German revolution of 1525.

and 'slow/fast' evolution tend to haunt all discussion of the subject. Suspicion increases: the Whiggish Darwin plays to the gallery with an insistence on slow evolution, that pacifier of those fearful of the revolutionary tide.

Here history, as we have noted, suggests something unexpected: the existence in the historical record of traces of evolutionary dynamism, in action of discontinuous processes. These tantalizing clues leave us with a sense that we are missing similar episodes in deep time, and that we are failing to grapple with the real meaning of evolution. If we look backward at the historical record since the invention of writing we discover clear evidence of a sequential logic at work, something not supposed to exist, and which leaves us with an unnerving sense of how misleading it is to assume we know how things evolve.

The discovery of the Axial Age, for example, has revolutionized our understanding of world history, and shows clearly the way in which discontinuous action occurs over short intervals, and in this case we have the data to observe this. The question of the so-called Axial Age has confounded the debate over history, and threatens to do the same for evolution. And the mystery of this clear discontinuity in our history is the way that something intangibly global can act on separated regions without a medium of direct action, such as the gene. In fact, the correlation with phenomena of the highest complexity in human culture is an unsettling demonstration of something unknown to us from experience. Or, at least until the thickening historical record made the data a part of our historical 'experience', as an archival record.

This question of levels is evocative of a well-known distinction, marginalized in the reign of Darwinism, of macroevolution and microevolution. And this distinction seems peculiarly appropriate to our discussion. For we can see that there are two components to our discussion of history emerging from evolution: a set of macroevolutionary transitions, and a kind of microevolutionary stream in between them. As we examine the historical data, for example of the Axial period, we can make no sense of this episode save as the interplay of two levels, and we might well dub these the macro and the micro.

We should note carefully the difficulty that has always attended the attempts to produce theories of history. For we can see that relationship of evolution to history resembles that of causality and freedom, in the sense that evolution would seem to be inducing the freedom to create history that emerges in the evolution of apes to man, or more accurately the evolution



Fig. 2.16 1848 barricades

1848

Although the year 1848 is no more than a rough marker chosen as a peg to hang a tale, and end a book, it neatly shows the point at which our pattern starts into its post-transition, and reversal from localization to globalization, unprotected by any factor of eonic determination from imperialistic degenerations and the new economic systems,

soon to be downshifted further by Darwinian ideology. Even a cursory glance at modern philosophy shows how the seminal era slumps out after the generation of Marx and Schopenhauer. Many other indicators make the point. This time, seeing the effect, we can take action to recover. We tend to be mesmerized by the ignited exponential processes (e.g. the demographic transition) beginning in the transition, but these are not the same. We must stick to the rules of our model, which suggests the intermittency of our transitions, which puts us outside of the eonic sequence. That will at least enforce a discipline of teleological disarmament of all parties.

1848: Teleological antinomies We can easily spot the crude division point predicted by the model at about the time of the French and Industrial Revolutions, at the outside by 1848, a truly spectacular generation in world history. This division is useful because it is about the exact 'first point' at which our 'eonic observer' can start to see the eonic effect, and also because its symbolic significance forces the issue of ideology.

WHEE

of passive entities to active entities, since the drama of ‘degrees of freedom’ is surely already latent in the stages of all animal species. We must be wary, however, of too facile an equation of causality with evolution, for the whole question of the complex evolution of man does not fall easily into the categories of physicalist explanation. But in general terms we can see that the transition from passive to active stages of the organism is reflected in our distinctions of the evolutionary in transit to the historical.

Another useful aspect of this framework is the way it easily extends itself into the present, and future of man, and this in turn throws a new light on the sense of the modern as a kind of ‘Axial Age’ in return. The rise



Fig. 2.17 *The Peasant's War*, 1525
Truly classic image from the starting point of the modern transition, an uncanny prophecy, with the bannered term ‘freedom’.

of the modern, before it is seen as a stage of the evolutionary, is best seen as a ‘second coming’ of the Axial Age, in the sense of showing the same characteristics of rapid advance, high level cultural transformation, and in general a very definite kind of macro action in a clearly demarcated ‘transition’.

We can see that, so far from being an inappropriate category, for recent history, the evolutionary rubric solves at once the perplexity over questions of historical theory, for we can easily consider the issue of the ‘evolution of freedom’, or in general of cultural action, as operating on a higher level than the genetic. Instead of laws of history we have stages of evolutionary transition, and these are visible in the past, as leading to our present, with a question mark about any future evolutionary transitions, in the sense that the phase of the evolutionary may be concluded with that of the historical in its wake.

2.6 Out of Revolution: The Modern Transition

The rise of the modern is a confusing question, but the application of the evolutionary category can resolve the mystery, in the perception of a kind of transition: man shows an incomplete potential, and this is a context of both social and individual polarities. We can, with the example of the Axial Age

Eurocentrism

The macro model clarifies the issues of Eurocentrism and the imperialism that arises in the wake of the modern transition. This section might better sense after reading the next chapter.

The macro sequence doesn't deal with continents such as 'Europe' or the 'West'. Its action is on limited differential subsets of civilizations, not civilizations. The macro process generates 'emergent streams', but doesn't police their diffusion into a larger context. The macro system never generates empires: these always arise as indirect byproducts of the core action. Note that the model repeated over and over is for fringe zones, e.g. the North American continent to absorb influences by diffusion, and then, as in this case, generate an independence movement, one that actually came at the climax of the transition.

The effect of the macrosequence is to seed transition zones in its axis point, and let the result take its course. By diffusion, and often of course economic interaction, a new oikoumene comes into existence, viz. the Hellenistic in the wake of the Greek Axial.

The modern transition has generated one brief imperialist distortion after another. But the point of globalization achieved is arriving with a global oikoumene achieved for the first time. The dominance of the transition zone begins to wane, as the center of gravity shifts away from Europe. Note again that the macro system doesn't act on a 'Europe', but a core transition area, and its associated diffusion zones. Thus Japan joins the transitional cascade sooner than many zones in Europe.

Moral cynicism has overtaken culture and politics: but the standard of high morality is always characteristic of the macro sequence, which never generates malign means to ends. It generates an ideal, delivers sermons, as it were, via religion generation, and then leaves the result to itself. Note for example the way the philosopher tries in vain to stop the strain of Machiavellian politics in avalanche.

in our minds, almost fill in the blanks for the modern transition, the analogy between the two being very close indeed. And just here we can seem to drift off into a speculative form of history, so we should be clear about a set of facts visible in world history reflected in the clear pattern of successive epochs since the rise of Egypt and Sumer. We see a clear pattern of rapid transformations in a definite rhythm and in equally spaced intervals, spiked with the ‘transitions’, axis points, or ‘new ages’, that animate their repeated beginnings. It is like a book with three chapters, the third of which is now getting underway with the onset of the modern period. We can stay relatively close to this set of facts, even as we consider inchoate stages of theory, and stay clear of speculative excess.¹⁷

It is here that we enter one of the key issues of our discussion, the ideologies of revolutionary politics, and the theories associated with these. It is remarkable to note the way that the modern world seems to invent the revolution as a form of social change. In fact, all of our transitions are themselves revolutionary, without being revolutions of the type seen in the modern period, which ignites in the sixteenth century with the Reformation, itself a revolutionary episode. The issue of revolution comes to the fore with the classic American and French revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century and these initiate the tide of democratic revolution that will rise to the fore in the ensuing period of ‘modernity’ so-called. Our discussion of the evolution of freedom becomes more than a phrase here, for we can see that the whole process of our putative series of transitions climaxes in a ‘whitewater’ of revolutionary episodes, as individuals attempt to take control of history explicitly.

Theories of revolution founder in the distinction we have made between macro-revolution and micro-revolution: micro-revolutions don’t analyze easily because they are whitewater on the larger macro process, chaotic



Fig. 2.18 95 Theses

17 Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The Reformation* (Penguin, 2005), Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714* (Norton, 1961), Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (New American Library, 1962).

Two classics of the '48 generation,
Engels on the English working class,
and *The German Ideology*, along
with *The Communist Manifesto*

Engels'
The Condition of the Working Class in England
Preface (1845)

The condition of the working-class is the real basis and point of departure of all social movements of the present because it is the highest and most unconcealed pinnacle of the social misery existing in our day. French and German working-class Communism are its direct, Fourierism and English Socialism, as well as the Communism of the German educated bourgeoisie, are its indirect products. A knowledge of proletarian conditions is absolutely necessary to be able to provide solid ground for socialist theories, on the one hand, and for judgments about their right to exist, on the other; and to put an end to all sentimental dreams and fancies pro and con. But proletarian conditions exist in their classical form, in their perfection, only in the British Empire, particularly in England proper. Besides, only in England has the necessary material been so completely collected and put on record by official enquiries as is essential for any in the least exhaustive presentation of the subject.

<http://studymore.org.uk/xeng1845.htm>

episodes of exotic creativity. The attempts to use concepts of dialectic tend to miss the distinction of dynamical versus philosophic issues. The idea of punctuated equilibrium works very well, as a set of words/metaphors, for the macrorevolutionary process of world historical 'transitions'.

THE Declaration and Standard

Of the Levellers of England
Delivered in a Speech to his Excellency the Lord Gen. Fairfax, on Friday last at White-Hall, by Mr. Everard, a late Member of the Army, and his Prophetic in reference therunto; shewing what will befall the Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, by their submitting to c. mmunity; With their invitation and promise unto the people, and their proceedings in Windsor Park, Oul in it park, and severall other places; also, the Examination and confession of the said Mr. Everard before his Excellency, the manner of his deparment with his Haron, and his severall speeches and expressions, when he was commanded to put it off, Together with a List of the severall Regiments of Horse and Foot that have call Lots to go for Ireland.



Imprynted at London, for G. Lamberton, April 23. 1649.

Fig. 2.19 The Levellers

The legacy of modern revolution is a confusing one, and one of the stages of that confusion lies in the shifting emphasis on economic issues. The modern revolution can't seem to live up to the visions of that hothead Münzer, and end as 'bourgeois revolution, tragedy, lately farce'. For the period of apparent revolutionary action is also the period for a kind of economic revolution, the crystallization of the technological factor in the form of industrial technology, and the take-off into a new style capitalist civilization. We can say that this process has 'always' been happening since the onset of civilization, or we can say that the era of the early modern 'somehow' invented or at least accelerated the threshold crossing into a new economic order. And this is the source

of great confusion in the thinking of historians, for the equation of modernity with capitalist economics is endemic, even as it was challenged at once by the successors to the revolutions of the early modern.

The issues of the bourgeois versus the proletarian revolution remain unsolved. It seems as if the Bolshevik revolution was a coup of the Bolshevik bourgeoisie who took control of the industrial setup as a new class. The proletarian revolution is, in one way, an abstraction. It will end up as a bourgeois revolution in disguise, unless the issue is faced from the start. One way to deal with that might be to recast the revolution, as with the American, as a bourgeois revolution aiming at communist and democratic principles. Principles instead of classes. Equality, instead of proletarian domination. Lenin seems to have understood the point,

The German Ideology

As we hear from German ideologists, Germany has in the last few years gone through an unparalleled revolution. The decomposition of the Hegelian philosophy, which began with Strauss, has developed into a universal ferment into which all the “powers of the past” are swept. In the general chaos mighty empires have arisen only to meet with immediate doom, heroes have emerged momentarily only to be hurled back into obscurity by bolder and stronger rivals. It was a revolution beside which the French Revolution was child’s play, a world struggle beside which the struggles of the Diadochi [successors of Alexander the Great] appear insignificant. Principles ousted one another, heroes of the mind overthrew each other with unheard-of rapidity, and in the three years 1842-45 more of the past was swept away in Germany than at other times in three centuries.

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/cho1a.htm>

The appearance of *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels in 1848 is a classic summation of the phase of post-Hegelian dialectic and culture. But the first formulation of historical materialism evokes its dialectical milieu, and the correct transition beyond the era of German classical philosophy requires more than anti-Hegelianism, and tends to become lost in the onset of Feuerbachian post-religion, positivism, and emergent scientism, and the polarization of idealism and materialism along political lines. The dialectic of idealism and materialism is already reconciled in Kantian transcendental idealism.

Failure to see the balance of opposites bedevils materialist oversimplification. The ‘transcendental idealism’ of Schopenhauer (on the other side of the barricades) via Kant would have made an equal foundation for the left. An equal tragedy is visible in the rightist trend, and Nietzschean cooptation, of Kantian idealism in ‘will to power’ ideology, thence Nazism. Why is socialism to be a positivistic reductionism? The macrohistorical format of socialism and communism is closer to that of the emergentism of religion in the post-Axial Age. As Hegel noted, this ‘German Ideology’ was the last phase of the Reformation, and the dialectical whiplash overtakes materialist oversimplification.

but his situation was a difficult one, and his thinking slipped from the democratic. The proletariat is more than a working class. It is more a question of the 99% spoken of by the OWS movement against the 1%. But the proletariat, no longer the presence in the West that it once was, is still very real indeed in the nightmares of globalization, from the de facto slave labor in textile mills in Bangladesh to the coltan mining in the Congo.

We can see that the phases of the French and American revolutions yielded



Fig. 2.20 English Civil War: Marston Moor

very soon to a strange kind of 'catch 22': the revolutionary achievements of economic freedom were in reality a kind of counterrevolutionary loss of freedom in the strange coming to power of King Capital, the dilemma of bourgeois revolution. These questions have been analyzed at great length by figures such as Karl Marx, who in turn was disciple

of the French Revolution, whose blunted outcome gestated this shifting focus of the leaders of the democratic revolution. But a number of problems have always been associated with the new form of revolutionary ideology. We should note that the question of theory, which was never present in the revolutions of the early modern, comes to the fore in the nineteenth century, and this tends to confound the whole question with precisely the kind of speculative theory, in imitation of physics, that has muddled the discussions of historical dynamics.

But if we can see the way to a new form of evolutionary discussion, beyond theory, we might be able to clarify the discourses of economic society and revolutionary action that have crystallized in the various forms of historicism on the left, the example of historical materialism being one of the principals. The questions of economic history are complex, but they have, as Marx made clear, become the focus of a distinct ideology, and this in turn has become, along with Darwinian theory, a kind of substitute framework for historical theory. In challenging this nexus the 'Marxist canon' tended to promote an equal fixation with economic fundamentalism, of the kind it wished to challenge and overcome.

The basic issues of historical theory, evolutionary interpretation,



[From the English edition of 1888,
edited by Friedrich Engels]

A spectre is haunting Europe—the
spectre of Communism.
All the Powers of old Europe have
entered into a holy alliance to
exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar,
Metternich and Guizot,
French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where is the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result
from this fact.

I. Communism is
already acknowledged
by all European Powers
to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that
Communists should
openly, in the face of the
whole world, publish their
views, their aims, their
tendencies, and meet
this nursery tale of the
Spectre of Communism
with a Manifesto of
the party itself.

To this end, Communists
of various nationalities
have assembled in

London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the
English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

Toward a New Communist Manifesto

The legacy of the various Internationales has played one hand on the potential of the Communist Idea. The idea does not belong to that interval of realization.

At a moment of crisis, the real spectre haunting Europe is that of runaway markets igniting disastrous climate change, and the ideological psychosis that has lost contact with reality. The dialectical complement thus rises as the challenge to that spectre. A major intervention in historical mechanics is thus entirely and well foreseen by the classic version of the manifesto. Such a manifesto can remain virtual as a set of addenda, to create both continuity and discontinuity with the first. A new initiative must 'restart' to defeat mechanization.

economic ideology, and revolutionary action might profit, despite the often brilliant insights of figures such as Karl Marx, with a new telling in the



Fig. 2.21 Yankee Doodle

kind of broad macroevolutionary construct we have discovered, and this in turn might become a useful set of guidelines in the period of economic crisis we have inherited from the explosion of capitalist economies in the tide of the early modern. Much of what Marx predicted has come true, and much of his analysis remains cogent, beyond the somewhat brittle theories used to encase them in a misleading scientific rigor.

The issue of economic systems and the modern phenomenon of markets is not as hard to analyze as the mystifications of economists have made them. The issue of one and the same false determinism that has always bedeviled historicist projects. Men are not pawns of economic systems, save as exploited elements in a construct of creators of markets. There are

no laws of history that legitimate this exploitation, if the issue of economic systems is one of humanly created stages of alienation into economic passivity.

2.7 1848: Last and First Men

As we examine world history with its suggestion from the brief interval for which records in real time are available of a cascade of successive epochs, the significance of the modern age becomes clear, as enter into a new stage of civilization, and yet one, as the early socialists saw, that had at its beginning not yet achieved its conclusive final state, in the creation of a potential leading to a possible endstate. As the consequences of the capitalist revolution close on themselves two centuries downfield from the conclusion of the modern transition, the better conclusion in the form of a meta-economic understanding confronts the reckless abandon with which modernity was equated with economic free for all, and this in turn with an extravagant fantasy of evolving economic agents.¹⁸

It was the science fiction writer Olaf Stapleton who coined the phrase ‘last

¹⁸ *The 1848 Revolutions: the hoped-for prelude to the proletarian revolution* (<http://www.marxist.com/1848-revolutions.htm>), *Karl Marx: The Revolutions of 1848* (Verso, 2010).

Is There a Postmodern Age?

The macro model can help sort out the confusion over the term 'postmodern': an artificial transition just after that of the rise of the modern makes no sense, and can only create confusion; although the term has created considerable confusion and debate, its usage proves itself by the spontaneous sentiment with which it has come into existence. We note that it is a term of periodization, invokes an epoch or age, and indirectly asks us to define what it comes 'after', i.e. to define what we mean by the modern age. But the term 'postmodern' in many ways is a fine term suffering a botched definition. Instead of indicating a reasonable suggestion to stand back and look on modernism as a whole, it tends to be taken as indicating a rejection of the modern, and the too facile hope one will simply rewrite the whole of modernism with a new beginning.

In many ways a 'postmodern' work in a true sense would be, say, *The Communist Manifesto*, this irregardless of one's ideology, or stance on the controversial issue of private property, in its critique of the modern transition and a subsequent aspiration to redirect that transition as an ideology or universal history of freedom. That's a good idea, or a very bad one, but, whatever the case, nothing in our model forbids it. The modern should be distinguished from the threshold or transition that created it. And the term 'postmodern' really should be 'post-transitional'.

We can adopt a simplified definition here, one that distinguishes

1. the modern transition, 1500 to 1800
2. a divide near 1800
3. a plain vanilla period starting in the nineteenth century. Note the postmodern is not defined here, but rises as you look backward toward the modern, i.e. transitional era, followed by the realization era of this modern transition. The 'modern' period is really two things. The right term is 'post-transitional'.

and first men', and in the wake of our evolutionary discussion, it would seem appropriate to wonder if the chronicle of the first and last men is not reflected in the stages of what we suppose is the macroevolution of the species 'homo sapiens'. We tend to think, as noted, in terms of 'evolution' stopping, for history to begin, but we should rather suspect a braided set of evolutionary histories,



Fig. 2.22 Fall of the Bastille

between transitional phases, such as history indeed shows, to be the real 'evolutionary saga', as yet incomplete, between the first and the last men. That this phrase echoes a quite different notion to the philosopher Nietzsche is an additional irony, for we can see that the 'last man' of that philosopher's tirades against modernity is in reality a parody of Darwinian pseudo-evolution, and, absurdly,

the false victor of the economic game, unfit to survive due to the blunting of his humanity in the phases of alienation.¹⁹

The year 1848 is a symbolic token of this state of affairs, prophesied by the witnesses to the French (and American) revolutions who saw a future and final revolution to come, yet one, as in the tales of Scheherazade, forever delayed to a new episode of the old. We should rather consider the scale of our larger chronicle, to see that events have proceeded faster than we might have thought, and that the urgency of the early challengers to capitalist domination seemed to sense that the endgame would not be a distant future, but a nearly imminent crisis in the system at hand. And so, two centuries form their urgency, we can indeed see that an unadulterated system of markets can in short order destabilize an entire ecological system, and in the name of free markets produce a kind of social madness in the octaves of Social Darwinist utopianism.²⁰

The revolutions of the year 1848 are thus an apt reference, more so than those of the classic early modern, to our current realities, since precisely the constellation of market liberalism triumphant and liberalism reborn in the resolution of its contradictions in the new banner of socialist democracy was

19 Olaf Stapleton, *Last And First Men* (gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0601101h.html).

20 Peter Stearns, *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe* (Norton, 1974), Mike Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (Basic Books, 2009)..

Last and First Men

The theme of Olaf Stapleton is an apt context for the considerations of religion, speciation, and the emergence of human self-evolution, social and individual. The descant of Nietzsche in the wake of Darwin is a dangerous oversimplification, but served as a sort of 'kick off' piece to set a dialectic in motion. It had a goulish value as a 'mad experiment in the *gedanken* phase', but unfortunately, his ideas were rapidly taken up by fascist, occult, and 'esoteric' factions of twilight fringe groups.

The eugenic concoctions of the Social Darwinists seem to have merged in a Nietzschean nihilism confused by the factor of Indo-European cultures, and their mystique. The result was a dangerous imposter theory of the the 'buddha as superman' in a degeneration of the idea of the buddha type.

The proper foundation for the future evolution of man requires a social context in which man can wait, rather than act, act at the social level to universalize evolutionary advances, and a stable matrix that can allow the individual to emerge and become his real self.

The degenerate context of capitalist economics and its vulgar 'superior types' animating greed as the good are a demonic counterpoint to the emergence of a communist association of free men able to master economies globally in an environmentally sustainable civilization.

There is no simple solution available to man as yet for this, but the great religions have created the context of a human evolutionary community, as with the dynamics of the 'path of the boddhisattwas' which touches, perhaps, on some of its dimensions.

at work, and powerfully recorded in the writings of the scions of the 180's, that seminal decade that saw the first phase of the modern world compromised at the start by the legacies of scientism, Darwinism, and economic ideology. That moment of high potential remains to find its realization in the last, and first new age of man's true speciation as man, the stage of *homo sapiens* as yet unachieved. Sooner or later, and, as it now seems, sooner, we will be forced




Fig. 2.23 Barricades:
Rue Clovis, 1848

to conclude the revolutions of 1848, as a global movement toward postcapitalism, environmental sanity, and in the context of an epochal transition in the macroevolutionary legacy of man.

2.8 Conclusion: A New Age Begins

We have introduced a short survey of world history, in light of 'macroevolution' as a sequence of transitions, and the result will induce a spectacular set of insights into a hidden dynamic at work in the emergence of civilization.

The data matches a finite transition model, and shows the characteristic 'floodtide' clustering near a divide, the point at which the revolutionary process projects its futurity, and we see the birth

of radical continuations in the emergence of socialism and communism as phases of the democratic revolution. The significance of the symbolic 1848 is suddenly obvious, and resonates in an absolute chronology of civilization. The result makes an excellent framework for the progression of democratic to communist revolution in the wake of the modern transition.

The 'Great Divide' Once we get a feeling for finite transition models the sudden conclusion to that interval generates a 'divide' period. Now we see the significance of 1848 (or the fifty year fuzzy interval before it): revolutionary system action turns into potential revolution as free agency. This is what generates the illusory sense of the postmodern. It is a perilous moment: the macro system simply shuts off and a new era starts. The phenomenon is similar to 'count down, lift-off, trajectory', in a rocket metaphor.

We need to chronicle the 'dialectical' totality of the divide interval, which includes the Enlightenment, and yet also the Romantic movement, and an immense series of synchronous productions. The danger of downshifting into at typical nineteenth century outcome track tends to lose the larger picture.

A New Age Begins

‘We are at the dawn of a new era!’ exclaimed Luther more prophetically than he himself imagined... ‘Rarely is a work undertaken out of wisdom and precaution,’ he declared, ‘but everything is undertaken out of ignorance.’ The man who initiates creative action can seldom know where his steps will lead him...But if Luther was a prime mover, the forces that soon set all Europe in motion were stronger than any single man.’ ”

The idea of a New Age has been taken up by the so-called New Age movement, but too often this is anti-modern (postmodern) reactionary impulse. But these movements will reseed the religious/secular divide with a greater continuity of religious history.

Multiple confused efforts have come down from antiquity proposing a cyclical theory of ages and epochs. All have correctly

The modern transition makes sense if we use a trick: it is trying to integrate the continuations of the Axial Age Israel and Greece. If you see these superimposed, so to speak, the confusion over ‘secularism’ becomes clearer. Once seen, we suddenly realize the Chinese and Indian Axial phases are also being integrated (cf. the seventeenth century fixation on China, and the birth of the New Age movement at the time of Schopenhauer).

sensed a succession of age periods, but none have been able to correctly place modernity in context. The reason is that the question is evolutionary and not spiritual. The modern transformation is a de facto ‘axial age’ and creates a process that will swiftly transform the global.

The macro model in its extended form shows us a sequence of axis points, in a frequency pattern strongly suggesting intervals of 2400 years.

The crucial role of a revolutionary critique of capitalism is that of a failsafe, and an equalizer in the distortions of globalization.

This is not a theory of history, but a model of an incomplete data set, that no doubt stretches back into the Neolithic and gives us a warning about 'theories of history', with a substitute that is very practical in the form of an outline and chronicle with the hidden dynamics subsumed into the background as secondary properties we can assess on a trial basis. The model exposes at once the inherent tension in the communist initiative as a continuation of the democratic revolution and (or) an anti-modern, anti-liberal effort to create a new 'new age' of postmodernity, in a negation of liberal politics. This contradiction, once understood, suggests an obvious resolution. If the model is correct the post-transitional slide from dynamics to free agency in its wake occurs with increasing distance from the divide. That is a warning of the potential chaotication that arises in the wake of the creative era of the early modern. This factor is already visible in the mechanization of modernist emergents.

Ctrl Alt Delete, a useful metaphor: The macro model suggests that the causal continuity of failed projects can be recursively reset (in our own minds at the point of intention) at the point of the 'great divide', which is a monumentally complex multitasking showing emergent streams in parallel. Current versions of the Windows operating system allow the user to stand outside the 'program in question' to make general choices about ongoing processes. Modernity is multitasking. The left after the French Revolution tends to downshift into one parallel stream: the materialist counterpoint to German idealism, in the emergence of positivism/darwinism. Fine, for a while. But it might be better to create, or recreate the full-spectrum totality of the closing period at the end of the eighteenth century.

The 'communist' idea has an already deadlocked temporal sequence from the late nineteenth century, which usurped the idea's potential so vividly alive in the lead up to 1848 and caught by Marx and Engels as they rode the bronco momentum through the period of revolutionary prophecy... The left must create a revolutionary caesura against its own history spectrum, reset from 1989 to the putative 'great divide' (as an act of thought).

Models are only that, here roughly fitting the data like a glove rather than as one-to-one causal dynamical construct, but the success of this model in uncovering and explaining this phenomenon, and its match to the facts is too great to be chance, but even so we should proceed with caution since we have discovered something difficult to understand, perhaps transcending human intelligence. The Kantian distinction of phenomenon and noumenon seems

Religion, Secularism, and the Axial Age

The place of communism in the wake of the modern transition resembles that of the emergent religions in the wake of the Axial period.

Our exploration of world history has uncovered the enigmatic design behind its progression of epochs. We see the macroevolutionary context of the democratic revolution, and the transitional status, between system action, and free action, in the context of a 'general oikoumene' framework, analogous to the great religions emerging from the Axial period. We are passing a watershed, as the dangers of revolution are surpassed by the dangers of doing nothing, *laissez-faire*. The passage beyond the Great Divide shows the switched-off phase beginning. It is unrealistic to suppose *laissez-faire* will spontaneously solve the problems of whole civilizations.

We see a system able to produce directionality in the centrifugal patterns of cultural differentiation. And the best interpretation of this process is 'evolution, brand unknown', as a developmental sequence, leaving the question of its relationship to the emergence of homo sapiens, in what evidence suggests was a rapid transitional phase crossing the threshold to a new speciation. Our evidence shows us how a global system can induce transformation over places and times, and stage recurrences on the order of ten millennia. The misleading claims for random evolution are therefore open to severe skepticism.

Such an intricate and elegant design evokes a design argument, and the historical record of emergent monotheism with its remorph of Canaanite polytheism to the IHVH cult puts the entire pattern of world history up for grabs from theistic speculations. But none of that will work, and monotheism is part of the output of the system, and theological historicism will lead rapidly to fallacious confusions. We cannot forbid design issues, but they are almost impossible to get straight. For example, an omnipotent divinity would not use a sequence of transitions, which show something less than omnipotence in the long and difficult struggle to climb *Mt. Improbable*.

to be at play, a fatal objection to standard 'surface' models of scientific type.

Where least expected an evolutionary or developmental interpretation seems the best approach, but this reveals a unique brand of the evolutionary: its braided overlap as freedom evolving with history as counterpoint freedom self-evolving. This form of 'evolution' must therefore go into latency as the active mode comes to the fore. An alternating sequence of transitions reflecting this is exactly what we see in our macro model, and the result is an elegant mystery. Our distinction of 'system action' and 'free action' comes into play and we can see that a high degree of free agency is involved in the 'teleological' template behind the scenes. We are thus cautioned to not reject teleological explanation, but at the same time to be altogether wary of the idea whose correct understanding is not known to us. If the 'telos' is to produce a book, then that is one thing. But if it is to produce 'book writing' situations, then that is a far more general teleological process, one compatible with our general stance on 'relative degrees of free agency'.

We can proceed with a minimal use of the model as a rough guide, and a clear liberation from reductionist views of history. We should note that we have actually given 'teleology' an interpretative model. But this risked the danger of its fuzzy extensions to more general usage. We should quality our usage.

The macro model makes a good substitute for 'historical materialism' and places emergent communism in the context of the 'discrete freedom sequence', instead of the 'postmodern' anti-liberalism of classic marxism. The model is far more robust, but might seem speculative however its incipient theory is not required to use the empirical framework in a chronicle of civilization in the context of evolution. The model is designed to default to a 'table of contents' in an historical chronicle. The model automatically subsumes contraries, historical materialism, idealism, religious and secular histories.

Note that 'historical materialism' as a theory of history is an event inside the model, and its continued use inside the 'meta-context' is possible, but the broader framework is useful because it automatically 'sublates' materialism, idealism, religious and secular, histories, and much else, inside it.

With this type of model we have a new perspective on the rise of modernity, and the place of revolution in the context of historical transformation. We can also see that a deeper dynamic than the economic is at work driving development. The model we have used exposes immediately the relationship of capitalism, globalization, and the revolutionary potential

The macro effect is depicted using systems analysis but seems to indicate an argument by design. It seems impossible to believe that a system that can generate literatures down to their poetic meters could be other than 'designed'. The point is clearly indicated in the interpretation of the Axial effect by the early Israelites. But they were unable to get the issue straight, and produced a very primitive mythology of theistic historicism. Thus, we have no ability to think rightly about designers. Their action is not that of 'agents of action'. Theistic speculations here will produce only confusion. Why would a divinity use a finite transition model? In fact, there is one good reason: to allow freedom to emerge via an alternation model. But the sad irony is that design arguments have ruined monotheism. The aggressive atheism of the Feuerbach generation is thus not surprising, but nor really the answer. Perhaps our benighted secularist can burn the candle at both ends and review the literature on Kant's transcendental deduction. Ay, there she blows!

Design arguments as to the rise of the modern occur in two places, Hegel, and the author we have cited, J. G. Bennett. And our own neutral systems model. Hegel is unique, and is doing exactly what the Old Testament redactors did: spiritualize an epochal transition. Bennett's version was corrupted by false theological issues, and was blind to the real effects. But he considered that demiurgic powers to be at work behind human evolution and civilization. Fukuyama, behind a veil of sociology and Nietzschean atheism, exploits the mystique of Hegel's design teleology, in a cunning deception.

As Hegel notes in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, written on the eve of Napoleon's approach to Jena, as the supposed (hubristic) World Spirit on horseback:

Our epoch is a birth time, a period of transition. The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things, and with old ways of thinking. The spirit of the times, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates one piece after another of the structure of the previous world. That it is tottering to its fall is now indicated only by symptoms here and there...but something else is approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces will be interrupted by the sunrise, which in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world.

of communism, as an abstraction injected prophetically into the concluding phase of the modern transition.

In a fashion reminiscent of the post-Axial period where the seeds of the emergence of world religions were sown very early as 'chase plane' formations aimed at the phases of decline, in the Occident, coming to fruition centuries later, the modern transition seeds a 'dialectical' response to its initial period of capitalism, and in the phases of the communist idea we see a secular mirror image of the phenomenon of religion, aimed at the chaotification of market driven globalization. This is a potential that transcends the early experiments in the legacy of Marxism, and the failures of the Bolsheviks marginally reflect the reality destined to emerge. And this process serves as a platform for the future evolution of man, in the drama of 'last and first men'.

The use of the framework of finite transition models to describe this uncovers a two level action, and this is in many ways the discovery of 'evolution as it must be', but is at first so strange as to seem counterintuitive to those misled by Darwinian fallacies. But the method, which has a powerful set of deductions, makes sense on its own terms, and works as a test of the data. The method exposes to a high probability a hidden dynamic, and is more of warning than a set of fixed conclusions: world history is not what it seems, and requires an extended style of science to do it justice. Note that our model is not a 'theory', but a chronicle with a potential theory at its sidelines.

The model merely reflects the way we tend to take world history, without realizing it. We take the Axial Age unnamed as the source of our traditions. We speak of the 'Middle Ages' hardly wondering, 'middle of what'. We speak of modernity, yet remain unaware of how to derive this, although the historical facts make the point by themselves. And we are beginning to adopt similar habits with the prior cycle: taking the epoch of civilization from the onset of Egypt and Sumer in the second millennium BCE as a unit. Clearly our model is a rendering of what we already assume, and its suggestion of a concealed causality should remain as an hypothesis to be explored. We suspect that this bare glimpse has an extended patterning into the Neolithic and before, but we lack sufficient data to close the case. And for that reason we have adapted our model to empirical chronicling, leaving the question of theory on the sidelines.

With our model a warning light goes on, and stays on, as to the prevalence of Social Darwinist, crypto-Nietzschean brands of evolutionism of the reductionist Darwinian type. They do not properly assess the complexities of human evolution, and will produce severe distortions in a putative

Is Capitalism a stage of history?

Our discussion of the macrosequence, and the hypothesis of stages leading back to the Neolithic gives us a better insight into economic history. The only stages are the phases of civilization itself, with accelerant transitions driving the overall system. We thus have the transparent stages of

The Paleolithic
The Neolithic
States and Empires

That is all that is needed for a series of stages. The study of economies in each of these contexts can proceed on an ad hoc historical basis. Capitalism follows the same 'stream and sequence' logic as other

There is an often-quoted comment of a Francis Horner, a Captain of Industry in the wake of Adam Smith, from 1803, declining to review a reissue of Smith's text,

I should be reluctant to expose S's errors before his work had operated its full effect. We owe much at present to the superstitious worship of S's name; and we must not impair that feeling, till the victory is more complete....[U]ntil we can give a correct and precise theory of the origin of wealth, his popular and plausible and loose hypothesis is as good for the vulgar as any others.

Michael Perelman, *Classical Political Economy* (1983), p. vii, and p. 171.

historical flows, and shows a strong sequence initialization in the modern transition, generating the illusion of a new 'stage of history'. The emergence of markets and capitalism in the context of this series is continuous, with the level of states and empires (itself the earliest phasing of globalization) often prefiguring the phenomena of modern markets. The pathology of slavery is overcome in correlation with the onset of the Industrial Revolution, and the challenge to a new form of labor exploitation is immediate.

To call capitalism a separate stage of economic history is misleading: the entire process is prefigured many times, as

for instance in the Greek Archaic and Classical period. There is no historical requirement to 'go to the end' of the capitalist phase of history. It is a cabal of Big Capital as such.

rogue neo-speciation of man. And this alternate model is a reminder that 'evolution' is most probably a global directed process operating at a species level, and can't be 'faked' with the eugenic projects of rightist cabals, or the economic class warfare promoted behind disguises by capitalists. The danger



Fig. 2.24 Barricade: The Paris Commune, 1871

of fascist attempts to hijack human evolution are already historical fact.

This model also gives a direct insight into the place of economic systems in the emergence of civilization. And the powerful evidence of revolutionary dynamics puts in context the emergence of revolutionary ideologies in the wake of the modern

transition. Although forms of proto-capitalism are as old as civilization, the distinct type of super-marketized economy familiar since the late eighteenth century is a modern innovation, and has no inherent connection to the evolution of civilization. Runaway capitalism is a conspiracy of elites ambitious to legitimize their own activity, and the theories, often highly mathematical, used to second that ideology are fraudulent and have no solid basis in science, and confuse those trying to assess the factor of economic determination. It is important to note that the modern transition was largely mercantilist throughout, with capitalism as an afterthought, in the effect of a supercharger. The development of modernity was not due to capitalist inventions or processes. The marketized regime's potential for distortion, exploitation, and environmental destruction, in a brushfire effect of 'free' markets was noticed immediately, not least by Karl Marx and his school, even as they admitted the force of accelerated globalization in action.

But the model of historical materialism tends to suffer a related economic reductionism, and the evidence of world history that we have found points to a quite different perspective, showing the emergence of postcapitalism directly in the context of the modern phenomenon of revolution. Our model shows the way that economies are plastic entities inside cultures, and Marx's warning that market structures are subject to class issues should be, but still isn't, obvious to sociological observation. Nonetheless the brilliant tandem work of Marx and Engels is easily adapted to our macro model, which can serve as a superset for a leftist praxis, relieving the burden of historical

The phase of German Classical philosophy is one of the most spectacular episodes of the macrosequence, appearing as the continuation and conclusion of the Reformation, and ending in the powerful synthesis of religious and secular ideas in a unity of effect. The conclusion to this great moment of the Great Divide, at the climax of the Enlightenment, tended toward the sterile materialism and scientism of the nineteenth century. The work of the post-Hegelian generation is suddenly fixated by the critique of religion given by Feuerbach, and the strain of atheism emerging as one sideshow of the Reformation comes to the fore as dominant. The result is that the entire explosion of philosophy is rejected (witness the ambivalence of marxists trying to keep a few fragments of Hegel) for the narrow cult of reductionist science, soon joined by Darwinism. This vehicle is not a proper representation of secularism, but a paltry decay of the dialectical richness of the early modern and the Enlightenment. It would be helpful to cast the communist idea in the context of an integrated successor to the Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment, in a far broader synthesis.

Hegel's notion of the rational and the real backfired and became a conservative legitimation of the 'way things are'. In our model the same phrase or a variant works perfectly because our statements refer to different levels. Although the macrosequence is not the same as the idea (of Hegel) of Reason in History, it comes close, as a variant, or larger generalization, and we see therefore that the 'real' is the rational macro action. The stream aspect may or may not realize that. And that is not a conservative legitimation, but a proposal for radical or revolutionary action.

theory destined to end in metaphysical deadlocks. The gist of historical materialism is to observe the effects of economic motivation of cultural ideology, no more, no less.

Our new model can provide a robust set of alternatives to economic fundamentalism, and allows us to harmonize the ideas of history and evolution, and mediate the contradiction between random and teleological conceptions applied to history. The discovery of historical directionality where least expected is a by-product of our novel periodization, and the result is the depiction of the modern transition, and just as important, its 'Great Divide', or the point at which the modern transition terminates and yields to the new age of modernity as such. This is a property of what we can call a 'discrete-continuous' model, its finite interval transformations in a series, finds a surprising confirmation in the facts of modern history, the extraordinary period of innovation that we see sixteenth century onward, up to the end of the eighteenth century.

This model distinguishes carefully between the so-called macro and micro levels of the macrosequence, and this, applied to the modern transition and its aftermath, suddenly uncovers the enigma of modernity in its often confusing and seemingly contradictory aspects: after the divide period the action changes its character from macro to micro.

The transitional interval from ca. 1500 to 1800, from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, is climaxed by the generation of the French, American, and Industrial Revolutions, and a host of other so-called 'emergents', and the result is a spectacular take-off point, the generation leading up to the period of the transformed mid-nineteenth century world of liberal/bourgeois civilization, with its prophetic endpoint seeding of socialist and communist continuations.

The so-called 'divide' point is especially remarkable, as the most massively creative era in world history, destined to reverberate in a future as yet unrealized, but recognizable in broad outlines from the prior example of the Axial Age. That these events in a massive cluster from ca. 1750 to 1850, the Great Divide, are an aspect of the 'non-random (macro) evolution' of civilization is, at first, surprising, and a strange way to analyze both history and modernity, but the match of the model to the facts is so striking that we gradually begin to get a sense of a tremendously subtle and deep system at work, one that resolves the chronic confusions of historical determinism and free history that have bedeviled all efforts to construct universal histories. Even if one found this macro model a bit odd it would be worth one's while

It is disconcerting to discover the way the ‘macroevolutionary’ sequence processes ideologies. Claiming that a certain ideology has the force of history can be delusive, but the reality can’t be avoided with pseudo-objectivity. The Axial Age makes it clear that this is the case, and that the highest aspects of culture are transformed in the eras of transition. The modern period shows this again with its political and revolutionary phasings. One key to this ideological dynamics (and a warning that dynamical action on ideologies is not a propaganda free for all) is the idea of freedom with its symmetric relationship to causality. The philosopher Kant senses this and our discussion of Kant’s challenge shows how the dialectical relationship of causality and freedom can play out.

The macro effect gives a spectacular insight into Kant’s sense of nature’s secret plan, and, even more directly, the (macro) progress toward a Civil Constitution.

Nature’s Secret Plan Kant’s famous essay also challenges us to uncover ‘nature’s secret plan’, and the eonic effect powerfully shows that plan in action. This language is suggestive of design thinking, and we should be wary of the sense of ‘agency’ that we ascribe to ‘nature’. However, in practice the point is clear, and we can suddenly catch a glimpse of what can only be called a hidden design to historical evolution.

Progress Toward a Civil Constitution Another aspect of Kant’s Challenge is to document the ‘progress toward a civil constitution’, and the eonic effect powerfully shows a strong correlation with just this, and we have just suggested that democracy itself is bound up in the eonic sequence, as it seems to generate the first beginnings of democracy in both the Axial Age and in modernity (which makes us suspicious that the earliest stage of civilization shows an earlier phase of its emergence).

to get this kind of analysis under one's belt, because this kind of systems analysis, however outlandish at first, uncovers something less organized approaches would miss completely. It is at this point that our system generates the idea of communism, in the lineage of the democratic revolutions, but directed toward the expanding context of globalization, and postcapitalism, in a world system. The dialectic (and we need not assume any theory of



Fig. 2.25 Lenin 1917

such) of capitalism inherently generates the communist resolution in the way that a planetary gestation of 'free markets' turns into its opposite.

The periodization created by our model suggests the significance of the revolutions of the year 1848 as the completion of the whole transition (but the artificial marker of a specific year is a symbolic gesture, the 'divide' being a rough interval from 1750 to 1850), the passage to a new age period, and a prophecy of a new phase of revolution to come in the context of the explosive growth of capitalist society, in the phases of globalization. The term '1848+' is simply one way of referring to the Great Divide period, or rather its immediate aftermath, clearly visible in the generation

of the 1840's and after.

This period is, ironically, the theatre of one of the classic failed revolutions, that of 1848, but one that left a mysterious question mark, and thus the 1848+ glyph is a topical notation serving to force a question on us: how should we take the phenomenon of revolution, and ideology, in the context of the macro model. More generally we should look at the whole outcome of the modern transition in its many dimensions and the way the nineteenth century comes to floodtide at the onset of globalization. The generation of the 48's shows a host of other parallel incidents of interest, but we can focus on the moment of emergent Marxism at the conclusion to the modern transition.

Actually, while most so-called scientific approaches to history attempt to ape the objectivity of the hard sciences even as they end in ideological bias, the macro model shows the way the world system is 'meta-philosophical'

Though Marx's *Weltanschauung* is widely called materialistic, Marx himself never dealt with materialism systematically... Marx's postulate about the ultimate possibility of human self-emancipation must be related to his initial premise of the creation of the world by man. Philosophically such a view is a secular version of the Hegelian notion that actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) is not an external, objective datum, but is shaped by human agency. For Hegel this shaping is done by human consciousness; Marx extricates this activist element of Hegel's doctrine from its metaphysical setting and combines it with a materialistic epistemology... Even at this early stage of the enquiry it becomes evident that such a view of materialism differs sharply from the mechanistic materialism expounded by Engels in the *Dialectics of Nature*...

Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, 1971, p. 65

Man Makes Himself, but...

There is no simple resolution of this complexity, and we can see that there is probably an additional Gaian component to the 'self-agency' of the human creation of civilization.

Teleology can be of many kinds, including the duality of fixed results, and 'creative potential situations'. The latter are clearly the type we see in the macro historical sequence, as man makes himself, but in a particular framework or context that has a directional component.

as it generates root ideologies in its wake. We thus can and should make no pretense to transcend ideology, doing ideology wholesale, and this keeps us honest by forcing the issue of looking at the full spectrum of ideologies. There were many intimations of this in the remarkable flowering of German Classical philosophy, from Kant to Feuerbach, and the task of creating a new kind of science, one in which ‘ideas’ are the objects of historical dynamics, *Bourgeois Revolution in Progress?*



Fig. 2.26 *Liberty Leading the People*

We should ask, if this is a portrait of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in progress...Cf. Neil Davidson’s *How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?* (Haymarket, 2012), with an extended history of the famous painting.

remains tabled as a future achievement of the modern transition. The idea of the Hegelian dialectic often attempts to look at philosophy, for example, as an historical ‘object’ subject to its own ‘logic’, but this inchoate beginning points to a future form of science. We can see hints of this in the way we have shown how the dualism of ‘freedom and causality’ is itself the key to the question of ‘historical laws’, as with our discussion of Kant’s challenge. As rough dialectical spectrum, the Axial Age alone shows us a multiplicity of differing perspectives and views on a stupefying scale, each hard to fully understand without a full-scale scholarly expedition.

In this context the immense macro action producing both a politics of liberalism and an attendant set of philosophical extensions (which so animates the philosophy of Kant) can help us to reconstruct the classic collision of liberal and post-liberal ideologies as this occurred instantly in the wake of the French Revolution, hoping to find some tactic of reconciliation between them, and some resolution of the immense tragedy emerging from leftist promotion of revolutionary adventurism. The task is easily achieved if we can evade the considerable mystifications of economic ideologies trying

A Gaian matrix

Our survey of world history in light of the macro effect exposes at once a planetary level action: a system that can operate across the surface of a planet, over tens of millennia, as it engages the elements of total culture. We can see that an idea of a Gaian matrix is indicated, as far beyond the current grasp of science and directly related to our portrayal of historical evolution.




Fig. 2.27 *The Solitary Wanderer*, a classic of the Romantic era, next to another, *Liberty Leading the People*

The Romantic Movement

The discussion of modernity and secularism is too often a one-dimensional cult of scientism, where the historical reality is something entirely more complex. The counterpoint of the Romantic movement in the wake of the Enlightenment is a prime example, and casts the entire modern transition into a momentary descant, one that ushered in the last surge of creative induction, and is a clear influence on the generation of Marx and Engels. But the tide of positivism has blurred this

We can see the danger of a movement emerging at the point of the divide and becoming a side track in a multitasking system, the fate of marxist ideology. The communist idea needs to be a version of modernity as a whole and relock itself to the full divide era, in a dialectical world creation by a socialist embrace of a totality.

complexity, which is a vast dialectical field. As a revolt against the rationalization of nature and the Industrial revolution's dark side, the Romantic movement should be a component of the communist thematic, as much a culture of the caretaker of nature and the global environment as an adjunct to economic reasoning.

to dogmatize about the future of capitalism.

Too many students of modernity become fixated on the substream of the rise of modern science, and fail to see the far more complicated picture at work. In some accounts there is variant of this thinking focused on Spinoza. Figures such as Kant emerge mysteriously at the divide point to counsel this situation with a complex set of critiques discussing the idea of freedom in the context of Newton's world. The rise of modernity revolves around the idea of freedom (which had no place in science, before Kant) and not only that of scientific causality. Hegel subsequently creates a kind of supercharged version of Spinoza. The wake of this era will learn nothing, and skid into the reign of scientism.

A similar challenge might be addressed to a tendency of nineteenth century leftist thinkers to reject the legacy of liberalism because of its entanglement with economic propaganda of the new capitalist elites. But the more basic issue is crystal clear: our transitional macro system spawns a liberal legacy of democratic revolutions, with an attendant emergent economic order. Despite the frequent equation of these two distinct things, in the ideology of so-called 'free markets', they are distinct developments, and the most obvious realization about the conclusion to the modern transition is that capitalism will produce a decisive but problematical passage to development and globalization, at which point its contradictions might yield to the prophesied postcapitalism of a new order, prophesied from the start, of a socialist, or communist world system. If we can see the dilemma of our transitional dialectic it becomes obvious that is seeing a temporary effect that must be transcended after the transitional interval itself has passed. If we manage to understand this logic, we can save ourselves from the many confusions that we now see coming on the triumph of global capitalism, ill-served by the propaganda used to maintain its regime.

Nonetheless, we should note at once, without conservative or reactionary bias, that the macro model puts a high premium on basic liberalism as an emergent process, and the reason for this is that it correlates exactly with the macro structure, and cascades with the coming of the multiple democratic revolutions that proceeded in parallel to the leftist 'deviations' attempting spastically to both fulfill them and overcome them. Marx or no Marx, the liberal revolutions outstripped their far leftist competitors, for reasons not hard to uncover, given a little study. Liberal emergentism has solid roots in the seventeenth century, and crystallizes rapidly in the so-called Great Divide. The point is that communism is a projection toward the future.

That said, there is nothing mysterious in the basic impulse of the




Fig. 2.28 Solon

The end of history

Our macro model has a spectacular match to the facts in the so-called discrete freedom sequence: the strange timing of the emergence of democracy in world history. This shows a dramatic example of the embedded emergence of freedom in the evolutionary determination of free agency. It is thus no accident the democratic revolutions accelerate near the great divide. There is a subtle logic here in our distinction of 'system action' and 'free action'. That action of a system to produce freedom is contradictory: it can lead only to the threshold. The induced revolutionary process seeds

via macrorevolution the gestures of microrevolution, and as the system passes the divide point, free action becomes dominant, a perilous passage. We see the same effect twice (and the case of Sumer probably makes a third): the appearance of Solon in the Greek system just at the prior divide, and the emergence of democracy just after the divide, is another case of the spooky timing in our macro system.

We see that the idea of the 'end of history' actually has meaning in terms of a finite transition model: but the meaning is different from the Hegelian. The 'end' is a perhaps a timeless factor that historical realization approaches. We might also think of the 'end' in terms of the idea of a virtual future, or attractor, discussed in the *Introduction*.




Fig. 2.29 Writing
the *Declaration of
Independence*

nineteenth century left: democracy means just that, how to bring 'real democracy' into existence? Thus the rise of the left is simply an aspect of one and the same liberal revolution, a point often lost in the fractious dialectic it generated. By the time this impulse reaches the throes of Leninism the point has been lost totally, and the basics of liberal emergentism look to



Fig. 2.30 Lincoln at Antietam

have been right from the beginning. The basic problem is that while the macrosequence looks to be 'revolutionary' indeed, the series of transitions are not the same as 'revolutions', which are particular historical episodes that occur in the context of the macro transformation, but don't represent its essential dynamics. Thus the spectre of teleological revolutionism arose as a fallacy of dynamics, and the result was a misconception of the case at hand. This should not blind us to the pioneering analysis of the modern transition by leftists who could see at once that the fate of capitalism would generate its own future revolution. There is something transparent in these seminal ideas arising just at the conclusion to the transition, as if in the ire of the Prophets to foresee a new and coming future.

Of essential interest is the now classic set of antitheses that emerge between the liberal and later leftist, especially Marxist, perspectives. It was Marx who first clearly outlined the issues of theory and ideology, in the context of revolutionary transformation and its dilemmas. And yet something has always seemed 'not right' about Marxist theory and the tremendous surging emergence of liberal civilization was never properly analyzed or resolved in the tenets of the suddenly-itself-an-ideology: the Marxist interpretation of historical dynamics.

The macro model forces a kind of 'recompute' on these questions, since it

The notes go into a kind of extended fugue on the 'end of history' question, but we should state a simple approach to the issue, which was originally a leftist take on Hegel via Kojève, thence appropriated by Strauss/Fukuyama. We cannot resolve such a hopeless meme in any definite sense, save to note that capitalism can hardly be at the 'end of history' if it leads to a burnt our planet! The end indeed!

In a finite transition model of the type we are using here we can consider or redefine the 'end of history' to be a teleological noumenon and that the macrosystem starts to connect via the macro transitions, reaching a climax near the divide, at which point we see capitalism and communism *both* as emergents. The prophetic intimations of postcapitalism now seem completely obvious in retrospect.

But in a finite transition model the period after the divide defaults to 'free action', and has no further connection with the macro system. All parties are on their own. The most probable result is decline and neo-medievalism, and attempts via rescue vehicles to stabilize the system. The outcome of the Axial Age is a good warning to be wary of teleological delusions.

In a model of our type, the 'teleological future' is suddenly seen in the past from a chaotifying future. In the ancient case, Christianity, then Islam acted as rescue vehicles. Some form of neo-communism is an obvious candidate for a rescue vehicle of the new era we have entered.

It should at least be clear that the 'end of history' idea as a defense of capitalism is delusive and very dangerous.

makes a strong, and finally much better, claim on historical theory than the brilliant, still usable, but too narrow 'historical materialism', whose analyses have never used the dialectic they proclaimed in their theoretical claims, what to say of their fallacious attempts to rationalize the phenomenon of revolution, witness the fiasco of the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath.

The macro model, it must be admitted, with whatever bias, gives a much sounder analysis of so-called 'bourgeois modernity', but perhaps risks the danger of itself being ideological in this respect.

The macro model shows the way that thought system and 'ideologies' are themselves processed by evolutionary history, and the attempt using the reductionism to 'denature' the subjective won't work. The idea of freedom, for example, shows the fulcrum idea in the transition between materialism and idealism.

In fact, the model is so comprehensive that it can table contradictions with ease, and its intent is reconstructive study, not ideological promotion. But the leftist rejection of bourgeois capitalism led to the rejection, in some respects, of the whole phenomenon of modernity itself, in the confusion of economic and cultural categories, thus ending in a kind of proto-postmodern muddle of trying to undo the very culture it was trying to promote. The crux of the confusion lies in the mis-analysis of the French Revolution, and the so-called 'economic interpretation of history' applied to the dynamics of capitalism'.

2.N1 Notes on: The 'end of history':

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We can extend our model into an almost wistfully speculative extension, by hypothesis...these remarks are essentially outtakes and can be taken as scratchpad speculations.




Fig. 2.31 Rousseau as a decisive influence in the transition to democracy: James Miller, *Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy* (Yale, 1984).

Our macro model suggests, in a finesse of models, teleological systematics acting from the future, and the break point is visible in the temporal/hyparchic 'cliff', as the 'history as usual' phenomenon outruns the mysterious noumenal unknown. The result will proceed ad infinitum until burnout unless men freely intervene in the mechanical process to connect with the virtual future... This makes assumptions about Kantian teleology, versus that of Hegel. That of the macro model being different still, but styled after Kant's thinking.

We must always be wary of teleological thinking. It is our idea of an unknown probably noumenal Idea of Reason beyond words, a statement confounding Kantian and Hegelian philosophies. Our model seems to fulfill a putative variant of a Kantian antinomy: yes there is, no there isn't, a telos... Below are some musings on the subject...analysis interminable...

This model transforms the 'end of history' tinkertoy into a host of possible interpretations: a two level system creates a new set of effects....

The discourse of the 'end of history' suddenly takes a new and ominous meaning in the context of our model: we might well suspect from the evidence that 'democracy in some form' shows progressive cyclicality *in epochal restagings (the discrete freedom sequence), of experiments to realize a definition of such*. But this is macro induction, beware: the result is not 'free', but 'making free'. Twice this occurs near a 'great divide', just before 'make free' transits to 'free agency', and probable discombobulation in the not too distant downstream, two centuries for Athens.

This is no doubt related to the phenomenal approximation as progressive cyclicality of teleology as noumenon. The thesis of Fukuyama's book (in the fumbled football from Hegel to Kojève to Strauss) is brilliant nonsense and as such confirmed and negated all at once: the model shows that the issue is not democracy American-style plus capitalism at the end of history, but the progressive recurrence of attempts to define and realize it, with the American attempt one of the first in modern history, in the wake of the English Civil War. The failed first definitions should be obvious from the instant high speed last ditch effort to rewrite the rewrite as 'communism', true democracy (as per Marx's idea), dictatorship of the proletariat (original meaning, 'counsel' of the proletariat), etc... The equivocations of the French Revolution, and their failure to conclude shows the spectacular confirmation/refutation of the Fukuyama style thesis. The Jacobins are about to pass into the far left, democracy in the balance. Clearly the modern transition restages not just democratic experiments but their definitional instability, with the instant judgment from Marx-style lefts of the left factions that it failed and needs a new consideration given the distortions of capitalism inside 'democracy'. The process stages an antinomy of 'rights' for all

and rights of property. The most obvious catch in Fukuyama's thesis is that the efforts to 'define' democracy fail, and the dread cycle is forced into the long wait for the next, unless man can actually do the job for himself. Note this point: everything ends in floundering as the attempt is made to define or approximate 'democracy'. Clearly he can't, and is well on the way to trashing democracy two centuries from the divide, in the same timing as the Greek/Athenian collapse in 400 BCE! Spooky. Clearly *homo sapiens* cannot yet create his own democracies, and if he is lucky the cycles will repeat until he can get the hang of it! If we examine an 'earlier cycle', the post-Axial era, the reign of democracy was evanescent, soon followed by empire, whose endgame in the Occident was a medievalism, a dark ages, and entropic cultural decline, subject to the attempted theocratic rescue operations of late Christianity and Islam. Athenian democracy could not define slavery out of its framework, and thus had at most a gestural prophetic significance. The next cycle is waiting on abolition, which arrives with exact timing at the end of the modern transition. The distinction of 'system' and 'free action' complicates the discussion. The real end of history is actually the beginning of history when man is on his own without the action of the macro driver.

This is a dire warning that *homo sapiens* is too 'will to power' prone to create democracy on his own, and lapses into empire and oligarchy to a high probability, over time. The finite transition model exposes suspicious induction from its higher level. Because of this more complex model the discussions of the 'end of history' thus reveal a kind of incoherence. These issues spring if course from Hegel (who never mentions the 'end of history'), are taken up by Kojève, then Strauss and Fukuyama, whose *End of History and the Last Man* sets the tone for the neo-liberal era: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandre_Kojève. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man. But these writers are all darwinians, fixated on economism, and variants of historical materialism in a non-marxist sense that disallow teleology as in Hegel's brand. What is the meaning of any of the terms then? Strauss was a genuine *eminense grise*, and injects much of this propaganda directly into the American neo-con bloodstream, and its warmongering imperial wars, viz. Iraq. Stephen Smith, *Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism* (University of Chicago Press, 2006). Derrida's, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International*.

Fukuyama's counter to Kojève was a logical next move, but already the 'definition' of democracy goes in search of a new one that will see the wisdom of the marxian critique: electoral government has almost ceased to exist in the US system where Capital controls the whole game. The problem of course is that, e.g. American democracy is not stable, was never free from Capital domination, and degrades over time: the critique of American 'empire' is clear.

Fukuyama touches on the evolutionary issues in *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*: the dangers of biochemical alteration of human nature. This invokes our theme of last and first men directly. But the

In *Everything For Sale* (University of Chicago Press, 2006), Robert Kuttner exposes the limits of economic theory...

Econ 101 Etc... in search of 'le texte'...

Paul Krugman, Robin Wells: *Economics* (Princeton, 2009), Richard Wolff and Stephen Resnik: *Economics: Marxian, Neoclassical* (John Hopkins, 1987) Hill and Myatt, *The Economics Anti-TextBook: A Critical Thinkers Guide to Micro-Economics* (Zed Books, 2010), E. Roy Weintraub, *How Economics Became A Mathematical Science* (Duke, 2002) Steve Keen, *Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Dethroned* (Zed Books, 2011)

Cf. The movement for a 'post-autistic economics':

Roger Backhouse, *The Puzzle of Modern Economics* (Cambridge, 2010), p.5: "A clear example of recent disquiet with economics is the movement known as Post-Autistic Economics, which was started in June 2000,..."

The failure of socialist attempts at economic calculation and central planning is challenged in

W. Paul Cockshott, Allin F. Cottrell, *Towards a New Socialism* (Coronet, 1993), proposes new ways create planned economies, and in general the potential of advanced computers to deal with economies with tens of millions of commodities

Meme Wars: The Creative Destruction of Neoclassical Economics (Seven Stories Press, 2011): *Adbusters*

danger is only of Frankenstein reductionism. A true posthuman, or truly first human, future must be able to understand the 'soul' factor in man, and come to an understanding of the complexity of human (spiritual) psychology. A darwinian science can never resolved any of these questions.

The notion of the 'end of the end of history' after the 9/11 attacks is again confused if these were false-flag ops. The real dynamic is the latent conspiracy to dismantle the Islamic world system, such as it is. The 'clash of civilizations' is another imposter here, and our historical model doesn't really deal in civilizations: the dynamic is of transitions and their oikoumenes.

2.N2 Notes

"...capitalism is unsustainable from an ecological perspective, and... constitutes a form of structural genocide against future generations..."

Last and First Men

From Calvinism to Iron Cages

Having created a new model of history, we have cautioned against using it. We have created a simple version that is useful but inconclusive in the sense that complicated super-subtleties lurk in the analysis, which stretches over thousands of years. A good example of one that has actually been deciphered by a great scholar, Weber, is the relationship of Protestantism (Calvinism) and the rise of capitalism, and the decline of this ethic into raw capitalist nihilism. This version of the 'Iron Cage' exposes the complexity of the Reformation.

The Republic of Ends

Harry Van Der Linden's *Kantian Ethics and Socialism* (Google books) tells the tale of a parallel derivation of socialism from the works of the Kant, who was called the 'true originator' of German socialism' by Herman Cohen, who created the Marburg school. The dilemma of the Calvinist reappears in Kant, who tended to support capitalism (which may have remained unfocused in this thinking), but whose ethics undermines the logic of markets as engines of selfishness with the derivation of the socialist ideal in the context of Kantian ethics.

Marx/Hegel and the Master/Slave dialectic

We have cautioned the 'Hegelian dialectic', and suggested a dialogical 'metadialectic' to assess its status, but on some issues the discussion might well revert to the historical givens: the classic discussion by Marx of Hegel's 'master/slave' discourse. Our caution against misuse of our model springs from the existence of a manifold of issues such as the three above.

Garry Leech, *Capitalism: A Structural Genocide* (Zed Books, 2012), p. 7
 Thomas Pinketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Harvard, 2014).
 Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (HarperPerennial, 2005).
 Tristram Hunt, *Marx's General: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels* (Holt
 2012).

Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right* (Yale, 2011). Benjamin Kunkel,
Utopia or Bust (Verso, 2014). Despite our wariness at postmodern perspectives,
 Jameson's works are interesting: *Late Marxism* (Verso, 2007).

The question of Engels remains unresolved by the marxist legacy. In some ways
 more talented than Marx he is blamed for the trend toward scientism, dialectical
 materialism.

"There is a giant death sentence hanging over much of our world...", Chris
 Williams, *Ecology and Socialism: Solutions to Capitalist Ecological Crisis*
 (Haymarket, 2010),

David Harvey, *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* (Oxford,
 2014).

Robert Reich, *Aftershock (Inequality for All)* (Vintage, 2013), plus movie.

"The Bush administration is paltering to the American public with exaggerated
 misconceptions of world-wide terrorism to frighten us into supporting a global
 police state, and the US corporate media serves as the handmaid of this deception,"
 Eliot Cohen, et al., *The Last Days of Democracy* (Prometheus, 2007).

Kirkpatrick Sale, in *After Eden: The Evolution of Human Domination* (Duke
 University Press, 2006) evokes the crucial question of the emergence of *homo*
sapiens from *homo erectus*. The environmental destabilizer *sapiens* is reaching
 his evolutionary endgame.

A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005), David Harvey
 chronicles the history of 'neoliberalism'.

Tallis, Raymond. *Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis, and the*
Misrepresentation of Humanity. (Acumen, 2011).

Harry Van Der Linden's *Kantian Ethics and Socialism* (Hackett, 1988) depicts
 a rich parallel universe in Kantian Socialism.

The resemblance of 'Big History' to 'historical materialism' is direct, and in
 both cases we lack a philosophy of history that deals with the issue of freedom.
 The association with Darwinism cripples these theories. Faulkner, Neil. *A Marxist*
History of the World From Neanderthals to Neoliberals. (Pluto Press, 2013).

Tariq Ali (ed.), *The Stalinist Legacy* (Haymarket, 1984)

The racial/geographical confusions of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and the
 (preposterous) 'progression of spirit' across continents is discussed in Teshale
 Tibebe's *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History*
 (Syracuse, 2011).

The macro model has an entirely different, and complex, take on Eurocentrism.
 The abstraction called 'Europe' has no foundation in the model which deals
 in 'differential time-space slices' of historical 'streams'. The temporary focal

concentration of transition zones begins to lose its geographical focus to globalization just around the period of 1848. Unfortunately by that time much of the damage has been done, from the resurgence of New World slavery and genocide, to the birth of the modern corporate imperialism in the inchoate appearance of the East India Company. The place of Africa in the suggested macrosequence is direct, from the Neolithic entry to the sub-Sahara onwards.

“Marx’s theoretical thinking presented itself, at various points, not as a philosophy, but as an alternative to philosophy, a non-philosophy or even an anti-philosophy,” Etienne Balibar, *The Philosophy of Marx* (Verso, 1995). But marxism appears in the wake of one the most most spectacular short eras of philosophy in world history, pegged with eerie exactness at the ‘divide’. Marxism tends to be caught in the wake eddies of Feuerbach, and the rise of scientism.

Paul Buhle, *Marxism in the United States: A History of the American Left* (Verso, 2013). Relative to modernity, the American sphere rapidly conservatized, but relative to world history, it is an all time classic revolution now a seemingly drab ‘bourgeois revolution’, a continuation of the English Civil War. The American Civil War is the world-historical conclusion to the Abolitionist turning point inside the modern transition.

As to whether Marx predicted 2008... The issue of predictions, catastrophism, and a tendency in marxism to assume crisis as the gateway to post-capitalism is discussed in *Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth* (PM Press, 2012).

Joseph Stiglitz, in *Globalization and Its Discontents* (Norton, 2002), documents the failure of global economic policies.

From String Theory to Derivatives demonology:

James Weatherall, *The Physics of Wall Street* (Houghton-Mifflin, 2013).

John Nichols: *The ‘S’ Word: A Short History of an American Tradition* (Verso, 2011).

Niall Ferguson, *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World* (Penguin, 2008)

The swindles of Pareto efficiency are discussed in Moshe Adler, *Economics for the Rest of Us: Debunking the Science That Makes Life Dismal* (The Free Press, 2010).

Who was Lenin?

Lars Linh, *Lenin* (Reaktion Books, 2011).

Neil Davidson’s *How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?* (Haymarket, 212), p. IX, has good discussion of this classic painting, “Delacroix enshrined the heroic conception of the bourgeois revolution at precisely the moment when the process began to overlap with the formative stages of the working-class struggle”.

Jacques Barzun, in an astonishing work written in 1941, *Darwin, Marx, Wagner* (Little, Brown, 1941), reminds us that Darwin critiques were once academically viable, before the Synthesis, and that the tenets of marxism were under assault by end of the nineteenth. Much of this critique is denied students of these subjects. But the Darwin paradigm is beginning to collapse: Cf. David Noble:

Kantian Ethics, A Theoretical Purgatory

In all the debates over religion and ethics, and then evolution, we can lose sight of the obvious realization emerging in the Enlightenment that Christianity was unable to produce a satisfactory ethical canon, a severe failing for a religion! But secular ethical systems seem to be one bad theory after another, none can quite match the ‘crashlanding’ of Kant. The issues are well explored by Kant who is one of the first philosophers in history to produce an ethical discussion based on autonomy with all the pieces in one place. Before succumbing to Nietzsche’s scenario and diatribes against ethical systems, we should suspect that Kant’s discussion is evidence of man’s inability to understand what Kant calls ‘common ordinary morality’.

The emergence of evolutionary ethical man suggests a resemblance to the mysterious emergence of language in man.

Kant’s brilliant effort remains a kind of sketch, and indicates the hard reality that *homo sapiens* lacks the intelligence to understand his own ethical behavior, despite the spontaneous yet facile ‘ethical behaviorism’.

Kant’s prophetic coining of the phrase ‘radical evil’, thence in descent from Hegel to Arendt: *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation* (Polity, 2002), Richard Bernstein (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics* (Blackwell, 2009).

Kant’s not so mysterious ‘blunder’

Kant is almost the one voice to scotch the inexorable rise of Machiavellian political psychopathy, and we must wonder that he took on Benjamin Constant, on the ‘right to lie’. He seems to have misunderstood his own categorical imperative, yet sends a message downfield. Constant seems right, yet political lying is a progressive disease.

We should see the wisdom of his gesture in our own times: such is the crescendo of lying that politicians cannot determine via truthful statements who is the real government of the US in the wake of 9/11. It would appear that a *coup d’etat* has occurred behind a mountain of lies and the action of covert agencies.

1. Mutations are not random.
2. Acquired characteristics can be inherited.
3. The gene-centered view of evolution is wrong.
4. Evolution is not a gradual gene-by-gene process but is macromutational.
5. Scientists have not been able to create new species in the lab or greenhouse,

and

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1113/expphysiol.2012.071134/pdf>

It is useful to apply our 'stream and sequence' (Appendix) argument to the emergence of 'revolution' in world history. Revolution is rare, or else implicit and semi-invisible. We can see that in the Axial Age revolution starts to become visible and explicit, and we can see this in the period of Archaic Greece, where

Behind the central stream of modernity we find the many strains of counterpoint, from the Counter-Enlightenment, to the Romantic Movement, Occult Enlightenment, Oriental Enlightenment, resurfacing Buddhist Enlightenment, postmodern phantoms, the 'dark side of...', and in the process study. redevelop the theme of Reason beyond its capture by scientism.

These issues are latent and very close to home: e.g. consider the context of the Protestant Reformation, and the underground Hermetic tradition give Hegel's dialectical idea a complex background, Glen Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition* (Cornel, 2011).

The counterpoint to the Enlightenment in the Romantic movement offers a direct resource for an 'ecological communism' beyond the constricted economism of marxism...

class struggle is documented, with the remarkable achievement of democracy (assuming slavery still) in Athens. As so often, any innovation in the Axial Age probably has a near birth in the range of the Sumerian transition phase. But the Greek era shows incipient phases of the 'revolution' as a transformative process.

The issues of Eurocentrism plague all attempts to grasp globalization. The macro model both embraces and explodes the Eurocentric myth. If we look at the facts of the case, we see that the macro model is confirmed in all instances, as the core ideas of modernity are adopted with alacrity, thence to challenge the excesses of imperialism that have no place in the historical outcome. From there a constellation of parallel modernities is already coming into being. Cf. Pankay Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012). The macro model is the 'spitting image' of punctuated equilibrium, but the idea has become darwinized. Cf. David Pringle: *Stephen Jay Gould and the Politics of Evolution* (Prometheus, 2009).



Fig. 2.32 Hegel observes Napoleon at Jena
 If ever there were a case where the notion of Crt Alt Del applied, it is with German Idealism, a thunderclap of the ages with spooky timing dead center on the divide. It is thus entirely apt to find Marx and Engels conflicted in the attempt to move with the tide of scientism but smuggle in ‘Hegeliana’ with little sense of the contradiction.
 Karl Ameriks (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism* (Cambridge, 2000)

The mysterious dynamic (‘dialectic’) of Hegel and Schopenhauer is the subtext of German Classical Idealism. Schopenhauer’s idea of the ‘Will in Nature’ will echo in J. G. Bennett’s interpretation of Classical Samkya. He will be one of the indirect founders of the ‘New Age’ movements to come, and gives a better rendering of the Upanishadic psychology than the original.
 Dale Jacquette, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (McGill-Queens, 2005)

In the investigation into the Last Man, it is essential to see the ‘degeneration’ of Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘will to power’ from Schopenhauer’s deeper conception.

The New Age movement is a confusion of post-modernism: the real New Age comes with the modern transition, and this mystery knows of its lost pieces, and will unexpectedly stage a rebirth of buddhsim in modern culture in transition perhaps to a rebirth.

Charles Allen, *The Search For the Buddha, The Men Who Discovered India’s Lost Religion* (Carrol and Graaf, 2002)



Fig. 2.33 Schopenhauer



The joker in the deck of historical theory can be seen from Kant’s discovery of the relationship of teleology and aesthetic judgment.

Fig. 2.34 Kant and Friends at Table

Fred Gutierl, *The Fate of the Species: Why the Human Race May Cause Its Own Extinction And How We Can Stop It* (Bloomsbury, 2012), Jared Diamond, *Collapse* (Penguin, 2011).




Fig. 2.35, 36, 37
Australopithecus.
comic book cover,
'Sheep to Slaughter'.

The 'Evolution' of Religion

Our discussion of the Axial Age gives us a handle on the 'evolution' of religion. We see that religion in history shows an epochal set of transformations, automatically regenerating every 2400 years. The Old Testament in the context of Biblical archaeology shows us the spectacular nature of the phenomenon of religion in one

We can now understand why religion is under attack by modernists: once again religion starts 'new aging'. Just as Isrealitism began to attack idolatry as polytheism, modern secularism is beginning to charge an idolatry of theism. But there is a new twist here, or two: Christianity went through a Reformation and seems to be surviving, and science has emerged wishing to replace religion. How this plays out in the new era is not clear yet.

complete seequence from the Axial Age to the modern Reformation. We see a complete cycle of initiation, the Axial Age, diffusion into a larger geographical region as a secondary initiation occurs, cf. the birth of Christianity. The result (and the case of Islam is similar. Nearby in India we see an analog in the emergence of Buddhism (so-called) with a synchronous transformaty into Mahayana in concert with Christianity! Right on schedule the modern Reformation shows the process all over again.

The Axial Age transformation of 'Israel' is hard to understand until we compare it with the direct analog in Archaic Greece. The result shows us the way the 'sacred' and 'secular' blend into each other.

The phase of Axial Age Greece shows a remarkable resemblance to the modern transition.

We catch a glimpse of the way religions evolve in history. But the term 'evolution' has changed its meaning. And the term no longer refers to a theory claiming universal validity. Instead, evolution is a descriptive term describing a series of unique occassions. The evolution of religion (which is not really a separate category) is a macro-induction process. and has no connection with natural selection.

One of the most notable challenges to Darwinists lies in the phenomenon of altruism. Why isolate this one character theory is dramatically evident from the totality, unless some agenda in the discussions of altruism by Darwinists. Why is selfishness thought so compatible with physicalism, while generosity smacks of religious idealism, ethical and/or philosophical? The contradiction between the implicit selfishness of natural selection and the phenomenon of altruism has been the object of considerable theory in the realm of population genetics, i.e. theories of group selection and kin selection. This bag of tricks is a *tour de force*, no doubt, but fallacious at step one: to make altruism a secondary derivation from the tenets of selection is a set of abstractions unverified in practice, and we will soon see another approach to the question based on the evidence of history.

Darwinism, Altruism and Ideology One of the obvious giveaways to ideology, in essence the economic brand, is the Darwinian obsession with altruism. Vindicating selfishness and denigrating ethical action via the debunking of altruism is well within the legacy of the Adam Smith canon of economic self-interest. But using natural selection to mechanize one virtue in a spectrum is a puzzling fallacy for science: the job is to explain the behavior of conscious ethical agents, and perhaps their evolution, the latter a difficult task with the evidence at hand.

Debunking altruism borders on obsession with Darwinists. That this virtue is but one isolated aspect of ethics is forgotten. The attempts to derive altruism from selfishness via the various mathematical models of kin and group selection (to say nothing of the interior debate between the two) has to be the most direct evidence of ideology at work, and yet the mathematical sophistication (seeming!) of the technical arguments tends to stall critics. The issue is simple: ethical theories require conscious agents with a will to moral action, and scientism has by definition eliminated these. These theories are therefore not candidates at all for a real theory of evolution. Any real theory of human evolution, in this sense, is completely beyond current science. Not even the default chronicle of the sequences involved in deep time are unknown. The group/kin selection models are simply abstractions without real data.

From *Descent of Man Revisited*, Chapter 4

The challenge of 'super-hard meta-technological problems, technology vs. techne, and 'soft causality'

The question of technology takes a jump to a new level with the challenge shown in the Axial Age manifestations, e.g. the emergence of the 'tragic genre' in Archaic/Classical Greece, a clearer instance of the misperceived issue of an 'Age of Revelation'.

The ability to stage a phase of 'tragic drama' in the culture sphere of a primitive people is a useful measure of the extreme complexity of the macro phases. By this measure we can see the still primitive character of the 'culture technology' of *homo sapiens*. By comparison controlled or planned economies should be easy!

Sacred/Secular

The 'macro' effect presents the puzzle of parallel entities showing synchronous transformations. Note how proto-secularism in Archaic Greece emerges in parallel to the Judeo-Israelite transition.

Our system doesn't distinguish 'sacred' and 'secular'

Early tribal history of the Greeks

-1200-900 Mycenaean period, Greek Dark Ages

-900-600 Dark Ages/Archaic period

-600-400 The great take-off period, the Greek 'Miracle'

-400 onward: We enter the Hellenistic, it's over

Compare this now to Israel:

Early Canaanite history

-1200-900 ? The onset of the 'Israel/Judah' kingdoms

-900-600 The history of 'Israel/Judah', emergence of Prophets

-600-400 The Exile period

-400 onward: A new religion has come into existence

Note the isomorphic character of these two histories. This is the embedded 'transition' pattern. Later we will see this in terms of what we call the 'stream and sequence' aspects of the eonic process/pattern. In the middle of continuous stream of culture a sudden relative speed up occurs. We must realize the high level at which this dynamic is operating. And remarkably in both cases a great literature comes into existence, the Greek and Old Testament epics. Note that 'Israel/Judah' disappears near the Exile, depriving us of a flowering or realization period, but enforcing a mysterious extra-state character to what will be a 'cultural complex' that travels transculturally. Note that our system treats states and religions equally in its dynamics, and it is the case that the core Axial period for 'Israel/Judah' is about a state, and not about a 'world religion'. Judaism as we know it comes much later, as do Christianity and Islam.


Kant is the first philosopher to see a connection between dynamics and aesthetics. We must either adopt design arguments or find the dynamical equivalent to aesthetic judgment!

Macroevolutionary induction? The ultra-subtle aspects of the 'macro effect' The sudden appearance of the tragic genre in the Axial Age. The Axial period is filled with such effects, many of which we still don't understand

Art, Evolution and The Tragic Genre


The macro effect gives hard evidence of the way a higher level seeds, microprograms, culture in its direct mainline. We are confronted by the fact that Greek tragedy arises in the Greek Axial interval, flowers in spectacular fashion and in perfect correlation, then begins to wane promptly at the conclusion of the transitional interval. In terms of our evolution formalism the correspondence is eerily exact, in terms of macro and micro, System Action and Free Action. We are left to wonder about earlier stages of human evolution if we see such spectacular kibitzing at the level of art.

Thus, the historian William MacNeill, in *Keeping Together in Time* considers the element of dance and song in human evolution. But this process is right under our noses if we carefully do some accounting of relative transforms in our eonic pattern. Most 'song and dance' elements are well established in the human legacy and cease to show relative transformation. We need to find one that is inside the macro mainline. We can see that the macro pattern is pervaded by spectacular cases of artistic flowering. Here is a prime case for our distinctions made between what is potential at all times and what appears in our macroevolutionary pattern. We can in fact isolate one spectacular intermittent effect in the genre of Greek tragedy (whose 'song and dance' elements are almost vestigial, as it passes into a literary genre).



William McNeill,
in *Keeping Together
in Time* (Harvard University Press, 1995).

Fig. 2.38 Theatre of Dionysus



3. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history will then pass under control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only at this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

Friedrich Engels

We have created a new perspective on world history and evolution, and the result shows a clear set of clues to an implicit dynamic built into the chronicle of the emergence of civilization. This gives us a deep insight into the veiled enigma of world history, and uncovers the sneaky teleological factor hidden in the drama of emerging civilization. A system of tremendous complexity and elusive action is at work behind the saga of civilization,

and we need to be wary of how we use our model and interpret this set of insights. We designed our model to default to a simple narrative of world eras, and we can adopt the rough simplification that economic systems are open to free agency making a postcapitalist project the result of such agency. To make our point we can stop abruptly, as if we had to proceed to action immediately with or without the complexities of our model. The world on fire, like firemen we proceed to the realm of praxis, the theory of our model to one side. We can cite our statement from the *Preface*:

At a time of planetary crisis, the profound praxis of Marx and Engels needs to be set in a new key, and to some extent set aside, and the macro model can taxi the legacy of those who first extended the revolutionary impulse of the French Revolution into the futures of capitalist economy, dissolving into the background like the Cheshire cat once its job is done.

In conclusion we can highlight once again the emergence of modern socialism and communism in relation to the era of democratic revolutions, leading up to the periods of the revolutions of 1848. This will show the incomplete nature of this prophetic era. The 'end of history' as 'democratic capitalism' fails, and the pseudo-democracies invoke completion as socialism/communism, as the transition era comes to an end with a question mark/

We can move toward a manifesto for a New Communism embedded in a larger framework invoking a sort of 'super-manifesto' that points to the need for man to design civilizations on the scale of the macro effect, as the phases of system action yield to free action. Our blank formalism has history emerging from evolution, and this would require completion as the ability to initiate development sequences at the species level on a scale of ten thousand years, i.e. the span since the Neolithic.

This almost impossible-seeming task requires a global level or 'Gaian' system that can replicate the macrosequence. This is not so easy, and braids economic, political, religious, and, nota bene, aesthetic questions. This context highlights the significance of a first step in the form of a postcapitalism, that can design a communist economic system, with a global political framework of 'socialist republics' in a Kantian federation.

There are two avenues toward this: the remorphed 'modern revolution' of the early modern seizing power, or the long-term 'hyparchic' religion/ideology/political movement not unlike the Christian response to the Roman Empire, moving from catacombed underground associations toward a final turning point takeover of the existing capitalist apparatus. This framework puts the issues on a higher level than ad hoc emergency response to crisis,

A short history of the world:
Ages in Transition

We can take a step beyond our outline with an expanded ‘new age’ model of the macro effect. Here is one of our outlines, with a warning that the Neolithic is probably a part of the ‘story’ with two ‘epochs’ although the evidence is insufficient. But the value of our model lies in the way in can start ‘*in medias res*’, with ‘relative beginnings’.

From the Neolithic to Egypt, Sumer:
probably two transition epochs:
8000 BCE plus and 5400 BCE plus (?)
Dynastic Egypt/Sumer: 3000 BCE plus
The Axial Age: 600 BCE plus
The Modern Transition: 1800 BCE plus
Our (downfield) Present

The New Age model is therefore, after an introductory fast forward from the Big Bang to the Neolithic, a saga of three visible epochs, initiated by a phase of transition, the age of the great civilizational complexes of Sumer and Egypt, followed by the epoch of the Axial period, concluded with the modern epoch beginning in the sixteenth century, with its actual take-off at the divide point ca. 1800. The confusing Eurocentric focus (after the extreme splitting of the post-Axial epoch) of the early modern has already generated a global oikoumene and the first world civilization is coming into being. The suspicion arises that the resumed ‘macrosequence’ beginning in the Neolithic has concluded and *homo sapiens* is shifting to ‘free action’ after a long period of induced transitions. This perilous moment (given the disastrous decline of the Occident in the wake of the Axial Age) could easily sink into a new barbarism based on mechanized scientism, capitalist plutocracy, and nominal enslavement of the classic proletariats.

In our epochal account, the ‘new age’ of modernity is just getting underway, a mere two centuries after the modern divide (the analogous point in the Axial period is ca. 400 BCE the two centuries after 600 BCE), in the suspense of ‘system action’ yielding to ‘free action’. It is very doubtful that free markets and darwinian ideology are going to be the leaders of future ‘evolution’.

such as climate change. But such crises may indicate a transition of the type suggested in the communist idea as imminent in the near term. The capitalist mafias will be ready with a fascist neo-feudal barbarism ready to reinstall de facto slavery and baboon culture games of lords and ladies, and a darwinian misfire in the legitimation of evolutionary ideologies as social darwinian class warfare up to genocide to create slave species.

First from Last Men, Unite...

We will conclude our study abruptly (the reader may also consider the conclusion in Chapter 2), as a work in progress, our prime objective accomplished, with an Appendix elaborating on our historical framework. We can consider as a formal gesture some ideas moving toward a 'new Manifesto', and then a selection in an addendum to this chapter from WHEE on the issues of the 'end of history', and the confusing legacy of Hegel and Nietzsche created by Fukuyama. That legacy echoes the work of Alexander Kojève and Leo Strauss, whose debates (a dead letter, perhaps) were repackaged for the age of the American neo-cons. We have given a number of useful interpretations of that derelict phrase in terms of our historical model. We should note the limits of analysis, despite completing our prime objective: the terms 'democracy' and 'communism' are too vague to really resolve: the first chases the second, and the second chases the first, a sure sign that neither has a stable definition.

3.N1 Notes: Toward a New Communist Manifesto

As the world system under globalization approaches convergence the crisis at the core of the capitalism becomes increasingly explicit, exposing the contradictions, and deadly side effects, of capitalist mania and its ideological economics. The inherent dynamic of *laissez-faire* evokes its final contradiction in the inevitable challenge to 'markets everywhere' by a global system that will proceed via the creative destruction of capitalism to a new postcapitalism, everywhere. This process waits on the 'versions 2.0' of the communist resolution, its classic manifesto as relevant as ever to the task, and yet now requiring a reformulation and a set of specific proposals for postcapitalist economy. One of the problems with historical materialism is the suggestion that the stage of capitalism can't be changed until the system has fulfilled all its potential, a disastrous 'delay forever'. In fact, capitalism is a spurious stage of history and should have been moderated from the beginning.




Fig. 3.1 Proto-factories in Ancient Egypt: ropemakers.




Fig 3.2-3
Iron Forges, ancient Egypt,
Novelty Iron Works, 1851

The larger model of the macro effect has a ‘stream and sequence’ analysis that helps to see the way the ‘industrial revolution’ has been both continuous since the Neolithic, and yet enters the ‘sequence’ phase in an explosive phase of the modern transition. Our outline suggests a whole new set of empirical studies starting in the Neolithic.

We have completed our prime objective in demonstrating a new model of history, and we can see the place of revolution in that history and the context of emergent communism as a realizable outcome of the revolutionary chain, now in the context of globalization.

Whatever we think of 'historical inevitability' arguments, and we have critiqued these, the reality is that some finalization as postcapitalism has become essential to forestalling the terminal crisis evoked by unrestricted *laissez-faire*. An ironic outcome to the hubristic 'end of history' nonsense as to the immortality of unrestricted markets. The evidence of the finite transition model is that emergent democracy shows a directionality in a recurrence by macro induction.

The lack of a full communist experiment via macro induction is a warning of the need for a careful strategy of its realization. We can see that marxism/leninism, a vital set of experimental first drafts, was not sufficient to the task, which is tantamount to civilization creation. Marx/Engels were clear on this point. But now it be necessary to adopt a constructivist approach. The project may default to the kind of hyparchic incremental realization we see in emergent Christianity as a slow motion 'revolution' against empire. We should not despair: the macro process is actually like an earthquake and quite crude, with many failures. Freely induced substitutes for system action might actually be superior. One might almost consider Popper's idea of piecemeal social engineering: the incremental remorphing of a democratic system to a communist system, with a clear understanding of this as a successor, not an antithesis.

The emergence of the modern transition is thus, by our logic, a complex of 'system action' and 'free action'. The system then downshifts to free action alone, and thus leaves off to allow free agency to create its own 'real' freedom. It seems unlikely that any civilization has so far come close to solving this set of enigmas. This is a better version of the confusion created by the 'end of history' idea-nexus. But as the system pulls away from its divide, the macro factor disappears. This says nothing about capitalism. If capitalism decreases democratic freedom then it is under challenge, and the attempt to create 'true democracy' then follows, and follows logically as perhaps communism. There is another model here: the 'generic oikoumene generator', or religion, visible in the formations of the post-Axial period. There were three exemplars, the buddhist, and two monotheistic formations.

To see the problem of interpretation, consider the Old Testament core history of the Axial interval: how close did the redactors of that history come to what we see now in a larger context? The result drifts into mythology even as it shows the macro effect in disguise. There

**The Hyperzoic Evolution of Man:
Gaia, the biospheric film, and ‘triadic/dialectical
materialism’, ancient, modern**

The model we have created shows very strong evidence of a global system at work in the way it projects macro induction across the sphere of the planet (and across time). This puts the question into the ‘Gaian hypothesis’ box, and suggests that ‘evolution’ is closely connected to planetary systematics. We have already cited the work of J.G.Bennett, where this hypothesis is given a neo-*Samkhya* rendering based on an interpretation of the scales of cosmic existence, in which biospheres are the intrinsic correlates of planets and solar systems. This is like ‘dialectical materialism’ reinvented, keeping in mind that dualistic ‘dialectic’ is not the same as ‘triadic’ integrated meta-logic...

This line of thinking is based on a different format of analysis, that of being, function, and will. The factor of will can rescue this line of

Multiple mysterious hints point to an anonymous source (coded *sufistic*) to Bennett’s flawed but brilliant book, i.e. the demiurgic sphere. We suspect a premonition to a new set of ideas for the coming epoch, with a further suggestion to wrest this from rightist to leftist contexts, where it always belonged. Consider our *Preface* here.

thinking from the confusions of calling cosmic entities ‘alive’. Life is a property of biospheres, and doesn’t apply to cosmic entities, which can however show manifestations of will (as in Schopenhauer very different from ‘will power’), as the framework of cosmic laws.

The evolution of man impinges on the ‘hyperzoic’ realm as it touches on the factor of ‘consciousness’ (as opposed to the zoic ‘consciousness’ of animal sensitivity) which is a cosmic ‘energy’, the groundstate of a complex of such energies.

This suggests the resolution of the confusion over human evolution, which is leading beyond the realm of life to that of cosmic energies. ‘(conscious/self-conscious’ sometimes stands in for this distinction, reversing the terms). Still in the realm of science fiction, this line of thinking suggests a new form of science in the coming epoch, one that can unify conceptions of nature echoing the ancient, and mysterious *Samkhya*, and a new, unknown form of knowledge based on a new understanding of human consciousness. These remarks might help to clarify the New Age confusion making spiritual methods a path to evolution. This is a confusion of categories.

This refers to *The Dramatic Universe*, of Bennett, especially Vol I and IV.

are two issues here: the emergence of monotheism, and the claim that the divinity in question staged the transition to that. But the saga of a divinity fails here, even as the data suggests the Israelites missed the real miracle. The problem is the obvious isomorphism to the Greek Axial interval, and an equivalent atheist religion in eerie parallel timing in India. Clearly we are far from understanding this phenomenon. We have used a neutral systems analysis with a cover term 'evolution' in a new sense. But we should be alert to what the Israelites almost got right: the action of some kind of process across a region over a three century interval. Science cannot resolve this kind of process.

This said, the design argument refuses to die because the Axial Age history of emergent monotheism is almost impossible to understand as a mechanical process. If the Jehovah hypothesis fails, we retreat to the IHVH mystery glyph! The same reference works as well for the Axial Age in Greece, almost more miraculous than the Israelite.

The design argument won't go away because the data makes sense if the designer adopted 'Jehovah' and its myths as an exoteric cover story. The distinction of system action and free action reminds us that such a higher power would let man create his own religion. Stick to our neutral systems model. Theistic reasoning will wreck interpretation.

As the system moves away from the modern transition, the second possibility rises: to create a generalized oikoumene at the global level. That was always the implication of the modern transition.

The modern transition, for reasons we have seen, is unifocal, where the Axial Age is multifocal. The potential Eurocentrism is resolved in the approach to universal categories. The language of 'economics' has been a useful such 'universal language' and we see the outcome of the modern transition rapidly moving past its source boundaries, a huge global success.

In an age of the 'secular' this could be a form of 'postreligion'. It makes no difference. Our macro dynamic doesn't distinguish 'sacred' and 'secular'. This second possibility is about the future, and the model we have created won't prove anything about the outcome. A 'religion' tends to indicate, not the spiritual, but the mechanization of social consciousness in a cult. But this can overtake the secular in equal fashion. In any case the communist project is clearly both a political realization, and the completion of the Reformation. A community of global communism must endow the social with the highest products of religion, a very difficult challenge. None of this would seem appropriate to the foundation of a new communism. But the issues require mention since the dangers of totalitarian theocracy haunt

Toward a New Communist Super-Manifesto

This classic formulation of Engels forms the basis for understanding the real context of a revolutionary turn to a new global society.

But as we see from our new model of history the tremendous scale of the operation suggests the need for a realistic humility about what is possible. The First Men emerging from the Last Men must be able to control the evolution of civilization over millennia, project macro sequences of their own as free action, on the scale of tens of millennia. We can see that man is not yet capable of that, and that a communist outcome as postcapitalism would make a good way station to study and prepare for the completion of the historical and evolutionary process seen in the macro effect.

The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history will then pass under control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only at this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

Our understanding of the system depicted in our model is a measure of our ability to complete this task, which requires projects managed over millennia.

Our model shows the way free action succeeds system action in the wake of each transition. Now we confront the probability that the modern transition is the last in a long sequence beginning in the Neolithic and that our 1848 nexus is thus a double challenge as man exits larger evolutionary induction to a condition of self-evolution. Man cannot as yet project activities on this scale, and the challenge to do so is probably equivalent to the project of evolution itself, which man as yet only imperfectly understands.

This conception might seem utopian but it forces the question of what is driving our macrosequence.

This is a clear warning that the regime of *laissez-faire* is too close to 'high barbarism' to be the vehicle of the future.

both sacred and secular outcomes. The issue is not 'religion' but the free consciousness of man. Our point: a communist succession to capitalism must be able to create a new culture, and the issue of religion must be dealt with carefully.

We could hardly compete with the eloquence of the original Manifesto, and don't need to, a symbolic gesture is enough, with some generalized notes toward a 'new communist' manifesto can suggest the need for an innovative form of the communist project that echoes its outstanding legacy and yet creates a caesura with the immediate past now fixated on the failures of the Bolshevik project.

We have seen the ad hoc character of capitalism, and its libertarian distortions of the basis of the democratic revolution. Those distortions were born in the counterrevolutionary wake of the English Civil War and entered the classic format of insurgent democracy as the recipe of bourgeois revolution in America. We should note the synchronous emergence at the high tide of revolutionary impetus of incipient democracy and capitalism at the helm of the Industrial Revolution. The first wave of democratic revolution never took this factor into account. This concordance made the inherent contradictions of the whole transition ambiguous, and we can see lately what the successors to Babeuf saw at once, the class basis of the whole 'modern situation' and the way that Capital has taken control of the State in the process provoking by its own dialectic the coming of a global system of government.

The attempt to correct this via a totalitarian system backfired completely. And it is this confusion of the revolution for the state beside the revolution against the state that has stymied the early attempts at a communist end-phase, creating a totalitarian outcome. Clearly the only format for a communist system is the democratic emergentism of the modern transition. But this must revise itself in the reckoning of libertarian sleight of hand and the domination of property that made the rights revolution into the contradiction pointed to by the generation of Marx, the era of 1848. That era was at once the seal of the modern transition, and the clarion of the passage to a new mideonic era.

There the inherent contradiction of 'communism' lies in its task of completing the democratic revolution, yet assuming as in the wake of the Axial Age the collectivist implications of the world religions. We can see the first failure in the theocracy of scientism. Having invoked a dialectical principle, the left was unable to use it. In addition to mediating rights and

‘End of History’ fool’s gold: the challenge of decline

The distinction of system action and free action is a warning that systems can begin slow but steady decline in the period after the divide. In antiquity that process was irreversible at all stages after c. 400 BCE. We see that Greek democracy was a very brief event, and almost gone by 400 BCE. The Roman Republic lasted a bit longer. It is thus clear that the Roman Empire was an historical aberration, a phenomenon of decline, with no connection to macro induction.



fig. 3.4 Visigoths sack Rome

In the case of the modern US, we see a direct correlation to the transitional era, and already, once again, within two centuries, a fatal closing of the American mind as a subtle corruption of democracy emerges.

The distinction of ‘system action’ and ‘free action’ evokes a perspective not unlike the distinction of mechanical consciousness and self-consciousness. The mechanization of consciousness allows the system to begin to drift. Nothing in this kind of system requires

inevitable decline. Free action must take control of civilizational dynamics and create a future beyond decline.



Fig. 3.5-6 Napoleon and Sphinx, Ruins by the Sea

democracy, economy and markets, a future communism will inherit the orphans of the Axial endgame, requiring more than the sterile, yet apposite, historical materialism, so useful as a shock to the system of 'spiritual hypnosis'.

The task is the real understanding of the meaning of secularism if this was initiated by a religious Reformation, not only a Scientific Revolution. It is significant that the real first born of that religious revolution, with Munzer so ominously in the background of the Luthers, was liberalism, whose transcendental basis against scientism was the real 'religion' of the modern, with as good a version of 'super-nature' in that idea as any of the antique monotheisms. This aspect of the Idea of freedom was clearly chronicled in Kant, and then Hegel, their brief phase of revelatory philosophy perfectly timed to the Great Divide constituting a conclusion to that Reformation and the world of Luther, now brought to the New Age of secular ferment, all too liable to reinvent religion in false or antiquated versions.

Our study has shown the indifference of our historical evolution to the distinction of sacred and secular, the modern transition having already played its ace in the creation of a modernist 'postreligion'. The sacred could be a secular awe at the Kantian antinomies of Reason, and the mysteries of beginning, or a sense of the real potential of the successor to homo erectus as a creature with mind, a soul in some sense, and a potential toward self-consciousness that can unlock the truth of the self.

The era of scientism in the wake of the modern transition is an incomplete version of modernism and has already produced a distortion of a complex legacy superbly tailored to the revolutionary completion of democracy in communism, and our analysis has shown the way that 'outcomes' of the modern transition will tend to downshift to single lines of action in a greater multitasking system.

The object of communism therefore is more than the settlement of the capitalist question. It must also Ctrl Alt Del, in our metaphor, with a step backward to ride the multitasking of the early modern (dialectics) up to the Great Divide, and fastforward to the virtual endstate envisioning by the prophets of the once and future modernity. The modern transition is a complex historical phase that transcends its particular manifestations.

The conclusion to the American Revolution, as in the separation of powers, was able to create a balanced system. A true communist revolution would require some such settlement in the creation of independent legal

bodies able to control and mediate the economic question, as an entity both beholden to and independent of a central government. Such bodies must mediate a level of indifference below which a thriving postcapitalist economy is able to function in semi-anarchic autonomy. All large scale corporate entities would be subject to both governmental and democratic feedback.

The outcome of globalization is foreseen already in the format of the American Revolution, a species of card magic around a rebellion against an imperialism followed by a dialectical rendering of semi-anarchic federalism in a system of states. The model reappears again with the less successful purported Union of (Soviet) Socialist Republics. We can see from the failures of both the way to success in a new rendering of the formula. There the exact nature of the resulting econologic of communism demands an inspired reinvention of economy that can reinvent rights beyond bourgeois property rights, and initiative beyond the compulsions of theology of greed. There a new Universal Class can assume the creation of a system that can resolve the class warfare endemic to the rise of the State. The invocation of the proletariat by the early communists was rendered into a misleading strategy by the marxist cadres. A larger democratic superset is needed to include multiple class formations, and to provide an exit strategy for the higher end of the bourgeoisie, indeed, Marx, and especially Engels being classic exemplars (and not proletarians).

The corruption of politics is more than the effect of capitalism. The modern state is degenerating into system run by psychopaths. The onset of the 'spy state' controlled by covert agencies is a cancer that has now spread to the American system. It is hard, after 9/11, to know who is really running the American government. The trend toward government by ethical nihilists with a pious face is an alarming outcome of modern politics. The feeble warnings of a figure like Kant as the onset of the reign of the Machiavellian politicians took hold has beggared the hope these politicians could ever resolve any issues at all. The anathema of simple idealism by the materialist cynic is a dodo now, given the evidence of Bolshevik history. And the imperialism of the American system has to be seen at its embryonic phases as intrinsic to the whole experiment in democracy.

Looking at the American system, we see that a simple overhaul of electoral mechanics could save the system. Yet this is beyond the possibility, it seems, of conventional liberals. The current situation with the dynamics of democracy captured by universal Capital bribery would have to be completely overhauled. But this requires a revolutionary strategy. At that point the

potential of a new postcapitalism arises to override the phantoms of reform.

A true communism must reckon with the free autonomy of its citizens amidst an incremental increase in economic regulation, trends toward surveillance domination. The history of Bolshevism is misleading. It suffered a set of misunderstandings such as that of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and a mindset inherited from Russian history. The reality is that of the dangerous passage from revolutionary vacuum to state stability as a successful overthrow of a past system of injustice. This cannot be called utopian if history shows success in the endeavor. The moral is that the communist revolution must be, quite obviously, a variant of democratic revolution led by a vanguard that can be trusted to set up a framework of communist right, economy, and politics under the aegis of freedom. The unchecked reign of global capital is a disaster unfolding; it cannot be called utopian to try and deal with its terminal crisis. The very elites that have created the crisis will attempt to resolve it to their advantage. A communist dialectic must be present to preempt the inevitable fascist outcome.

In five thousand years since the rise of the State, the failure of political systems has been a constant. The failure of laissez-faire and pseudo-communist totalitarianism are two most recent entries to the list. The question of the end of history is achievement for the first time of a truly human civilization and politics. A communist foundation for that project should be one of first achievements of the first after the last men.

3.N2 Notes: Theory, Praxis, and Model

Our method was simple: does world history show systematic properties? A simple frequency test yielded an unexpected result, leading us to a larger pattern. This pattern reminds one of a garden variety driver disrupting equilibrium into a set of epochs. This pattern shows developmental logic, and is therefore 'evolution', by definition. We cannot complete the analysis since it requires close observation, at the century level, at least, and that is available only for very recent history. This result is unneerving: no other data set exists at the 'century or less' level, and we must forever be suspicious we cannot fully understand evolution in deep time. The result we are left with is filled with remarkable correlations and makes sense using a finite transition model. We should leave it at that, leaving the analysis to the

Slavery, Abolition, and Macroinduction

Classical civilization is reaching a crisis point here in the Roman world, beyond which no progress is possible short of abolition, which, please note, ignites explosively just at our next divide. (...)

Consider antiquity, then, in the wake of the Axial period, then the beginning of civilization. A system set to advance, with new elements of economy, simply nosedives, the factor of slave society growing progressively worse—until the medieval period, in the West at least. Christianity and Islam get honorable mention here, but they simply were unable to solve the problem, however much they laid the foundations for a ‘New Man’ able to handle the elements of modern civilization. We cannot neglect their crucial seminal contribution, nor blind our eyes to their inability to resolve the problem in full. This factor of slavery exists from the beginning, but never as a true functionality of real civilization, which cannot come into existence in such form, we should think. It should be, we suspect, like the Greek case where the new and future mode is stillborn in the midst of the old.

Market Evolution It is here in this period that the idea of the evolution of the ‘market order’ as the basis of historical sociology will fail: it does not evolve spontaneously against slavery (although the Roman Empire, it could be argued, has a considerable market evolution based on slavery). Instead the whole western system peters out and ends up in a Christian/Islamic medievalism. The picture of civilization at this point was not pretty, precisely because the market order was too immature to pass beyond slavery. The great irony, for those who think ‘self-interest’ as secular religion can explain history is the long delay in the birth of (modern-style) capitalism and it almost seems like there was a need for a long religious preparation. The market order requires sophisticated help like everything else. We still see the last phase of the confusion in the modern transition where freedom grows in relation to the core, while slavery is exploited at the fringe, resulting in the historical confusion of the American paradox, a slave state grafted onto democratic generation. The ancient system never achieved the market order as it amplified the slave system into such institutions as the Roman latifundia. Such statements require the obvious qualification and challenge of noting that capitalism was essentially already born in one sense, in the snafu over ‘relative transformations’ our model handles properly.

From WHEE

Appendix and restrict our use of the model found to a simple outline. This outline is a 'chronicle of free agents' in a context of macro processes. The two intersect as the transformed consciousness of the agents. That transformed consciousness conveys the innovations in the intervals of transition. As the transition closes that energistic impetus wanes and disappears. But man is learning to self-generate creative actions. Our history is of free agents whose actions are able to transcend economic subsystems which have no deterministic implications. The relative barrenness of the 'mideonic' periods is not an inevitability, but the creative energy must there come from man.

We have created a set of simple outlines to make use of a new model of history by default, and this 'story line' is a progression of epochs. The rise of modernity is precisely the onset of a new epoch in this series, and the entry transition puts the revolutionary process in place, for the first time, in a history of bad government over thousands of years. The model suggests that 'modernity' issues from an integrated transition comprising a complex dialectical spectrum, a very different view from the standard interpretations of disconnected innovations.

The following quote shows the way historical analysis inevitably invokes the value domain, and in the process a ghostly 'second evolution'.

Huxley's Evolution # 2 It is T. H. Huxley himself who spotted the flaw in the theory of natural selection in his work, *Evolution and Ethics*, and in the process unwittingly exposed a paradox in the theory he had so long defended. His perception was that there must be something else beside the 'law of evolution', survival of the fittest, at work, for man was condemned to oppose its effects in practice, on ethical grounds. Whence, if we accept this dualism, comes this evolution # 2? Here the data of the macro effect shows us at once two levels of evolutionary action. The macro effect shows us evolution #2. From WHEE

We have shown directly how a 'second' level of 'evolution' is related to the value domain, and directly visible in world history. This does not imply one level is mechanical, the other valuational exclusively: the significance of levels can be seen in the 'idea of freedom' as a 'value' concept, and, logically/dialectically a concept of mechanics: the 'discrete freedom sequence' inside the macrosequence, both dynamical and valuational. The macro process needs to 'free' the system from inertia, 'evolve' it, in the process as both a mechanical driver and a source of new values.

Our analysis is not communist propaganda: it is entirely fair, almost too fair to capitalism which has a headstart and the danger is that a runaway

Are we to suppose ringworlds will evolve by natural selection and stage free markets....?





Fig. 3.7, 8, 9, 10, 11 The Sanford Torus, Neanderthal scene, Hollywood poster, Avatar motif, evolutionary line...

Capitalism in outer space? The movie, *Elysium*, projects exploitation from a 'ringworld', while the movie *Avatar* stages a revolt of aliens against interplanetary corporate power.

Outer space looks empty and barren, but the project of 'free markets' in outer space is likely to produce a surprise. If the 'last men' destroy a planet, they are unlikely to have any second chances.



system will be hard to overtake, given the almost neanderthal mentality of capitalists mixed with cunning high intelligence, a novelty of history: in modern economies, high intelligence has confused itself. Our larger analysis uses a 'stream and sequence' metaphor, another way of stating the 'micro/macro' distinction. The economic 'stream' is mostly a lower level up to the modern period. But, as we can see from the 'divide' point around 1800, the thunder of emergent capitalism and the Industrial Revolution almost creates a religion out of economic reasoning, swamping the complex balance of the overall transition.

This reversal of values is dangerous, and yet seems to have an amplified momentum, a point obvious from our model. Not surprising that an emergency counterpoint emerges almost immediately in the chase plane parallel take-off of communist or meta-capitalist ideas. The sudden mass conversion of American civilization to Ayn Rand's 'farewell to alms' shows the danger on the precipice of calamity.

The rise of modernity shows the restoration of lost democracy (via macro induction?!), the final achievement of abolition, but the parallel emergence of capitalism creates a new challenge that evokes the response of communism proposed as a solution to the paradoxes of bourgeois revolution. The issue of 'macroinduction' is a warning to leftists that the revolutionary spontaneity of the early modern will disappear and the future of revolution will require active premeditation and conscious intent, a mixed blessing.

What happened to 'historical materialism'? We have threatened a 'critique' of this 'ism', and our data is a de facto near-falsification, but in reality we left this 'classic' alone. It is an event inside our system, matched with a spectrum of opposites. Our tactic is not so much to critique as to step back and look at the source spectrum from which it emerges, taking that 'compact dialectic' as the starting point, and not the splitting downstream fragments in parallel. This puts us in the high Enlightenment period around the end of the eighteenth century. We have called this period the 'great divide' and it is one of the strangest periods in world history, and our model suggests the reason why. It is at this point that the idea of communism emerges in relation to the Industrial Revolution and its capitalist ideology. The idea of communism is clearly the 'envoi' or coda to the modern transition. It is surely the proper meaning of the 'end of history' ideology which, in any case, crystallizes later. The whole point of the Marxist critique was that Hegel's thinking, already brilliantly aware of the work of Adam Smith, was too immersed in its moment, and needed a further completion as the transition passed. Marx and Engels are almost spookily well-timed

at the exact exit point from the modern transition with an idea for a future mideonic response to capitalism. Simple, logical, and eerie in the usual mystery of the macro effect.

Why stop there: we can embrace the modern transition and conceive revolutionary communism as an integrated realization of modernity, done right. We expand our viewpoint to a larger superset of parallel classics, as a dialectical companion to the surge of idealism in the phase of German classical philosophy. The triple phasing of materialism, transcendental idealism, and absolute idealism can't be resolved with an ideological choice toward 'materialism'. Over and over the left rediscovers this connection, and then stops short, often in a descant on Hegel. The issue of teleology makes this hard to avoid. We did not set out to refute materialism. Instead we exposed the failure of all historical theories of the deterministic type. We can easily recast historical materialism as the empirical study of economic 'determinations' (a looser category than causality) of historical given economic systems, from the Neolithic onward.

We don't want to replace the acerbic 'materialist' realism of Marx/Engels with sentimental religiosity, but the ideology of capitalism is a dangerous tonic that will soon turn a hoard of Ayn Rand fanatics into a race of Klingons, last men indeed.

Our model implies that the macro phase goes into shutdown in the period after the Enlightenment/French Revolution up to the period ca. 1848, the onset of a new era, graced with a 'prophecy' in the parallel 'chase plane' emergence of a potential downfield rescue vehicle. Already within two centuries the system is in trouble with degenerating democracy and runaway capitalism turning into the source of a global crisis. Nothing in the legacy of world history suggests that the entirety of economy, culture, and government should be handed over to a universal process of marketization. The transition to 'postcapitalism' is therefore tabled as a search for some viable realization of systems of the communist type.

We have designed our interpretation of our pattern to be a series of factual statements in a periodization matrix, not laws of history about causal events applied to free agents, in imitation of physics. The tenor is that of these free agents making history, with a relative degree of freedom. The status of economies is thus that of the creations of free agents. The question of 'capitalism' is thus clear, and in Adam Smith the defining issues are proposed as 'policies' by free agents.

In a teleological system pulling away from its axis point, it is important to consider the drift of system action into free action, and compensate for the entry into a middle period. Communism seems destined to suffer this task of riding through chaotification on the way to a global oikoumene. It is analogous to the chase-plane formations emerging after the Axial Age as oikoumene integrators, and recovery vehicles for mideonic decline. It is therefore a cultural vehicle, far more than a commentary on economic civilization.

We have created a cloud of historical issues around the idea of our model. but that can become a distraction and we should be setting that analysis in the background as we 'reinvent' historical materialism as the study of the economic systems emerging the epochs of our 'grand narrative'.

As our framework is set up a new set of studies is evoked of the history of economic systems, starting with the Neolithic. *Inside the Neolithic Mind* (Lewis-Williams & Pearce, 2005) proposes a 'revolutionary Neolithic' as a period rather than a 'revolution'. Right up our alley! We distinguished already 'revolutions' inside a transition or 'macro(r) evolution'. We must suspect that our distinction of 'revolution for the state' and 'revolution against the state' shows the dual struggle creating social class systems for the first time. We lack the close data, so we must be careful. We can see in the modern transition that even century intervals are too coarse-grained.

Our model more than delivers Weber et al. from the dreaded 'disenchantment' of the world of the world of the Iron Cage. But we have discovered something that is far too complex for confident theorizing. An enchanted woods indeed. Dynamical, design, and teleological properties are all perfectly fused in a unified systematics that often suggests a form of superadvanced technology. The term 'evolution' is nonetheless the right one, if only as an empirical category with no theory to match.

What happened to the term 'evolution'???

It seems like the dog ate the paper here. The idea of evolution has been defined in terms of the formalism of a finite transition model. We suspect this approximation is a rough guide to evolution in action. One problem here is the display of unique events, defying mechanical interpretation. And it might seem the use of the term 'evolution' is wrong. That is because the Darwinian usage is wrong and misleads us. Our usage, please note, is not a reference to a theory, but an empirical map of a developmental sequence in the zones where we have data. The term is thus descriptive and refers to an integrated set of events over a temporal/geographical region. This is probably closer to the reality for

deep time because it refers to macro processes that operate on whole species, or subsets of species, the results being on a scale sufficient to redirect the whole. This non-theory usage is designed to accommodate inconsistent opposites. If our 'evolution' looks like 'design', then we can speak of designed evolution. History and evolution overlap.

Evolution : History = Macro : Micro = system action : free action

Note that microevolution is not just natural selection, but the context of free action in the realization of a potential, the action of 'free agents'.

Deduction of the finite transition model: the transition from Evolution to History can't be instantaneous and would show a transitional process: evolution: transition: history. But this might happen repeatedly: evolution: transition: evo/hist: transition: evo/hist: transition: history. Our historical model suggest the kind of macro series involved in transition to *homo sapiens*.

What is the meaning of New Age talk of 'spiritual evolution'?

This formulation helps explain the confusion over 'spiritual evolution' in New Agers.

The use of the term 'evolution' to describe practices of yoga or spiritual practice are surely incorrect, in our model, at least. Note however that 'emergent religions' in the Axial Age are 'evolution' in our sense, so the issue is ambiguous, and macro events realized in practice via the microevolution of individuals. The micro level, we would think, can't generate the macro level or create a new species.

The potential to 'higher consciousness' 'evolved' thousands of years ago at the dawn of man. The realization of that potential is not evolution, which is completed. /Evolution is 'macro', spiritual practice 'micro'. The spiritual evolution of man to a new species of man is beyond the capacity of all current religions and sciences. We are left to wonder at Bennett's thesis: is the evolution of man guided/induced by demiurgic powers?

3.N3 Notes

We can summarize our exploration with some general observations in conclusion.

- We have given a theoretical foundation for a kind of 'macrohistorical' super-manifesto whose scale is that of entire civilizations. We can

proceed with a more practical idea of realizable communism at the level of achievable postcapitalism.

- Economic determinism has disappeared, and free agents are the creators of both history and economies. No reiteration of marxist boilerplate will get a second chance. The larger perspective of the macro model can take the place of classic historicism of the marxist seizure of the communist idea.
- Our full model of history is exceedingly complex and is replaced in practice with a simple chronicle and a set of questions or hypotheses. You are ready to go immediately with this perspective on history. Study of its complexities can be adjourned.
- But this model warns us against 'flat history' with strong evidence for non-random action, more explicitly directional processes.
- And it gives an exit strategy to a materialist from the Darwinian ideology. Our study of world history suggests the reality of evolutionary dynamics, and that human speciation is still underway and the macro system idles, or stops, allowing human self-development to proceed.
- Evolution as speciation is not a competition of classes against each other. Man so far cannot imitate or control the macrosequence visible in historical evolution. Early speciation in man is an unknown.
- Macroevolution in our sense operates on aggregates, taken in differential time-slices, e.g. the intervals of the Axial period.
- Our basic recipe for activist projects is that 'emergent processes' emanating from the modern transition have an historical backup factor, and this will help energize their realizations. As the transition ceases, after the divide, those processes are on their own. Communist emergentism appears in association with the democratic revolutions timed to the 'great divide' and in parallel to the crystallization of capitalism in the same period. The issues are tricky, and yet transparent. Communism emerges as a prophetic failsafe and chase plane rescue system in the explosive and uncontrolled bushfire of capitalist globalization.
- However unrealistic a project for a 'new communism' might seem, the need to think in opposites can provide a genuine dialectic in a situation where the ideology of *laissez-faire* is leading toward destruction. The free ride for this ideology has gone on long enough. Time is short.
- In this context the idea of the 'end of history' as a justification of

capitalism as a teleological absolute is a pernicious distortion starting to end in the lunacies of Ayn Rand libertarians.

- The macro model is not a source of applied theory shackling action, but a rough outline of a system that is highly elusive and teleological. The model must move to the background to focus on the situational present.
- The system of teleology shown in our model operates on differential subsets of civilization as integrated culture, not on individual factors such as economies. It honors the distinction of 'system action' and 'free action' and is not deterministic. If the 'telos' is, viz. compose a novel, as system action produces an archetype, then free action must realize the project, by writing a novel. This is a unique and quite different form of goal directed action. Fukuyama cleverly tried to claim that capitalism was derived from the directionality of democracy. But we can see that that is propaganda.
- The project of communism must produce a realization of modernity: instead the left became entangled in postmodern/anti-modern fixations.
- At the same time its emergence at the conclusion to the modern transition indicates its potential role as a 'mideonic' rescue vehicle.
- The communist project is thus an analog to the emergent religious vehicles of the succession to the Axial Age.
- The legacy of religion can't be replaced with sterile scientism. The left must be able in principle to act at the level of 'religion creation', while foregoing the temptation of useless theocratic ideologies.
- The secular project of modernity is neither for or against 'religion' but a transition beyond the religions of the Axial period.
- The resolution of religious issues lies in a post-Kantian realism about monotheistic metaphysics, and the idolatries of both religious and secular obsessions.
- The distinction of system and free action points to the decline of early modern innovations and institutions, and the American system already shows signs of an eroding democracy. The left is conflicted by its antagonism to basic liberalism and the need to bring the system to a higher degree of freedom. So far, the judgment of history is severe: *homo sapiens* can neither truly initiate nor maintain democracies.
- The communist project must be wary on this point and not anathematize liberalism only to create a new form of the tyrannical.

- Early modern revolutions have an elemental of spontaneity. Future projections of revolutionary intent require the more difficult option of directed intention applied to history, a source of potential surprises!
- The model of the American revolution (and the similar federation rubric of socialist republics) is appropriate, applied to a global system: a Federation of states, resulting from a colonial revolt, here against an incipient American imperialism.
- The revolution for the state and the revolution against the state are two contradictory impulses. The Russian example shows how the former overwhelmed the latter.
- Capitalism is not a stage of history. The attempt to make it an absolute and a substitute for the state is deluded.
- The focus on the proletariat has not produced the result intended. What is required is a focus on a 'universal class' (with the working class as a possible center of gravity) that can integrated the class formations in place as a new unity.
- The economic focus of the earlier communism made it blind to the ecological factor. A robust hybrid of ecological economics must take its place
- The context of long term social action impinges on the category of evolution. Our historical framework allows a critique of the Social Darwinist ideology that overtook capitalist thinking, and then also that of the marxist left.
- The question of evolution remains unsolved, especially that of human evolution. Our historical framework suggests a set of hints toward the reason for this failure, and a practical way to take 'evolution' as an empirical chronicle, here of world history.
- A new communism must take up the issue of the 'last and first men' as a guardian against pseudo-evolutionary lunacy and eugenic massacre with a realistic sense of the real difficulty, so far beyond man, of evolutionary speciation at the hominid level.
- As the example of the post-Axial period shows, the issue is not the future of economic systems, but the reckoning with the decline of civilizations. The project of communism must conceivably become a rescue vehicle for the onset of civilizational breakup and medievalization.
- Our analysis of transitions, revolutions, and macroevolution, beside our epigraph from Engels, leaves the suggestion that *homo sapiens*,

so-called, at the exit point from the macrosequence has completed a second stage of his speciation, the remaining self-evolution of man requiring more than another cousin of the dismal cousin in primitive Darwinism: man must learn to truly create civilization for himself, and rise to master the scale of evolution in the projection of civilization in time frames of tens of millennia. The fixation on Darwinism leaves little room for optimism about such a project. But the potential of the macrosequence, and of modernity, is not yet fully realized. So we must hope. Such a project is almost inconceivable at this stage, but the conception can lead to some humility as to the projects of revolution, thence transition, thence civilization construction visible in the classic snapshot of an evolutionary driver visible in world history.

- A project for a new communism done right will be the appropriate receivership for the wreckage of global capitalism. We might conclude with an echo of the eloquent manifesto of Marx/Engels that we have nothing to lose at this point, and that realization of the true crisis will produce perhaps the correct desperation at the failure point for an entire evolutionary speciation.
- This is only the beginning. Beyond our prime objective a vast new project of socialist construction looms as the task of crisis:
- The New Communism must be founded in a new understanding of rights, able to create a truer democracy in the limitation of property rights. It needs a robust populism of economic rights to propel its leadership of a new Universal Class. This requires a rejection of the one party state, a new form of economy beyond State capitalism, and without false compromises of principle, and in general a way to challenge rather than foment the rising Leviathan of the totalitarian state controlled by covert agencies.

3.N4 End Notes: The original ending to WHEE

1848: End of Macrosequence?

We reach the end of our macrosequence, as our transition concludes and our system enters a new era, one that will soon move beyond its source area

(and the Eurocentric confusions of that) toward a global oikoumene. The rough year 1848 is useful, for we can see that this is the first point at which one could begin to clearly perceive the macro effect. And who do we find here but Marx and Engels generating a post-transitional 'second opinion' or course correction, an activity destined to swift failure. Our discrete freedom sequence seems to end up an indiscrete Whiggocracy and to have some unfinished business. Not surprising. Whenever there is a Leveller a True Leveller can't be far behind.¹

End of Macrosequence? We are left with a sense of wonder about the relation of modernity, and the macro effect as such, to evolution. Far more than purely genetic evolution the evidence we have uncovered shows that the fine-tuning of evolution stretches into the subtlest aspects of culture, from art to politics and the ideologies of culture. It is at first hard to accept this larger dimension of evolution just behind our historical present, but this approach is in reality far superior to the reductionist perspective.

Theory and Ideology But isn't there a contradiction in the exploitation of theory as ideology in our portrait? The answer is that our system transcends the phenomenon of philosophy, as our realization of its highest abstractions comes into being a political philosophy and the tactics of action. We can see in the close relationship of the ideas of freedom and causality that the deeper level of System Action operates with a generalized mechanics that far transcends the realm of ideology or Free Action, and glimpses of which we begin to sense in the spectacular dynamics of both the macro sequence and its embedded 'discrete freedom sequence'.

As we conclude our portrait of the macro effect we see that we only observe it as exit from its action, and that as we distance ourselves from the modern transition the dilemma of our free potential to create history in the wake of the evolution of our own freedom becomes a paradox and a dilemma. We see the similar situation at the conclusion of the Axial Age resulted in chaotification, and decline, and the expectation of some kind of returning new age or 'end time'. We must hope that this time we will become the masters of our own self-consciousness and withstand the tide

¹ Oscar Hammen, *The Red '48ers* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1969), Alan Gilbert, *Marx's Politics* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981), Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962), Christopher Hill, *The Experience of Defeat* (New York: Viking, 1984), M. Hardt & A. Negri, *Multitude* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

of mechanization that overcame the civilization of antiquity. We should imagine that in the modern instance we have completed a major evolutionary passage, an interval of man becoming man comparable to what we suspected was the 'great explosion' of the Paleolithic. Our evolution formalism and macro model are set up so that they switch off in our present and we only observe statements about dynamics in the past. System Action yields to Free Action and this prevents the kind of confusion with theories and action we demonstrated with the Oedipus Paradox.

Although the year 1848 is no more than a rough marker chosen as a peg to hang a tale, and end a book, it neatly shows the point at which our pattern starts into its post-transition, and reversal from localization to globalization, unprotected by any factor of macro determination from imperialistic degenerations and the new economic systems, soon to be downshifted further by Darwinian ideology. Even a cursory glance at modern philosophy shows how the seminal era slumps out after the generation of Marx and Schopenhauer. Many other indicators make the point. This time, seeing the effect, we can take action to recover. We tend to be mesmerized by the ignited exponential processes (e.g. the demographic transition) beginning in the transition, but these are not the same. We must stick to the rules of our model, which suggests the intermittency of our transitions, which puts us outside of the macrosequence. That will at least enforce a discipline of teleological disarmament of all parties.

1848: Teleological antinomies We can easily spot the crude division point predicted by the model at about the time of the French and Industrial Revolutions, at the outside by 1848, a truly spectacular generation in world history. This division is useful because it is about the exact 'first point' at which our 'macro observer' can start to see the macro effect, and also because its symbolic significance forces the issue of ideology.

This choice of symbolic year is about the same as Hegel's 1806, but more cogently directed to the issues, and merely a useful token for a rough ending to the transition. It is like the difference between ignition, liftoff and steady flight getting underway. But is it also the end of the macrosequence? We don't know. But it is an unsettling thought, since 'revolutions as free action' will move to take the place of transitional sequence.

Armed with the distinction of macro and micro-action we can see at a glance the overall dynamic at work, however we understand it, and it is unsettling. We think in terms of linear progress, and then are understandably baffled by the First World War, the Holocaust.

Whatever else is the case, these are well outside the macrosequence. These are clear cases where mideonic stupidity is starting up again. Nietzsche influenced by Darwin does not bode well for the future.

Can we even maintain the modern transition, let alone advance it? In fact, we can, but we see in antiquity this dread effect as the classical transitions run out of octane fuel and lapse to a higher degree of mechanization, never to recover. That is less likely in this case, although we see the fall-off take effect as the transitional effect wanes. This is not Spenglerian decline but a one-time slump-down from a bursting episode of high performance, followed by a more stable process tending to a more contingent social drift, and then potentially, we can hope, new advance, but without macro determination, a new freedom beyond the macrosequence. This is the punctuation, then equilibrium, of the whole macro effect. But it is not really equilibrium, and the metaphor is not quite right. A whole series of take-offs have been ignited, and it is completely within the rules of the game to realize the dynamic and compensate. The fate of the Hellenistic need not be ours.

Although our model seems to be confounded by an ideological modernism or a Eurocentric focus now under challenge, we see that in fact it has a built-in device to reconcile these contradictions, and we leave our system just as it undergoes its convulsive reversal from local transition to global oikoumene creation. It is important to remember that in our model, the local and long-range future diverge, and no teleological claim on the latter is possible for the former. And our system aggressively reminds us of this as the sequence seems to stop in the wake of the revolutionary early modern. This explains the baffling puzzle arising in the instant bifurcation of our system at the very moment it is getting under way. And one issue is the teleological antinomy, latent in Kant's Challenge, of the potential system and actual outcome, with its economic emergentism taken as the 'final state of the system'. Chillingly apt that Marx (not alone!) proposes the abstract category 'socialism', which he refuses to define, as a next 'transition'. This thinking merely reflects the antinomy, and it is important to remember that our model predicts nothing. It is right that it be that way and we can see that Marxism suffered the fiasco of a 'local time teleological' projection. Marx/Engels as champions of democracy works quite nicely.

Econostream != macrosequence We don't need to indulge in leftist propaganda to see that our model distinguishes two things: the economic stream and the macrosequence diverge. If someone says that you must submit to economic 'laws' in the name of history, laws that make him rich and others poor, that man is pulling the wool over your eyes with

bogus theory, because we can see that economic processes pertain only to economies and don't generate the long-range future (at least so far, looking backward), these points not to be taken dogmatically. Our model simply mirrors the debate, its proper task.

How elegant yet somber to observe this system cross this divide into a new era in rise of liberalism, the turbulence of revolution, and the passage across the spectrum of the Left to the year 1848, about when our transition moves toward shutdown in the open field of a 'new age'. Although a basic liberal interpretation is well within the bounds of our model, a kind of default outcome, we should note that this construct cannot be safely used as a form of legitimation for that.

It is not hard to show that emergent liberalism was an imperfect outcome of the modern transition. The American system failed even to abolish slavery, proof that nothing deductive can be extracted from 'macro determination', in case propagandists aim at a legitimation of modernism via this model. The sudden chaotification resembles overshoot and undershoot in a control system, and the instability or equivocation is evident from the first in the twin figures of Luther an Münzer, then in Locke and the Levellers. As if a last minute course correction, suddenly turning into a demand for a different outcome, finds Marx and Engels challenging the whole transition as it were, on the verge of a disastrous attempt at course correction. Lest we forget, they took action at a desperate moment in a system that almost failed to accomplish abolition. We are left with an unnerving question, What else is missing?

An immense ideological veil protects the confusion of macrosequence versus econostream. The modern transition rapidly crystallized into the capitalist societies dominated by market ideology that are prone to the domination of a new type of elite. We can't quite mediate that using our model, and the potential of this system so far outstrips systems of antiquity that leftist reactions tend to backfire. The world of our transition is nearly done before the Industrial Revolution, which rapidly generates a secondary post-transitional culture of the new capitalist society. Looking at the chaotic movements of world history we should think this development potentially almost benign by comparison, and the classic Marxist critiques, while altogether cogent and seminal, tended to misdiagnosis and false efforts to construct an undefined socialism whose record speaks for itself. We cannot legislate these issues with our model, which promptly reflects this dilemma without resolving it. We see the obvious lost opportunity: the founders of the American system could have created a socialist republic, but were too fixated on Roman history.

However, the whole point of our model is that it allows us to distinguish two levels, e.g. emergent democracy at its initialization, however obscure, and the subsequent realization, which may be flawed or fail. In a global context the dilemma of empire arises very quickly and we find the sad reaction to the American system rising to produce a challenge to its future. The rich potential of the macro starting point is soon forgotten in the mix of Darwinism, classical liberalism, economic ideology and scientism that assembles the new worldview. Locked in this box we fail to see the limits to our vision this induces. Challenged at once by the far left, the new economic society ambiguously enters its mideonic pilgrimage in experiments still young in the reckoning of five thousand years. The future of the reign of Capital is an ominous suspense.

The new world of capitalism must be judged on its own terms, our job done. We have merely disengaged it from the macrosequence. But we must note that before classical liberalism stands the work of its creators, who never foresaw the results of their endorsement of economic freedom, that orphan of the discrete freedom sequence. The macro mainline can't control the economic field, as core and periphery imbalance arises. But the difference between the two can be seen in the way the modern transformation lets loose a new round of slavery in the periphery, while the core, racing against time, generates abolition, and not a moment too soon. The American sidewinder system doesn't make it, and we have the preposterous constitution of four-fifths person at the outcome. Downfield course corrections beyond the divide point prove very costly, and are prone to fall into the hands of those who don't know what they are doing. In the post-divide the gates of the penitentiary slam closed, and the inmates begin to make their own rules.

Like a great oak tree the macrosequence sprouts a new limb and this injects new life into the world system, even as the other limbs continue in their growth and separate existence, forced however to mediate the immense confusions of globalization. Needless to say we must evaluate dialectically the nature of the modern outcome by sifting the macro emergents defining our transition. There is no simple talisman or formula of success. Some more complex process has differentiated into a scattershot spectrum of results and we are inside that field of macro emergents, assessing their components as relative free action. We must beware of getting lost in fantasies of a 'Western Civilization', although that confusion will prove inevitable, at great cost to the slowing of globalization momentum.

Last and First Men

Our current time-frame, ca. the year 2000, now seems to be the geopolitical endgame of the Western system of nation states emerging after 1500. The five centuries since this watershed are visible as a unit of transformation, and one comparable in scope to the birth of civilization, and the passage of classical antiquity. On the scale of millennia its revolutionary breakthroughs of liberty, more even than its emergent new systems of economy, constitute an enigma of cultural evolution, a decisive movement against historical trend that is difficult to account for short of the macro model.

The great, to many, unexpected, turning point of the times, at the end of this period, is the collapse of the Russian Communist world system, whose outcome was an ambiguous variant of this nationalism, casting the spell of a future internationalism it was unable to achieve. This monumental convulsion in the dynamics of global modernization as the ghost of Universal Empire declared itself the end state in the outcome of modern politics and industrialism, and was so denounced as crypto-eschatological prophetic futurism, especially by those who prefer to claim the genre, and wish their own version of this Event. This juggernaut has now been replaced by resurgent fundamentalism, and the tide of Islam, and we can at least see the dilemma of globalization at work in the wake of a series of micro-transitions operating on a minimum principle.²

This cycle of revolution starts with the revolutions of 1848, the last and the new first in the tidal wave beginning with the American and the French Revolutions, and earlier. The liberal world gets its revolution, then the system freezes. It is the first fact of modernism that we constantly recycle this core period of leftist surging followed by royalist restoration, action and reaction, whose pivotal years lie between 1789, and 'last' gasp, 1848, the year of the Communist Manifesto. This, we will see, is the point at which the world

2 Stephane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York: Praeger, 1961), August Nimitz, *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to Democratic Emergence* (Albany: State University of New York, 2000), Alan Gilbert, *Marx's Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981), Richard Hunt, *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels: Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy 1818-1850* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), David Steele, *From Marx to Mises* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992).

system crosses what we will call a Great Divide, and the realization of current modernism comes into being. The modern political transformation revolves around one simple issue, one only; will the trend toward liberty move to fulfill itself as equality? If it does, modernism succeeds. If it does not, modernism fails.

The ambiguous mood of 1848, and its gloom of leftist disappointment, fills the air even now in one and the same sense of shock at revolutionary failure. Once again, the failure of capitalism to fail results in a take off in a long Boom like that which followed this earlier period of failed revolution. Beyond this, the grand historical questions remain of the place of revolution in the dynamics of history, its rarity before the rise of the modern world. Its place is clear and yet mysterious. Between early antiquity, and the modern transformation after 1500, freedom in its liberal meanings disappeared, after a first birth, and certainly did not reappear as a result of incremental social evolution. After 1848, the revolutionary tide was ebbing even short of the abolition of slavery, as Leftist ideas expanded into a fragmented sociology of permanent revolution. This recycling of the 'old slogans', 'pieces of eighteen forty-eight', is an appropriate starting point, or ending, in the consideration of historical discontinuity.³

In all its considerations of historical materialism, leftist ideology has failed to do justice to what it rightly sees as the 'bourgeois revolution'. But behind this surface lies the real key to Marx's own theory. Marx is really a frustrated transcendental idealist attempting to bring the idea of freedom into the surface world of economic determinism. We have seen a better way to deal with that. It is not chance that democracy suddenly reappears in modern times, and as we will see near the 'Great Divide'? The problem is that the system begins to jackknife against itself as the left becomes ambivalent about the hybrid system of democratic freedom and capitalism.

What constitutes democracy remains a critical question, but even approximations will work fine with our argument. We are closing in on Kant's Challenge, and a simple resolution of Marx's difficulties on theory as the term 'democracy' floated into 'dictatorship of the proletariat', in the losing battle for the word's definition, whose crisis is clearly evident in the thinking of Rousseau. If we reach further backwards we see, or so some have claimed,

3 Melvin Krantzberg (ed.), *1848: A Turning Point?*, (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1959). L. B. Namier calls the year a 'seed-plot of history', one that survived its own failure and the moral revulsion of revolutionary disorder, Trevelyan calls 1848 "the turning point at which modern history failed to turn", *In the Beginning: The Advent of the Modern Age* (New York: Macmillan, 1994) by Jerome Blum. Peter Stearns, *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe* (New York: Norton, 1974).

the first, before the first, birth in the first nexus of Sumerian city-states.⁴

First and Last Whigs We seem to be committing the ‘great blunder’ of Whiggery, quite unrepentantly. But we are doing something completely different. The discrete freedom sequence does not ‘evolve’ from the medieval period, in the notions of liberty said to be latent in the episode of the Magna Carta. Our directional thesis refers to a far larger scale, system return in the macrosequence. Herbert Butterfield in his *The Whig Interpretation of History*, chides the Whig historians of the nineteenth century who saw history as a process fulfilling their political preferences. But suddenly, we are left with a question, perhaps there is a Whig Interpretation of History: but it seems to involve outsmarting the Whigs, Tom Paine style, liberalism becoming democratic liberalism. Will we be promoting the ‘telos’ of democracy in theory? We should first define the term, and determine whether a teleological system would produce what Marx thought the wrong result. The answer is a cautious ‘yes’, we see a clear directionality suggesting a teleological component. In any case, in the macro version we discover the Whigs, sometimes known as the ‘Glorious Whigs’, to have made a mess of the question, if the outcome of the English Civil War was hardly democracy. What of the Levellers? But the Whigs were onto something, the first great breakthrough of the modern liberal world. The issue, in any case, has nothing to do with fancies about the Magna Carta. Not slow evolution but a dreadful historical discontinuity seems responsible.⁵

The criticism of teleology, although essential, fails to explain why the impostor Freedom ever made a comeback after its ancient defeat, and did so when it did. The correlation of emergent democracy and our macro pattern, at first seemingly random, will be found to be one of our ‘macro effects’.

We can see already, most ironically, that emergent democracy is more fruitfully bound up in a question of directionality, and that, if anything, the Marxist initiative simply derailed from this directionality. Thus Popper’s important plea for the open society attempted to deny the existence of

4 W. G. Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy: 800-400 B.C.* (New York: Macgraw-Hill, 1966), H.W.F. Sags, *Civilization Before Greece and Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press Univ Press, 1989), p. 34, a consideration of the issue of ‘democracy’ in the early period of the Sumerian city-states before the rise of kingship after the first creative period of the beginning of civilization. The original suggestion springs from Theodore Jacobsen’s “Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia”, pp. 167-70 in W. L. Moran (ed.), *Towards the Image of Tammuz* (1970). Cf. also Jennifer Roberts, *Athens on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

5 Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (New York: Scribner, 1951). Craig Thomas, *There to Here: John Locke and His Influence on 300 Years of Political Theory* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1991).

historical forces on the grounds of their inherent totalitarian nature, in prophecies or predictions of historical laws, in the exclusive emphasis on the power of rationality to create the future piecemeal. But unfortunately these 'historical forces' are very real, however difficult it might be to define them. The simplest way to consider this reality of historical forces would be to look at the discontinuity of modernism as a whole relative to greater antiquity. And ask why society 'opened' at all, and so briefly, in the age of Solon, and then waited so long for the renewed fulfillment of this ancient dream.⁶

The philosopher Hegel grappled with a sense of the directionality perceivable in the history of freedom, keeping in mind the ambiguity of 'direction' in rival linear, or cyclical, interpretations. The acuteness of his thinking is veiled in the philosopher as a metaphysical Sphinx all too liable to misinterpretations, and some earnest questions in the face of his reticence near Prussian censorship. The accusations of defending the reaction forget the brief period of the progressive Prussia. Even as he is defended from the charge of ideologist, he appears to be doing remarkably well in this role for post-Communism as the historical grand finale wished for in a new Restoration of classical liberals. Suffice it to say he, or some phantom by that name, seems to confirm Marx's warnings, as the current bald eagle for the 'end of history'. This concept of the 'end of history' has been so abused as to seem worthless.

End of macrosequence? Our model produces a parallel, though quite different, idea of the 'end of the macrosequence'. This makes no definite statement about the social form of the period after the last transition, save that the self-evolution of freedom must replace that of the macrosequence. The ominous possibility of the next 'revolution' (as man-made micro-action or pseudo-transition) to reach the 'end of history', or the end of the 'end of history', lurks beyond bourgeois propaganda in the mideonian wasteland of political systems deviating from the classic period of the divide.

Hegel's metaphysics apart, his commentary on liberal modernity is classic. Hegel was an acute critic of the limits of civil society. As S. Avineri notes,

Hegel accepts Smith's view that behind the senseless and conflicting

6 Hal Draper, *Dictatorship of the Proletariat' from Marx to Lenin* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), Michael Harrington's *Socialism* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972). That the virulence of the Communist Left sprang in part from the virulence of the Tsarist reactionary right and the disastrous conservatism of the Russian nineteenth century is brought home in *The Shadow of the Winter Place: Moscow's Drift to Revolution, 1825-1917* (New York: Viking, 1976). For an account of the Decembrists, cf. Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

clash of interests in civil society lies a hidden assumption which implies that everyone in society is thus being well taken care of. Poverty, which for Smith is always marginal to his model, assumes another dimension in Hegel. For the latter, pauperization and the subsequent alienation from society are not incidental to the system but endemic to it...the only problem which remains unresolved according to Hegel's own admission is the problem of poverty.⁷

Before the leftist tide caused social conservatives to close ranks around Adam Smith, the flaws in the emerging capitalist system were obvious to many, one of them Hegel. But should we man the barricades for Hegel's political suggestions? His critique of the stark contradiction at the root of the emerging capitalist order makes him the direct inspiration for his well-known and less compliant successor. Hegel hesitates, Marx cuts the Gordian knot. Hegel's seminal study of the English political economists nonetheless distorts his 'cunning of reason' idea, and for all his daring with teleological thinking gets it mixed with the 'invisible hand' thinking of the capitalist ideologists.⁸

In *The End of History and the Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama steps without hesitation into this Hegelian vein, anxious to sneak the kludges of teleological idealism into the barren mechanics of sociology, and finds in liberal democracy the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government". This was the Hegel of the philosopher Kojève. The basis of the 'end of history' idea is open to challenge, and the idea is not present in Hegel in the fashion now imagined. A far more interesting approach might be our macro model, with a question, to be developed, 'Have we reached the end of the macrosequence?' With the macro model, we know at once what Hegel is driving at, but can't quite put his finger on.⁹

7 Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), "Poverty and the limits of Civil Society", p. 147. Steven Smith, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

8 Harold Mah, *The End of Philosophy, the Origin of 'Ideology'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). James White, *Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical Materialism* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996). Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester and the Working Class* (New York: Norton, 1974), Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), M. Steger & T. Carver, *Engels After Marx* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

9 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Jon Stewart, *The Hegel Myths and Legends* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996). Fukuyama's interpretation is influenced by the works of the philosopher Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (1969). Cf. also, Shadia Drury, *Alexander Kojève, The Roots of Postmodern Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994). Cf.

The course of the idea of the Hegelian ‘end of history’, the idea that history had ended in 1806 after the Battle of Jena, i.e., the principles of liberty and equality had become the ‘limits of convergence’ of the global system of Universal History, fails as linear directionality, and changes its meaning with context and is bound in the equivocation created by ambiguity between the ‘end of history’ and the ‘end of antiquity’, and Hegel himself a harbinger of a New Age, yet haunted by the memory of the Great Terror, and the wish to justify the passage to new and different futures in the collisions of that era. But the New Age is secure, and grants no further proofs of justice, as liberal systems emerge in temporal form guaranteed no Whiggish certainty by the arguments of Hegel. Anyone who uses this nearly hopeless terminology ends up mesmerized. In any case, the rise of pragmatism with its ‘naturalized Hegelianism’ makes us forget that ‘geist’ is the fuel for the motor, and a theory of evolution, de facto, and its status as a design argument is like all the rest. The lesson suggested by our discrete freedom sequence is well suggested by the founders of the American system, ‘Democracy, if you can keep it’.¹⁰

Meaningful summons of Hegel requires the use of his ‘dialectic of stages’, which fell, however, into an unfortunate Eurocentrism. Freedom does not proceed from East to West, but along the mainline of the macrosequence. And this ‘dialectic’ cannot be tacked onto a sociological argument about the influence of economics or technology on history, for it is a challenge to the very foundation of normal logic, to say nothing of physical causality. The ‘end of history’ argument in its current form proceeds from the philosopher Kojève, in a hybrid of Hegel, Nietzsche,

also *After History? Francis Fukuyama and his Critics*, Timothy Burns (ed), (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). Cf. “The Tower of Babel Rebuilt”, Peter Fenves traces the Kantian origins of the ‘end of history’ idea and the reservations of Kant in his “An Old Question Asked Anew”. George Kelly, *Idealism, Politics, and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a discussion of Kojève on Kant and Hegel, cf. Patrick Riley, *Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), Bhikhu Parekh, *Marx’s Theory of Ideology* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982).

10 For all the efforts to debrief Hegel by the Left Hegelians, none can seem to match the acutely ‘demystified’ Schopenhauer. But Hegel, in ponderous magnificence, leaves a philosophic daguerrotype, ‘cliché’ with idealist flash, much better than Hollywood, of the surging moment of Napoleon riding through Jena. It is never noticed, that the ahistorical Schopenhauer has a potentially superior inverted philosophy of history hidden behind his rejection of progress and a science of history. Note quietly the hidden resemblance of ‘will’ and ‘geist’, then the many (inferior) involutory triadisms of ‘will’, and their concocted divinities.

Marx, and Heidegger. In the end one might do better to backtrack to the buried Kant whence 'ideas for a universal history' have sprung, to find there a more realistic sense that a teleological view of history would do better to adopt a stark realism about the future, in the progression toward the perfect civil constitution, even given the great achievements of the Age of Freedom beautifully reflected the critique of the Dialectic of Illusion.

Fukuyama thus falls back on standard historical theory, and asks, "Do all or most societies evolve in a certain uniform direction, or do their histories follow either a cyclical or simply random path?" Fukuyama proposes to find the historical mechanism in relation to various candidate factors, e.g. the development of scientific knowledge, as a cumulative force whose development can 'clock' the 'irreversibility' of progressive time and asks, "But if history is never to repeat itself, there must be a constant and uniform Mechanism or set of historical first causes that dictates evolution in a single direction, and that somehow preserves the memory of earlier periods into the present."

This states the problem of historical causality quite directly indeed, and in a fashion that makes the linear or uniform and the cyclical mutually exclusive. But here is the exact difficulty, for the mechanism that Fukuyama might wish could show a cyclical character beyond the modern rise of science and technology that seems to hold sway only after 1500, and as much a series of effects as drivers of the motion. And what is the relevance of Hegel here? Hegel's argument is not causal. The 'mechanism' of the 'end of history' is the dialectic of stages in the emergence of Freedom. Normal causality fails as a candidate for the Grand Mechanism. All such efforts amount to variants of macroeconomic models of growth, and they don't work. Sneak in Hegel draped in the American flag. We will soon look at the case of the missing centuries, in relation to science, to discover that science, at least so far, could not be the candidate for this generation of uniform direction, bound up itself in the dynamic history.

The great historical Mechanism that Fukuyama describes must pass muster throughout Universal History, in the record of civilization. It is not sufficient to begin with the rise of modernity and find therein the resolution of Universal History in its effects, rather than its causes. Thus, we cannot assume the implied conclusion of his 'if'. What if history does repeat itself? Such arguments assume, perhaps, the Judeo-Christian 'mythistorical' discovery of linear progressive time as a *fait accompli*.

It is significant to consider the appearance of modern forms of Freedom

(and equalization), and the Communist explosion, in its proper context, of 5000 years, the entirety of what we call 'civilization', unable to establish a practical equality of economic justice, except for one brief period near -600. The modern world of Freedom was the child of revolution. This led to the rise of the notion of the 'permanent revolution', when, in fact, a flawed system was simply becoming stable. This stability is guarded by reasonable compromises, and the unique experience of American economic and political success. But the issue remains, for the gains of freedom are never secure. The discrete veiling of this fact by those who wish to brand 'revolution' as a pathological aberration or the will to power is a token of the brevity of historical memory. Our memories are short if we forget the birth of a left that sprang into existence before the abolition of slavery.¹¹ But the original sense, and the real heart of Fukuyama's argument, is the preservation of the gains made at the 'end of modernism', and an attempt to insist the technological gains of modernization should be accompanied by the gains of liberty, even as desperado traditionalist cultures wish the fruits of technology while calling liberal modernization 'ethnocentric'. We are forced to consider this thesis to be Hegelian propaganda. Let us, however, take the thesis seriously to this degree: we might reach the 'end of history' if we are successful in achieving true democracy for the first time!

Could humanity regress completely, find itself reviving slavery, theocracy, aristocratic society? Unfortunately it could, because it has, the more so as its experimental 'communist' fail-safe itself deviated and proved an abysmal failure, precisely on this score. Armed with Darwinism regression is already underway! What then is the source of freedom? Part of our confusion is the assumption of pure linear advance, and the viewpoint this creates, that particular forms, cultural states, or periods are islands of random rationality adrift in time. Our study might attempt to give a better meaning to the term 'end of history', as the passage of a divide, and, more basically, a phenomenon related to what we will call macro transition. And our study might highlight, and possibly reconcile, the contradiction in these linear views of progress into which the cyclical factor would threaten to return, and in the process make us less sanguine about the inevitability of any simple form of short-term political directedness.

11 Cf. *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (New York: Oxford, 1966), *Slavery and Human Progress* (1984), David Brion Davis.

Theory and Ideology: Out of Revolution

It is ironic that we only begin to observe the macro effect as we exit its period of action, and as we pull away from the modern transition we are left to wonder if we are at the end of a major evolutionary interval, or whether once again we will fall into the confusions of the post-Axial period with its decline from creativity and advance. It seems that our observation of the phenomenon signals the end of its returns and that we are left to the realization of our evolved freedom in a future of our own creation.

We are left with a sense of wonder, and the realization of the operation of a larger dynamic, even as we witness a rebirth of freedom in its wake. This double birth of democracy in an exact timing is eerie in its strange precision in the silence of the ages, and a clue to the reality of directional evolution. And, having evolved toward freedom, we must wonder if we will witness once again the cycles of decline and fall, as if in a recurrence of Roman *libertas* proceeding to Roman *imperium*. In fact, the ironic aspect of our macro pattern is that we become aware of it only as its action concludes, and we enter a new future where our evolving freedom passes into our own potential, and we are left with the existential sense of our aloneness as we grapple with a mystery that is incompletely known to us.

As we contemplate the future of our own freedom we are left with the paradoxes of slow and fast evolution, and of revolutionary action, whose basic question is, how do we bring about historical change. This is a moment worthy of the comment of Engels, stripped of its capitalist versus socialist trappings:

The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history will then pass under control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only at this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

Engels' language on paper is perfect, in light of our thesis, but the reality that we observe in the progression of civilizations is something vastly more complex than historical materialism can explain. And the attempt by Marx to create a theory of revolutions after the example of the French Revolution and Hegelian dialectic is unsound. The importance of their commentary lies in the way they pointed out the contraction of meaning in the idea of freedom around economic freedom, in the sense of the elite manipulation

of economies. It is remarkable this 'second opinion' rushed into the fray, but unfortunately the critique was flawed.

The ambiguity of 'revolution' We can see that as we exit the macrosequence we will be driven to either go into decline or conceive some substitute for the macro transitions visible behind us. The concoctions of spurious revolutionary theory in Marx and Engels are the perfect example. With a better sense of the vastness of the macro dynamic we can remain less naïve about the transformation of whole civilization. The macro effect shows us 'revolutions' done right!

We can see that it is almost science fiction to expect that human free will could as yet control processes of evolution operating over tens of millennia! And this realization shows us the problematical character of the revolutions of the left attempting to recreate society. That is not an argument against revolutions: the rise of modern shows that revolutions are the key to that rise. The left adopted an ideology of revolution, and we can see that, in light of the macro effect, a Burkean faith in the slow evolution of society is misplaced, and yet at the same time we can see why simple gestures of political revolution have so often proved to be illusions. We can see that 'revolution' is correlated with our macrosequence, but it does not follow that the model of a revolution corresponds to what we call a 'transition'. The sober reality is that the liberal revolutions gestating in the early modern, and climaxing in the period of the French Revolution stand in a direct association with our macro systematics, while the anti-liberalism of the nineteenth century left that arose from Marxism seems to have misunderstood the dynamics of historical motion. By making socialism a negation of a liberalism Marx's theories produced nothing but confusion. Since socialism is an idea that came into being in the context of democratic revolution, it is a mystery why such poor leadership vitiated the idea at the dawn of democratic republicanism.

Our macro portrait, closing on the present, moves between the ur-liberalism of the seventeenth century in the wake of the Thirty Years War and the far left of the nineteenth century, which is just as well, and leaves the reader either in a large library or on the barricades. But a leftist of our own times must ask himself why the initiatives of the nineteenth century far left were unreasonably off the mark and ended in such catastrophe.

We can see how all the effort in our transition works toward one result, basic liberalism, while the effort, post-transition, to modify this outcome is too thin a soup to start from scratch after the main event, and doomed to jackknife against the momentum of renewal created. We should also

note how the implicit prediction of this lurks in Kant's Challenge, as an 'antinomy of teleological judgment' haunts the false sense of an end state.

It's not the end of history but the dawn of a New Age, and if the starting point has a problem we should be ready for 'mideonic course corrections'. We have consistently critiqued Marx's theories, but he keeps sneaking back into the picture. It can't be otherwise, because basic contradictions lurk in the capitalist assembly of atomized individuals seeking to maximize utility. All the refutations of Marx forget a simple fact: atomized individuals at the wrong end of the market game may seek to maximize utility via class struggle and revolution.

Since by the structure of the argument we have invoked Kant and given classic liberalism a one-lap advantage this is hardly bias, but a recommendation to embrace the entire spectrum of dialectic from Luther to Marx in the year 1848. This year also sees Schopenhauer offering his opera glasses to a soldier in the revolutionary broils. Despite his ahistorical Buddhist strain, he stumbled backwards into another resolution of universal histories. There also we find Wagner, a cultural derelict of this period, about to proceed from the left to his reactionary views chasing the phantom of the aesthetic state., an idea destined to shipwreck at the hands of Hitler. By this point the classic German philosophy has bifurcated into separate streams as the chaotification of ideologies proceeds. And the concealed Platonic authoritarianism, Kant only exempt, and often charged against the metaphysical tradition pitted against the Lockes, resurfaces with a vengeance to befuddle the left.

The situation is not complex. Our system is injecting a trend toward equalization, Solon, now Rousseau, both perfectly timed in the mechanization of equalization, and undergoes a convulsion. Our divide era has passed yet even the abolition of slavery is incomplete. What are the rights of one class against another in the woes of world history? It is worth reading Hegel at this point. The credentials of a conservative noting in some alarm the incomplete and contradictory result of the liberal systems is unsettling. It is no use speaking of the glories of the market if King Leopold destroys ten million Africans and there exists no system to challenge that on a global basis. We see the resulting anger of Lenin at a critical moment and the even worse futility of the attempted correction. Marx's theories are poorly constructed, but his basic insight has proven all too prophetic. We need not agree with Marx to see the cogency of his critique of Hegel on 'Right', the starting point of his and Engels' strange career. But Stalin's reading of

this should remind us that nature in its wisdom shows an emergentism of renewed natural law theory in our core transition, the tool to get the job done, prior to philosophical tinkering. But we seem to have lost this option. Nature is waiting for man to produce a system of free and equal men. Five thousand years is enough. The climax of the modern transformation falls into place around this dilemma of equality

We end therefore in the year 1848, whose ambiguities of incomplete transformation beggar easy hopes of the 'end of history' conception, and should serve as a reminder of the principle liability warned of by these seminal times, the manufacture of social identity as ideology in the emergence of a new economic order. Our system is not ending, but new-aging. Humanity cannot afford again after two promptings of nature to slide back into a baboonery of lords and ladies.

We are left with Engels' hope that man can learn to transcend the mechanization of forces of history to recast his evolutionary free action as genuine freedom in an intelligent global 'commune' of true men, able to apply direction to econostream without exploitation, and realize the potential of techno-sequence without Faustian hubris, as the tide of human self-consciousness rises to meet and surpass the social forms appearing in phase in a new sequence of his own making that might be called Civilization for the first time.





4. APPENDIX

History...permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it...

Kant, *Idea For A Universal History*

4.1 History and Evolution: The Non-random

The question of evolutionary theory haunts the efforts to create a science of the historical. No such science of history exists: there the issue of human nature defies easy analysis with man inside the problem. But we can suspect such a science in the evidence of the non-random.

The term 'non-random' is the safest way to refer to a perceived dynamic we don't understand fully. Crusoe who sees a footprint in the sand shows an example. But ripples in the sand would also qualify. The first case 'designed' the second causal, and maringally 'non-random. World history combines both and we see 'ripples' or cycles that carry interior cultural 'designs'.

The question of this 'pattern' arises in the context suggested in a famous essay on history by Kant to find a pattern of universal history. Although

1 This chapter will show the occasional usage of the older term 'eonic effect' for the 'macro effect'. This can serve as a bridge to WHEE.

fuzzy, with a dynamics that is ambiguous, our pattern fits the bill, and there are probably no other solutions to ‘Kant’s Challenge’ than the one we uncover using a frequency analysis, over the range of world history for which we have data at the level of centuries, or less. That’s it: pattern shown. But what does it mean?

The ‘non-random’ is any evidence of a patterned process or dynamic. This could be causal, meta-causal or teleological or even designed. The evidence of world history contains a surprise: non-random patterning that exposes a ‘macro’ effect and provides a way beyond the dilemma, with a special kind of model. We see a rough solution to both questions: history and evolution (human) are Janus-faced. Our study will work with a model of this phenomenon and is like a passage through an enchanted woods.

The basic strategy is to look at the Axial Age,
 to ask if the pattern is unique
 go in search of a larger pattern
 find one in the similarity of modernity to the Axial period
 suggest we find another in the early period of Egypt, Sumer
 generalize the pattern to a sequence of axis points
 review the modern transition in this perspective,
 consider the question of evolution
 arrive back at our ‘short history of the world’

This strategy is not fully successful as the data thins as we move backward, but uncovers a part of what must be a larger pattern. We have clearly stumbled on a hidden treasure in the correlations of the data, the Axial Age effect being out in the open.

But it leaves a complex mystery that we must approach with care. Consider the phenomenon of the Axial Age: the data suggests the meta-causal, that is, some kind of semi-causal process that operates on some different level, acting on history rather than in history. The distinctions of causal event, machine and engine evokes something similar. Or perhaps the meta-causal process is really a teleological one, that gives evidence of directionality in the form of a cyclical process. This in turn hints at a distinction of the Kantian noumenal or phenomenal. This is the reason we limit ourselves to a broad set of outlines. The full model remains somewhat ambiguous.

Our idea of a ‘model’ is that of a periodization sequence that is an empirical chronicle. The periodization sequence may itself be evidence for a possible dynamic, as a conjecture. The value of this approach is that we don’t propose a ‘theory’, i.e. a universal generalization against an infinite interval of time. In fact our model is designed to start anywhere using ‘relative

As we study world history in the light of the discovery of a ‘non-random’ process we see that historical materialism is essentially falsified by the striking appearance of complex emergent entities on all levels: culture, religion, art, philosophy, and politics. Reductionist scientism just doesn’t work here. That said, design arguments can lead us astray. The emergence of a religion of beggars, with begging bowls, in Axial Age buddhism isn’t in the vein of historical materialism, yet has a most ironic economic sub-melody. The issue in science is the discovery of mechanisms. But this has led biologists astray, in that evolution is something more complex. The data we have, is closer to ‘creative evolution’, and shows the sudden appearance of unexpected novelties. Many will demand such complexity requires a design argument. But in the midst of this complexity a strangely mechanical action is at work: a cyclical or recurrent driver forcing us to think in terms of a system in a frequency pattern. We cannot make the claim that a designer would operate in such a pattern. Our approach is that of a model and this in turn is simplified to a basic outline or chronicle of history. We should then take up the ideas of the model on the side. This model isn’t complex, but does invoke some unfamiliar ideas. We should simply list some of the basic concepts, and then return to our outline approach. The basic framework is

1. a finite transition model, based on the idea of a macrosequence in a frequency pattern, initiated by triggering transitions. This sequence is designed around relative transformations, and does not require an absolute beginning. These transitions can also appear in parallel, as in the Axial period.
2. a new ‘fundamental unit of analysis’: the transition, instead of the civilization. These transitions seed oikoumenes in their wake.
3. the macrosequence generates globalization via a subset mainline following an acorn property or frontier effect.
4. a distinction of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ can divide the analysis into two levels.
5. We must distinguish the action of a system, and the free action inside it. And this connects with the transition of transitions, i.e. the macrosequence: the transition from evolution to history, in the emergence of active men/hominids (free action) from passive ‘to bed men’. This generates the deduction of a transition model, very elegant, but quite mysterious..

beginnings' Theories fail. A non-random pattern is very hard to dissipate.

The model in question is a finite transition type, with epochs or cycles initiated by a macro induction phase or transition. Like a locomotive the system goes through cycles or 'transitions' with an initial driving phase that applies fresh energy at the start of the cycle. However, conventional dynamics doesn't apply here in the emergence of values from facts.

The prime feature of the model is the distinction of system action/free action. The early modern shows revolutions system generated (and carried out by free action) while the situation after the divide must be due to free action. In the wake of the modern transition, we must consider carefully what we mean by revolution.

We can see that historical materialism probably won't work as a philosophy of history. We could just as well apply Schopenhauer's idea of 'will in nature' to reinvent design arguments. It should be noted that part of the problem is the ideology of 'economic materialism': the core insight of Marx into the economic determinations of consciousness and ideology is better recast in a new model with a revision of terminology. We need to rescue Marx's core insights from 'histo-mat'. Economies are really conglomerates of 'free agents', who design economic situations. The routine habit of economists to use differential equations here is a form of fiction. But the economic factor is not the driver of the overall history of civilization. And men inside these economies are free at any time to recreate them, at least in principle. We can easily restate the issues of class and ideology in this different context. We can see why we are driven in retreat to 'general outlines' with commentaries on dynamics on the side. We cannot easily resolve foundational issues. It is a toss-up between historical materialism, transcendental and/or absolute idealism. That is, the whole field explored by German classical philosophy. That this field is theoretical bedlam can be seen if we propose an hypothesis of Hegelian FrankenGeist: a gaseous vertebrate that can act everywhere all at once. The Axial Age requires something like that, perhaps. This would put us close to the ancient Israelites, who intuited a frankengeist in their tribal history, and made a tribal religion out of it. But the data seems to resemble the distinction of phenomenon and 'thing in itself'. A good Kantian warning about teleology is needed.

The strategy in our model is to examine the Axial Age and ask if this period is unique. As we examine the preceding and successive eras we suddenly suspect we are dealing with sequence of axis points. But the data is insufficient to extend the model to the Neolithic or before. Even the first transition in Egypt, Sumer is thin on data, but as we examine this era, which shows all the signs of a relative beginning and an Axial Age-type parallel effect, we suspect it is the successor to an earlier suspected transition, ca. 5400 BCE, the real beginning of civilization, after the onset of the Neolithic around 8000 BCE (and before with a similar ambiguity of starting point). The model resolves so many problems it must be onto something, but some of its effects seem strange at first. A good example is the parallel appearance of Egypt, Sumer in a mini 'axial age'. Two relative transformations in parallel is very strange, but the model is able to deal with this effect.

We may be unsure of the full scale of our model, but we have enough to never again think history a random emergence phenomenon. It seems more like a very elaborate and driven process operating elegantly in a series of transitions. We don't have to complete the model to take the warning that natural selection is inadequate for any account of human evolution, organismic or cultural. It is confusing because it shows directionality, but this can split into parallel lines. And then in the modern period the parallels reunite in one line. Again confusing.

We cannot use this model without reading a large number of books on each section, all of them complex specialties. But we can follow the rough progression of epochs, in the last three transitions, giving

1. the era after 3000 BCE: the parallel world of Sumer, Egypt.
2. the era after the Axial Age: we now why its succession goes into such decline. Our model clarifies this mystery of sudden advance followed by decline.
3. the rise of the modern: here we must specify the transition, as the interval from 1500 to 1800, and a divide, or end of the transition at that point (roughly).

We can see the significance of the year 1848 as the dawn of a new era, in the wake of a new transition. We suspect this is the end of the macrosequence, also, in the conclusion to 'resumed evolution' starting in the Neolithic. The relative beginning property is useful here. We start in *medias res*.

Our confusion recalls an essay on history by Kant, and even as we construct a macro model we should also attempt to consider an ‘idea for a universal history’, a phrase from the philosopher Kant who wrote a short essay, *Idea For A Universal History*, with this title. In this essay he proposes a challenge, which we can call Kant’s Challenge:

Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like every other natural event, are determined by universal laws. However obscure their causes, history, which is concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.²

Note the elegance of the idea here and the way we can ‘deduce’ a cyclical process. It is as with a computer mouse: the ‘play of freedom’, mouse clicks, must show regular alternation with the deterministic system, the computer. The regular movement in the play of freedom is close to home, and yet seems to apply to universal history in the large, which is quite stupendous.

A deterministic system of laws demands unique outcomes of all events in a causal chain. The finite transition model shows that cascades of potential events emerge in a set of transitions. Inducing change in a geographical region over three centuries is a form of ‘soft causality’ that eludes our understanding.

We have already stumbled on an instance, in the discussion of the ‘end of history’, and the ‘discrete freedom sequence’, of the causality of freedom in the way the ‘births’ of democracy show progressive recurrence. There is something meta-causal about emergent freedom, as Hegel quite noticed, the reason Fukuyama picked up the fumbled football of the ‘end of history’ and ran with it. We have the solution, then, but it eludes us the moment we try to carry out the calculations of the ‘causality of freedom’. The details would be hopelessly non-linear. We can put Kant’s formulation on the wall as inspiration and proceed with the outlines of a history of free agents, relatively free, with a question about free will. Historical materialists cannot allow free will, and it barely enters the formulation of Schopenhauer. But the distinctions of phenomenon and thing-in-itself allow a solution to the riddle.

A recent innovation in historiography is that of so-called Big History, history

² Hans Reiss, *Kant’s Political Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 41.

Neolithic Sources

As we examine the Axial Age, we suspect it is a step in a sequence, and if we apply a simple frequency hypothesis in intervals of about 2400 years a revealing pattern stands out. The result would be:

- Transition 1 ?-10400, as an arbitrary start
- Transition 2 ?Proximate start of Neolithic ca. -8000
- Transition 3 ?The Middle Neolithic interval ca. -5500
- Transition 4: The birth of state civilization, interval before -3000
- Transition 5: The 'Axial' period, interval before -600
- Transition 6: The early modern, interval before 1800

All at once we see what's going on. The rise of Sumer and Egypt, like the cases in the Axial Age, is not the absolute start. There is a long prelude, with a series of stages along the Fertile Crescent, now being discovered. The fit is too good to be chance, but the picture is still incomplete.

We need to be wary of this suggestion, because the data also suggests periods of parallel emergence as the streams split into synchronous lines

We see the beginnings of civilization in the Middle East with the first splitting stream with Dynastic Egypt and Sumer, then the Axial Age with its multiple tracks...

We suspect the period epoch from -5500 in northern Iraq to be the key to the later era of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt.

We take this as serious guesswork, not even yet an hypothesis. But it is a warning that we can't understand the dynamics without closely tracked data at the level of centuries. This is the real significance of the Old Testament: for the first time a people undergoing a transition documented the process.

since the Big Bang. This often seems like an extension of historical materialism or scientific reductionism to the whole of deep time. A useful notion we should take care to challenge with our 'idea for a Universal History'. As we examine deep time we should acknowledge the labors of evolutionary Darwinists, but remain skeptical of the flat causal plane of reductionist explanation. All the prime heresies resurface to plague the account: the history of planetary life looks a lot like a progression of stages, and the emergence of life, and then mind, are not easily explained by anything in the Darwinian tool box. The suspicious ambiguity of the evidence suggests the 'meta-causal', directionality.

Big Histories, Universal Histories Our account proceeds from causal Big History to Universal History, the evolution of freedom, and we can set up the starting point of 'Big History' as a backdrop to our search for a 'Universal History'. The idea of Big History, history since the Big Bang, is developed, for example, by David Christian in his *Maps Of Time*, and this is also appropriate for our tale. Ironically this absolute beginning may in fact turn out to be another relative start, since Big Bang theories may or may not establish absolute starting points, and in any case this forces on us the question of evolution in its most general cosmic context. The connection between the two, self-evident in the eonic effect, is indicated by Christian de Duve in his *Vital Dust*, where the emergence or evolution of the human will in relation to values becomes a challenge to purely reductionist views. Reductionist science simply disregards the demand for any account of this aspect of evolution.

We are not condemned to scientific heresies not to be found in physics itself. Thus, Paul Davies in *The Goldilocks Enigma* asks, Why does the universe seem so well-suited to life? Physics may have stumbled on the rationale for the completely unexpected discovery of the 'macro effect', the 'meta-causal' something that leaves its signature in history. Do we mean history, or evolution? We can see that the two are related. Free agents seem to emerge from 'evolution' and then proceed to create history. But we must suspect the two overlap. Evolution shows many signs of free agency with the dawn of the primates, which means it is probably present in potential from the beginning, in the 'animal' and its locomotion. And, we now suspect, history shows many signs of evolution in the relative passivity of the free agents as they undergo large-scale 'meta-causal' events such as the Axial Age. But we cannot eliminate that free agency: the meta-causal is like the invention of a 'genre', the outcome as semi-free agency is the result of the agent creating an example of that genre. We cannot avoid this double aspect. In fact, this distinction of 'genre' and 'exemplar' pervades the Axial Age, and is literally the case in the sudden emergence, to take a clear example,

Beyond Natural Selection

From the onset the real issue of the Darwin debate has always been the status of the theory of natural selection. Many of the first reviewers of Darwin's *Origin* accepted the evidence of evolution, but had difficulty with his claims for the mechanism behind it. The strength of the evolutionary hypothesis tends to mask the weakness of the claims for natural selection. It is simply not true that Darwin provided voluminous and convincing evidence for his theory of natural selection. Frequent reference under challenge to the evidence of bacterial samples, where Darwinian thinking seems confirmed, does not give us grounds for the universal generalization of natural selection. It is a confusing circumstance in so far as the visible aspect nature shows the struggle for existence, the teeming ecologies of competing lifeforms. Natural selection is the bottom line, the test of survival. But does it generate 'evolution'? Verifying that it does so, and does so in all cases without exception, is immensely difficult, perhaps impossible, leaving the claims of theory, and the ambitions of social ideologists, in limbo. Darwin observed these innumerable cases of natural selection, through Malthusian lenses, but none of these conclusively established a true theory of evolution. The theory of natural selection was also the linchpin for the claims of non-random evolution, and denials of directionality or progress in evolution.

It should have been possible, even before Darwin came around to it, to criticize the whole imagery of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. But if we except Samuel Butler and one or two other unheeded critics, everybody preferred "Nature red in tooth and claw", and either regretted or rejoiced that it was the only means of making improvements in species. Some obviously feared that if natural selection were discarded evolution would be endangered. They thought the two theories inseparable and foresaw a rebirth of superstition. But dropping natural selection leaves the evidence for evolution untouched. It was not even a question of dropping natural selection, for natural selection is an observed fact. It was a question of seeing—as Darwin came to see—that selection occurs *after* the useful change has come into being: therefore natural selection can cause nothing but the elimination of the unfit, not the production of the fit...

Jacques Barzun (1941), *Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage* (Doubleday Anchor, 1958), p. 62

of the 'genre' of Greek tragedy and the exemplars created by the tragedians of the Axial Age. Sure enough, as the Axial Age closes, the genre sputters and disappears, then reappears in the early modern.

System action, free action We suddenly see that the issue of history must be a hybrid of meta-causal 'events' or fields, and creative realizations inside them. Semi-causal situations, and the semi-free realizations inside them express a kind of dual action or dialectic of determinism and creativity. We cannot fully resolve the one against the other.

Think of a ship and its passengers: the action of the system, the ship, and the action of the passengers on board is a hybrid system of mechanics and free will, or free agency, free will or not. This distinction of system and agents might seem confusing, but we already know all this: the simplest example of the many we encounter every day might be the 'system action' of a car, and the 'free action' of the driver. We need a looser version of the duality of causality and freedom: system action and free action. Free agency is not always 'free will'. And you can be a free agent in an earthquake, but not free to do much of anything while it happens!

This distinction impinges on the 'end of history' question. The end of history can't have a temporal 'endpoint'. At the end of a transition the macro factor disappears, leaving the long term to 'free action' and probable decline! How long will democracy last, is the basic question.

The implications of system action and free action can be seen from two examples:

1. A child's training bike might contain a third mini-wheel to set the balance. In the emergence of freedom macro induction ('make free') is less free (but often better realized) with a temporary lowered degree of freedom (i.e. not free to fall over). As the training wheel is removed a higher degree of freedom (freedom to fall over) emerges as unguided freedom, perhaps less well realized.

2. The generation of a 'genre' is abstract and leads to a realization by an individual. This distinction is literally the case with many examples from the Axial Age, e.g. the emergence of the genre of Greek tragedy.

'System action' is never observed directly and resembles the noumenon. These distinctions can help to clarify the hopeless confusion in the emergence of Israelite monotheism in Israel/Judah. We must suspect some 'macro induction' but this is realized as the free action of the Canaanites

The fundamental unit of analysis

The study of history tends to deal with 'civilizations' as the fundamental unit of analysis. But it won't really work. The key is our set of transitions, and then the oikoumenes they create by diffusion. The Axial Age followed by the rise of the modern is completely confusing until we apply the logic of globalization: in a primitive era a splitting mainline makes sense: cover the whole in parallel. The results are too far apart to collide. The next phase will be forced to work in a collapsed parallel system now a single mainline: a parallel effect will no longer work. This single transition zone in the 'West' of Eurasia is thus completely logical, and shows multiple emergent aspects that will easily generalize beyond cultures: the economics of capitalism is thus part of an easily understood language that will easily be transcultural. This economic process must yield to a larger transculturalism in the common global oikoumene. The rise of the modern in the 'West' follows the exact logic of the frontier effect: a zone with no prior transitions, and outside of the Eurasian center of gravity, the frontier effect. At the exact boundary of the old Roman Empire. All the Eurocentric talk of 'Western civilization' is nonsense in light of this more complex process. This strategy of globalization from the time of Sumer onward is spectacular, exact, and very elegant.

Note the way this model scotchs Eurocentrism. The modern transition is not a phenomenon of Western Civilization, but of Eurasia, a time-slice in a transitional sequence that has jumped to a new unused Eurasian location at the fringe of the old Roman Empire, on schedule in a phase of 2400 years. The 'locations' of the time-slice are a crescent around Northern Italy: Germany, Holland, England, France and Spain. Our model is the only one that can explain this phenomenon. The American case is not really included, and appears like Rome to Greece as a sidewinder, but tails the transition and thus really a part of the English modernity. The American case is one of the first successes of the oikoumene globalization of the modern transition, but is also a convenient staging zone for a rebirth of democracy. The Russian case, after the Great Divide, please note, is another late sidewinder, and becomes the staging zone for a communist experiment. Note the strangeness of this formulation, but it works. The global oikoumene is already in existence in the first stage of a new world culture, and capitalism being transcultural has helped that process, as Marx/Engels quite obviously foresaw.

of that time and place. This raises the preposterous possibilities that design arguments may be about cover stories of invented designers! We may use these concepts to 'debrief' the unsettling legacies of hopeless theological confusion that attempted to explain historical action as theistic myth and free action in that context.

The work of Kant was highly relevant to the rise of science, and staged a counterpoint to the assumptions of causality. And Kant still clearly distinguished physics from biology, and warned that the two were different subjects. The question of human evolution remains problematical: thus one aspect of that totality is the mystery of free agency, and thence the question of the 'evolution of freedom'. Such issues became the focus of a critique of scientific reductionism that began in the wake of the triumph of the New Physics. We have pointed to an 'in principle' formulation using an idea from Kant, involving the powerful suggestion running through German classical philosophy of a 'science of freedom', but that is hard to carry out in detail.

Our solution, tacitly adopted for the most part by historians, simply takes for granted the reality of 'free agency' in the creation of history. History becomes a story or chronicle overlaid on a causal substrate. This kind of system distinguishes two things: the action of a system, and the free action inside it. Think of a car, the driver as a single system: there is no simple law of motion here: you have a causal system and free agency in a hybrid context. This is a variant of the basic strategy of the philosophy of history, and it assumes that a 'science of freedom' exists ("something causes freedom") that can embed the 'scenes and stories' of free will. And it need not be 'free will' but only 'will of some kind', a decision matrix in an organism. In fact, reductionist science fails at this point, and this is also reflected in the evolutionary interpretations of history.

As we explore our model the spectre of Kant's third critique haunts our analysis, and the match of aesthetic phenomena to the dynamic suspected forces us to consider the way teleological issues are connected to aesthetic judgment. This remains *terra incognita* still at about the point Kant left it. Teleology as constitutive or regulative generates uncertainty. In fact, we suspect that teleology is in fact constitutive of our historical data. But teleology and directionality as 'thing in itself' and 'representation' warns us to wary of the stampede to do away with Kantian transcendental idealism.

The problem is clear: if we reject design arguments, then we must find a mechanism that can induce/delineate art forms, and their quality.

One of the ideas of the model is the distinction of 'stream and sequence'. The temporal stream, or the flow of continuous history in a culture of civilization, is overlaid with a discontinuous 'sequence' that expresses the transitions in the 'macrosequence'. Consider this in relation to the modern transition: it is not the same as the stream history flowing from the Middle Ages, but echoes the larger stepping stone sequence of the larger evolutionary pattern. Note the way 'evolution' applies now to disconnected regions in a larger system.

Lamarck's idea of two levels finds a remarkable realization in this analysis.

The 'stream and sequence' concept is evidently a form of teleology in disguise. We should caution against too easy thinking on teleology, and the quote below shows the strict Kantian view of the matter. Yet it seems hard to claim that teleology is a purely regulative ideal. And yet we sense Kant's point: the stream shows no teleology, yet the sequence, overlaid on the stream, generates directionality, and thence teleology. And this seems to follow a phenomenal/noumenal distinction: the *representation* of teleology seems to be cyclical process. The elusive connection to 'aesthetic judgments' is as yet unclear, although our transitions overflow with aesthetic phenomena.

The third Critique does not develop a teleological metaphysics. On the contrary, it shows that teleological principles are not constitutive of the empirical world, but can only be regulative for our reflection upon the empirical world. While the first Critique justifies the mechanistic method on the basis of a mechanistic metaphysics, the third Critique justifies the teleological method in spite of the impossibility of a teleological metaphysics. This impossibility is insisted upon time and again. Kant admits only a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. There is no metaphysics of purpose, but only a Critique of Teleological Judgement. He shows that there is no conflict between the maxims of mechanistic and teleological method. There can be no conflict between mechanistic and teleological metaphysics because, according to the critical philosophy there can be no teleological metaphysics.

Stefan Korner, *Kant*, Chapter 9

One reason we are wary of theories is the nearly insoluble issue of teleology, from Kant to Hegel to materialistic reductionism, a very large ground to straddle. The suggestion that 'teleology' is expressed by cyclical directionality allows us a practical way to proceed without solving the full problem.

The transcendental idealism of Schopenhauer could be a tool to solve many of the problems of historical analysis but suffers the paradoxes of the distant past coming into estence in the act of representation. This will argue against any use of the formalism, but its value for resolving the paradoxes of psychology makes it a strong contender on the sidelines next to the hopeless confusion of reductionist thought.

The 'something causes freedom' idea, or short-circuit, must arise at the core of any account that depicts the evolution of a free agent. Note that we say 'free agent', not necessarily a 'creature with free will'. Free agency can be subject to multiple causal influences, but that agency is relatively free, and shows choice, forking outcomes in the causal stream. The resolution of the question requires, therefore, an axiom on the 'evolution of freedom', and this requires something that current Darwinism can't provide. That is slightly unfair: noone at all has any closely tracked data as to the emergence of early man. It looks as though there was a 'great explosion', a period of rapid transition, from which modern man emerges.

The data, although still confusing, points to this in the period after about 200K BCE. The creature that emerges thence is a creator, with a complex instrument of consciousness, something he calls a 'soul', and of course a complex linguistic capacity, beside which lies an inchoate but definite canon of moral instinct, subject, to be sure, to cultural contexts. This moral potential, like language, is beyond the capacity of science to even describe, as yet. There is an irony here. Of all the issues that should animate 'intelligent design' proponents, it should be here on the issue of man that their challenge should arise. But, because the Biblical texts cannot themselves understand the issues, there is nothing there that can form the basis for a religious argument. The tale of Adam and Eve, despite its deep philosophical overtones, fails as a theory of evolution, quite obviously, despite a haunting 'story' of great aptness about the 'queer consciousness' of that creature man. It almost seems to sense the transition from *homo erectus* (but we may underestimate that hominid) to a 'willful' beast of reason that can also be a part-time evildoer.

The dynamics of human evolution may well be something different from that of earlier evolution. It is the one case where a 'design' challenge to the

System Action, Free Action: Determinism vs Creativity

Related to the issue of Kant's Challenge is the issue of creative history, and we need to set a distinction, before embarking in the next chapter on a study of world history. The data of history is confusing unless we distinguish a causal factor from free agency, AND be sure to keep the two together, in tandem. We have evoked Kant's Challenge, and we must distinguish historical dynamics from free will, since **both** are operating, and we can call this the distinction of a system and the free agents inside it. Think of a ship and its passengers: the action of the system, the ship, and the action of the passengers on board is a hybrid system of mechanics and free will. It is important to see that history is not determined: it shows many hybrid situations where behavior is partly determined and partly free in the creative action of individuals. This distinction of system and agents might seem confusing, but we already know all this: the simplest example of the many we encounter every day might be the 'system action' of a car, and the 'free action' of the driver. The point is that 'history' has a mind of its own, so to speak, and we are inside it operating with our agendas. But the two intersect. We need a looser version of the duality of causality and freedom: system action and free action. Free agency is not always 'free will'. You can be a free agent in an earthquake, but not free to do much of anything while it happens!

Some analogs The simplest example here is that of a driver in a vehicle. The situation shows the tandem action of a causal machine and a free agent, with our without free will, in control of that machine. Another example is that of an ocean liner and its passengers. Still another is a computer with a mouse, a clear tandem situation of 'system' (computer) and 'free agent', user with mouse. DMR

idea of mechanical evolution might succeed, if creationist thinking did not always end up in a muddle. The dawn of 'mind' seems to touch on a new dimension of 'evolution', in the same way that the 'dawn of life' initiated a new cosmic era. One reason design arguments persist is that complexity is beyond the regime of natural selection, and on man the Darwinian account is implausible. Perhaps it is the fault of the Darwinists here in feeding creationism with the unrealistic mythology of natural selection. There is every possibility of a naturalistic, but non-Darwinian account of evolution, early evolution. But the question of man is a stubborn exception to the very idea of evolution, not our idea of it, but that of reductionists. The whole thing shows an uncanny resemblance to a software upgrade. Our idea of 'evolution', however, has become unmoored from the false definition of Darwinians. And it is no longer a theory, but a chronicle, one that might describe a dynamic, but without a theory of such. So the idea of evolution for us has become a descriptive narrative, one that shows development in time. It shows more we suspect, a sequence of transitions in a progression of evolutionary 'punctuations'. History and evolution are thus braided: macroevolution 'evolves' man/culture in a series of finite stages. This high level process influences the free agent's action, his realization of evolution which becomes history in the making. The free agent during this transition has a slightly lower degree of freedom, since the macro is inducing it, but highly creative in the process, while in the wake of the transitions, the free agent has a higher degree of freedom, but lose the creative self-consciousness that came with the evolutionary macro stage. This is the kind of strangeness that the 'causality of freedom' must evoke. But it helps to see why, say, the Greek Axial Age is so overflowing with creative genius. This creative moment is as sudden in its appearance as in its waning, and we can all at once see what is going on with the progression of creative moments and the long periods of decline in between them.

One reason for this uncertainty about man, as Alfred Wallace made clear, is that man has a potential, and this is hard to manifest. Yet it is real, and takes the form of a 'superconsciousness', to use a term that is a bit 'new agey', but usefully vague. The problem with potential is that it never interacts with the environment: it is latent. How could a latent potential evolve as a result of environmental interaction and adaptation? And this is related to this creature's stubborn conviction he has a soul. And the related beliefs in soul migration are endemic in man, that superstitious being who may in fact ignore the coming of scientism and persist in his 'hominid 2.0'

beliefs. This creature is hapless and disheveled buddha, chasing phantoms and seeing ghosts. This shambler seems not to be an evolutionary advance, but the appearance must be misleading.

The complexity of the human mind will drive many to suggest design arguments. The point here is that there is a distinction of forms of consciousness, with a cosmic connection: such a transformation is not within, but beyond, animal consciousness. That could never have evolved, as such, since it is not a property of man. We can swim in the sea, but the ocean is not ours. Thus the dimension of consciousness is supra-organismic. And always there is the equivocation over consciousness/self-consciousness: 'yes it is consciousness, no it is not consciousness'. The reversal of terms is characteristic, mechanical consciousness is often called 'unconscious', or a lack of consciousness.

The answer can be seen in terms of the classic distinctions as to the instrument of human consciousness, which plays on the states of sleep and dreaming, waking consciousness, so-called 'self-consciousness', and a fourth beyond that, the mystery of mysteries. We cannot produce a theory of this unless we have explored it, and as Buddhists will tell you, fully exploring this potential results in a cessation of life-cycles, which is an odd restraint on the hopes of science. We need to suspect that the transition to *homo sapiens* involves a transformation of consciousness, one that we can hardly scientize, since we are 'deep welled' short of realizing what it is that 'evolved': it is potential in us. It is no wonder that we can't produce theories of human mental evolution.

Here the study of world history can provide another clue: we can see how a directed evolutionary process, suspected of teleology, can operate in history over many millennia. Once we see how a Gaian meta-evolution can upgrade a species, we will be less prone to the *Just So Stories* of Darwinists. Although the evolution of civilization seems different from the evolution of organisms, a rising suspicion suggests that this distinction is false, that the human evolution of the organism in a micro-culture of transitional apes is just as good candidate for the 'civil-ization' category, just a bit elemental. The point, we suspect, is that organism and proto-culture evolve together. How could it be otherwise? if speciation is a variant of culture formation, sort of, then there is no paradox at all. The macro effect in world history will show us how a global systematics can work, and leave a hint as to what must have been a 'species level' operation on a field of apes, or, rather, *hominines erecti*, creatures already the 'first men', despite the limits of their

consciousness, we suspect.

The directionality of history, in a totality of divergent cultural zones and areas or civilizations, is very hard to detect, and yet it is right in front of us. Our model shows how a mainline is generated from a diverse whole, via a chain of meta-causal transitions, that leapfrog and connect in a transitional sequence that is transcultural. We can follow this sequence, which can split into parallels, from its genesis in the Middle East, then via Sumer, to the Axial Age, thence to modernity. It is very strange, and needs long study, but it does show how a directional process is being realized in world history.

The study of the macro effect shows how the question of economic development takes its place very naturally as a module of civilizational development. In this context we can examine the relationship of economies to the larger scenery of world history. We can see that economies are genies in a bottle: passive entities relative to the dynamics of macro-civilization, until they are let out of the bottle, and begin to overwhelm the whole. An early case of this happened was with the disease of slavery, let out of the bottle. Extreme capitalism is emerging as another 'out of the bottle' case rising to overwhelm the whole. The question of capitalism is not easy to analyze, for it is, as Marx well knew, a mixed blessing, good and evil.

Here it is useful, especially in a period when the libertarian perspective starts to pit capitalism against the state, to recount the emergence of the 'state' in the context of civilization. The state is not the monster libertarians think it to be: it is the key step in the rise of civilization. We can also see here the birth of class struggle. And, as Hegel noted, and we can state it in our own words, there is a countermovement (a dialectic if you wish) to the state, inside the state, a revolution against the state, as state formation is upgraded. In any case, this new perspective is useful, because it passes seamlessly from hunter gatherer bands, to states, and 'metastates'. The point is that economies are almost always set in a 'general mercantilist' framework. The suggestion of Adam Smith to loosen up a bit, resulted in a rogue ideology of unlimited *laissez-faire*, the point at which obsession takes over.

Throughout the process of globalization continues, and has done so since the first bands of *homo erectus* left Africa for their global future. In this context, the emergence of democracy in the phases of the 'dialectic' of states is, to our stunned surprise, a macroevolutionary process. A step beyond this, we see the inherent potential, and dilemma, of arising communism, arising in the context of democratic revolution, and yet of state formation. The

The Limits of Observation

The debate over natural selection has been persistent. Where did Darwin go wrong? Darwin's theory is a provocative generalization applied to immense vistas of time that are unobserved. Those unobserved intervals in deep time can fool us badly. We can exit the chronic debate by simply demanding proper evidence. The demand for evidence of the fact of evolution is far less stringent than that for natural selection. Demonstration that the latter is the key to all forms of higher complex structure has never been demonstrated scientifically. The task is exceedingly difficult, for starters. The difficulty may preempt easy hopes for a theory of evolution. One way to see the problem with claims for natural selection is to look at history, and we will proceed to an examination of non-random evolution in the dynamics of historical emergence.

The Hurricane Argument Consider a hurricane, a very brief event by comparison, as a global 'system evolution' on the surface of a planet. We know a hurricane when we see one, but its dynamics, mechanism, and full progression require incremental 'closing' on degrees of evidence and observation, a task not fully accomplished until the advent of satellites able to map global coordinates. In the same way we know evolution when we see it, roughly speaking, given the fossil evidence, but its dynamics, mechanism and full progression require incremental 'closing' on degrees of evidence and observation, a task not fully accomplished. Note the analogy suggests global positioning satellites over the entire planet over millions of years, to observe drifting species and their changes. Suppose an observer in outer space only had loosely sampled data on pre-Neolithic man, and post-twentieth century man, and then conjectured that some mutation caused this dramatic change.

This analogy shows at once where Darwinism departs from scientific practice. Historians routinely assume they must close on the facts in such an analysis, yet Darwinists wish to claim exemption. We have no fully observed datasets in Darwinian deep time. It is an insidious trap.

dilemma is one that haunts the revolutions of 1848, at once the stepchildren of the democratic revolution, and yet also the premonition, prophecy, of higher state formation, one that can be the 'metastate' to economic systems.

Thus, as we examine world history the evidence is clear for a powerful macro effect. This can be seen in many ways, but the simplest approach is to simply look at the evidence of the non-random in the historical record. It is a puzzling pattern to deal with. The clue is that the successive stages jump to a new civilization to generate a time-slice. It is a little odd, like hopscotch. It is odd that we make assumptions about deep time, and then apply that to history, when it should all be the other way around: what history shows us ought to be a clue to earlier times. The reason is simple: we have no records at all of a continuous chronicle in 'real time', none, except world history of the last five thousand years, and then only just barely. The issue therefore is not theoretical, but empirical.

And here the question of economies can be put in perspective. And there is a powerful version of a Marxist praxis based on the question of macroevolutionary history, one that can extract the key insight of historical materialism from its context of reductionism, and nineteenth century positivism. We will see that 'communism' appears as an analogue to the generation of 'oikoumene generators' that emerge in the wake of the Axial Age. Such integrators can be religious or secular, and this is a powerful suggestion of the latent energy behind the idea (which transcends its 'taxi ride' via Marxist theory). Communism emerges in the wake of the Reformation, and has its own prophets, and prophecies. The idea of communism appears at the dawn of modernity in Thomas Munzer. And is suppressed. It appears again in the English Civil War, and is suppressed. We can see why Marx and Engels got suspicious. It almost seems like real modernity never happened. The revolutions were all bourgeois revolutions, and the main event never got off the ground! That's trifle partisan, but the point is important: the 'end of history' is taken to legitimize capitalist finality. Surely the evidence points to the opposite: All these bourgeois revolutions must be concluded by a last one, the end in the beginning, just as the early socialists suspected.

The obsessive hold of economic ideology can be moderated by an expansion of scale to the level of world history as a whole, and this larger perspective soon impinges on the question of evolution. Economic factors are not the prime movers. The ambivalence of Marx on the issue of Darwin lies in the way he saw a natural relationship between his view of historical materialism and the discovery of the reality, the fact, of evolution. But he

Consciousness, and the Evolution of Ethics

There is nothing mysterious about the limitations of Darwinian explanation: value-free science must eliminate questions of the value domain. But is this legitimate for the question of evolution? Related to this is the attempt to produce purely causal explanations of ethical behavior and its evolution. The positivist methodology of scientific reductionism, by declaring the rigid separation of facts and values, leaves us to wonder if nature itself truly respects this division in all its processes, especially those of evolutionary emergence. Sometimes the naturalistic fallacy is cited here. But how do we know that evolution doesn't process values amidst facts, this in a naturalistic fashion? Darwin and his successors, making natural selection the fundamental axiom of explanation, have attempted considerable ad hoc extensions of great ingenuity to make selfishness the source of morality. This dramatic play of opposites has produced some exotic attempts to 'save the paradigm' in the theories of group and kin selection. These theories are essentially logical phantoms attempting to puzzle through the paradox of making selfishness the basis for its opposite. But none of this answers to the real issue, which is to explicate, and show evidence for, the emergence of an 'ethical' agent.

The issue of ethics is really one of the freedom or potential freedom to act according to an 'ought', and it is almost by definition not going to be explained by the mechanization of valuation via natural selection. This issue gives us a hint that Darwinian style explanation is wrong in principle and wildly off the mark in practice. We must see if we can find any actual data that will give us a hint as to what the evolution of ethics might be like. We don't have far to look. In general, a theory of ethical behavior must explicate the consciousness of an ethical agent, and produce a model of choice-based behavior. But theories of evolution cannot yet account for consciousness. To make ethical consciousness an epiphenomenon of natural selection, and to propose that it arises as an adaptation in the game of survival beggars the nature of the phenomenon itself. What's more, this approach creates a de facto standard of ethics based on the evolutionary 'value' of pure selfishness.

soon saw the problem with the theory of Darwin. And the irony is that a similar difficulty seems to haunt the Marxist view of history. The onset of positivism is problematical for both of these theories, and the result is the 'kidnapped' theory of Marx, one that contains a deep insight, but one that by being cast in the mode of scientism, becomes a reductionist theory that is too one dimensional. The modern world, from the Elizabethan laws on sturdy beggars, to Malthus and his 'better they starve', to the advocacy of social darwinists like Spencer, bemoaning welfare, has suffered this combination of evolutionary and economic hybrids, the one and same wretched ideology, that was exposed by the early studies of ideology, as those of Marx, of the use of false theories to justify class warfare.

The study of macro-history can create a better context for the study of economies than historical materialism, which tends to overplay their importance. However, we have just shown how historical materialism, as an idea rather than a theory, scored an early success in exposing this corruption of capitalist and economic thinking. Economies dominate because they are massive, with a logic of market motives, but a long-range view, as with the evidence of the Axial Age, shows that historical materialism is too reductionist to produce a theory of civilization. The question of modern capitalism has produced a distortion of our understandings of culture and the solution in the form of a postcapitalist world system finds support from this larger perspective. The mythology of markets, taken to the extreme of indifference to all forms of environmental destruction, is countered by seeing them as 'brush fires' induced by man himself, and this situation has no basis in natural law.

The subject of history is the core of the human evolutionary question mark. And, beside the question of the place of value there in the field of fact, lies the suspicion that the historical doubly confirms our suspicions about Darwinism by showing us the play of non-random processes in the large. It is one of the basic tenets of Darwinism and reductionist science that purely random processes are at work, and that nature shows nothing to contradict this. But we have a rising suspicion that world history contradicts this dogma and is able to show us the falsification of a basic Darwinian tenet. The achievements of archaeology in a revolution of discoveries more or less in parallel with those of other fields of science in the same time frame, have transformed our sense of world history to give us a unique record: the first, and only, chronicle in real time of an evolutionary progression. And this discovery is related to our discussion of both modernity and the so-called

The rise of molecular biology shows a complexity of structure that cannot easily survive statistical challenges to claims of random emergence. The new genetics and the emergence of developmental biology have exposed the limits of Darwin's original theory, in the remarkable findings of complex biochemical systems and evo-devo.

Evo-devo Although the findings of developmental biology have already been grafted onto the mythology of natural selection, they raise the question of a particular kind of teleological interpretation of evolution. As we examine world history a developmental sequence unconnected with genetics emerges with a demonstration of evolutionary directionality visible as macroevolution over five millennia. The representation of teleology as intermittent directionality suddenly gives meaning to the idea of 'punctuated equilibrium'. World history has its own 'evo-devo', with no connection to genetics.

Epigenetics The recent discoveries in the realm of epigenetic inheritance point to a major new perspective for the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis. DNA sequences remain invariant during development, but cells can acquire information they can pass on to their progeny, creating a new avenue for evolution beyond genetics.

Sean Carroll et al., *From DNA to Diversity* (New York: Blackwell, 2001), Rudolf Raff, *The Shape of Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), J. Gerhart & M. Kirschner, *Cells, Embryos, and Evolution* (New York: Blackwell, 1997), Jeffrey Schwarz, *Sudden Origins* (New York: Wiley, 1999), G. Miller & S. Newman, *Origination of Organismic Form* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).

Jablonka, Eva, et al. *Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), Chapter 4, "The Epigenetic Inheritance Systems". WHEE

Axial Age.

The question of evolution in the Darwinian take is really about ‘random evolution’. And the evidence of world history offers us a surprise. The solution to the evolution question can be found in world history itself. And this discovery ironically echoes the insights of the first theorist of evolution, Lamarck.

The connection here lies in the way that a solution to the evolution mystery requires a two-level theory, a connection to directionality, and the questions of adaptation, and environmental interaction, relegated to a second level. This exposes the core problem with Darwinism, soon found in the theory of natural selection. Once we adopt the two-level approach, the problems with evolutionary theories tend to dissipate, to be replaced with a sense of the mystery in the higher level, with its teleological overtones. World history shows us a powerful, and slightly different example, and once we see that, the one-dimensionality of Darwinism stands out. We will start by looking at the Axial Age to see how this strange situation can come about, and the evidence makes no sense unless we can see a two-level developmental logic at work. That developmental logic really demands the term ‘evolution’, and a question about the relevance of this thinking to the earlier stages of human evolution. There is a strong suspicion that this is the case, and there is no really satisfying account of human evolution along Darwinian lines.

4.2 Debriefing Darwinism

The discovery of evolution occurs during the high tide of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, one of the most revolutionary and innovative periods in human history, one, as we will also see, correlated directly with our macrohistorical timing. The theory of Darwinism is quite different and comes a generation later. The crux of evolution appears directly in Lamarck who saw that evolution is operating on two levels, a drive toward complexity, and an interaction with the environment.

Darwinism collapses those distinctions of levels. The question of history been transformed by the discovery of evolution. And this connection has produced for the first time the right context for the study of history. But this has also produced confusions of its own, and the issue of Darwinism has generated the errors of Social Darwinism, and has been braided with the economic ideology of Adam Smith, as if evolution was somehow a variant of *laissez-faire*.

The connection with radical thought has persisted from the start. But

A Timeline for 'Big History'

In the first second from Planck time to the separation of the fundamental forces to the drama of cosmic inflation and the appearance of quarks and antiquarks the spectacular first sequence proceeds in the first minutes to the appearance of hydrogen and helium nuclei. The first three hundred thousand years show the beginning appearance of atoms and the new universe is on its way toward the formation of galactic then stellar formations. By the period of four billion years ago the beginnings of life will initiate the planetary scale of Earth evolution.

The Big Bang, 13.7 billion years ago

10^{-43} seconds: the universe is smaller than the Planck length.

10^{-43} to 10^{-33} : onset of cosmic inflation

10^{-10} : separation of fundamental forces, quarks, anti-quarks

3 minutes: nuclei of hydrogen and helium

300,000 years: atoms form, galaxy, then stellar, formation begins

5.6 billion years ago: Our sun appears from debris of a supernova

3.9 to 1.8 billion years ago: emergence of life as bacteria

550 million years ago: The Cambrian era

55-60 million years ago: first primates

3-5 million years ago: Australopithecus, emergence of hominids

50,000 years ago: *homo sapiens*

10,000 years ago: onset of Neolithic

5,000 years ago: rise of advanced civilization in Egypt, Sumer

2500 years ago: the era of the so-called Axial Age

1500 C.E.: the explosion of modernity

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the radical populism of the idea was shifted into a conservative ideology in the generation of Darwin. Of interest is the fact that Alfred Wallace, the probable real discoverer of the Darwinian theory had socialist beliefs, and was an outsider next to Whiggish Darwin and the crystallizing science establishment. Darwin's theory, seeping into the private and unspoken thinking of a powerful fringe public, and mixed with the tonic of Spencer and the fulminations of Nietzsche, was to become a powerful shadow ideology behind its outer manifestations, severe enough, in the phases of Social Darwinism in the Gilded Age, and the eugenics movement.

The implications of the newly discovered world of fossils precipitated a crisis in world views, and the first beginnings of attempted science are visible in such figures as Erasmus Darwin, and the key figure, Lamarck, who essentially wrote down the first real theory of evolution. His efforts, occurring in the period of revolutionary action in the crescendo of the French Revolution, were seen as a radical thesis challenging the settled view of society, in time, that spoke to a conservatism of political reactionaries. It was to be the conservatizing action of Darwin's theoretical rendering of the idea of 'evolution' that was triumph in the public's mind, and in the minds of those who sought a professional science of biology.

The period of the birth of modern biology is synchronous with the onset of evolutionary speculation, and that birth retained a qualitative challenge to the emerging reductionism suggested by the Newtonian canon of physics. The sheer splendor of its success tended to promote the impulse of imitation in the creation of successor sciences. This one aspect of the obsessive belief in natural selection, as if a mechanical 'law' of evolution could place biological evolution safely within science.

Metaphysics of Evolution The need for a 'science of metaphysics' is the first step to a 'science of history and/or evolution'. But it is just this requirement that proves the stumbling block. In his famous first critique Kant isolated the three great issues of the metaphysical tradition destined to get into trouble on the way to a 'science of metaphysics': that of divinity, followed by those of soul and free will. To these we should add the question of teleology, and note the way Kant considered teleology within the bounds of methodological naturalism, albeit ambiguously. The questions of divinity, soul, and free will demand proofs of existence, and Kant exposed the way that the road to these three proofs is beset with contradictions. They are metaphysical because they stand beyond the empirical.

But there were objections to this rising scientism from the start, as with

Non-genetic Evolution

The Axial Age is a clear and devastating challenge to ideas of natural selection and of genetic evolution. Darwin is more or less on record as assuming that natural selection is at work in the destruction of primitive races and that the achievements of the Greek classical period are the result of differential natural selection, a most doubtful viewpoint. Why was there a Greek flowering of culture? Because, by natural selection, the Greeks were smarter or some superior race? What about the Hittites? These were essentially the same tribal and linguistic stock. Yet they shew very little creative culture. They weren't in the macro mainline. What about the Romans? They are almost a variant tribe, yet already look backwards to an established tradition. One is just before, the other just after. In parallel we find the post-Vedic mimic in concert the Greeks in music of different key. This has to be a problem of periodization. The foundations of the Greek classical achievement appeared at almost record speed from -900 to -600 for reasons, we can strongly suggest, that were conditioned by zone and period, in a master sequence. It is a question of macro determination. This remarkable interval, echoed in the raw structure of the Old Testament, has no other account than as a 'fast interrupt'. Even if we thought they had special talents or intelligence as a culture, this other explanation would hold good. For we will move to see the full counter-experiments in all combinations, the comparable Hittites, and (Greek) Mycenaeans before, the Romans just after. In general, evolutionary theory assumes that selection for intelligence is a foregone conclusion in the evolution of the brain. Even the small snapshot we have of human history shows the 'survivors' too often to be a very restricted range of men. Uphill selection requires unique conditions for success.

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the figure of Kant, and his successors in German Classical philosophy, along with the Romantic movement, which produced a clear set of challenges to the mechanization of nature. To banish teleology from physics was a great advance, but it has misled biologists. The realm of physics shows us causal fields, but in biology we see an immense range of 'devices', machines with a purpose. The biochemical field is little else. And this situation is in part the reason for the assault of design arguments at all stages, including the generation of Newton, where Thomas Ray, an member of the royal society, advanced design arguments.

The issue of design arguments haunts biology for the simple reason that mechanism cannot seem to provide universal explanations in the ascent of life from matter. The mind then tends to 'flip' into the false duality of 'mechanism, designer'. The term 'design' is ambiguous, and could refer to processes of nature. And the stubborn reality of an unseen dimension of the 'spiritual in nature', cannot be resolved by reductionist dogmatism. Extremely complex phenomena, such as the spectrum of human consciousness, the nature of the 'will' and its potential freedom (as 'free will'), violate mechanical assumptions from the start.

The reality then is a genuine case of 'dialectic', albeit deadlocked, and critics of reductionism should consider this dialectic of mechanism: propose mechanical hypotheses until they fail. And it would seem that 'natural selection' has thus failed. But its antithesis, as a design argument, should also fail, leaving the resolution of that dialectic to a new, still unknown range of processes. Our study of history show at once the way in which a larger perspective is needed. However, the design argument retains its powerful allure for religious critics of evolution, who may simply be right in many of their challenges to scientism.

In Kant's wake, beside the seminal work of the embryologists, still not 'evolutionaries', studying the process of development, there came a school of so-called 'teleomechanists' who sought to reconcile the mechanistic and teleological aspects clearly visible in the biological field. This seminal field did not long survive the demands for 'science' which had so prospered in the banishment of teleology from physics. But clearly the field of biology was not going to yield so easily to this regime of reducing all phenomena to the kind of laws that proved so fruitful in the mechanics of Newton and Leibnitz.

The question of evolution has been one of the great successes of the rise of modern science, but its discovery as a set of facts about the chronicle of

The Teleomechanists

As biological science in the Newtonian legacy emerges in the era of positivism the denaturing of teleological components leaves Darwinists stranded with no definition of an 'organism'. This situation was virtually prophesied by Kant whose work suggests issues of natural teleology. The data of our macro effect, proceeding empirically, gives us an actual example: a intermittent oscillator that expresses directionality, i.e. a hybrid of mechanical and teleological components, both and neither. But this phenomenon has a 'noumenal'/'phenomenal' Janus-face.

As Timothy Lenoir notes in *The Strategy of Life*, "Teleological thinking has been steadfastly resisted by modern biology. And yet, in nearly every area of research biologists are hard pressed to find language that does not impute purposiveness to living forms. The life of the individual organism—if not life itself, seems to make use of a variety of stratagems in achieving its purposes. But in an age when physical models dominate our imagination and when physics itself has become accustomed to uncertainty relations and complementarity, biologists have learned to live with a kind of schizophrenic language, employing terms like 'selfish genes' and 'survival machines' to describe the behavior of organisms as if they were somehow purposive yet all the while intending that they are highly complicated mechanisms. The present study treats a period in the history of the life sciences when the imputation of purposiveness to biological organization was not regarded as an embarrassment but rather an accepted fact, and when the principal goal was to reap the benefits of mechanistic explanations by finding a means of incorporating them within the guidelines of a teleological framework. Whereas the history of German biology in the early nineteenth century is usually dismissed as an unfortunate era dominated by arid speculation, the present study aims to reverse that judgment by showing that a consistent, workable program of research was elaborated by a well-connected group of German biologists and that it was based squarely on the unification of teleological and mechanistic models of explanation." DMR

fossils has not been matched by an equal success of theory, or so we must suspect from the prolonged and intractable controversy set in motion by Darwin's theory, that of natural selection. This controversy has persisted throughout the entire history of the subject, expanding to incite the nearly implacable opposition of religious groups, from the fundamentalists of the American Bible Belt, to the sophisticated 'second opinions' of the proponents of so-called 'intelligent design'.

Tornado in a Junkyard: the statistics of natural selection induces a frenzy in creationists given a free gift of the falsification of the basic theory... The metaphor is from Fred Hoyle's well-known critique of the standard Darwinian theory.³

It is important to consider the way in which Darwin's theory, which we suspect was in reality that of Alfred Wallace, broke the deadlock of stalled thinking on evolution. The irony was that the placeholder, a mechanism of evolution, was needed to assist in visualizing the way in which species might diverge from one another. That natural selection was simply a placeholder for this larger perceptual breakthrough is lost on a later generation that cannot remember the problem the pre-evolutionary generations had in getting a grip on the unfamiliar reality of development in time.

It is interesting that Wallace, the declared co-discoverer of the theory, soon saw that it was an oversimplification, certainly as to the evolution of man, and recanted his earlier allegiance. Thus, if it is true that he led Darwin into the woods here, it true that he left him there, and the reign of the theory of natural selection, like a 'get rich quick' scheme, became the tenaciously held article of faith for many who soon took it as the foundation for a secular world view. The theory rapidly became a metaphysical guardian of views about modernity, in turn driving much critique of Darwinism into the camp of conservative anti-modernism, soon to be postmodern high hopes of dispensing of the modern world, and its anti-religion.

One problem here is that 'secularism', which is the direct achievement of the Protestant Reformation, is not in any inherent sense 'anti-religion', since its principal action, if anything, by setting religion in motion, seems more akin to religious re-creation as a field of 'unchurched' spirituality in free fall. The secular period is thus the object of a wished-for takeover of the place held by religion in society. This is a 'mistake' that is more than understandable, if we examine the clear trend of the modern transition from

³ James Perloff, *Tornado in a Junkyard: The Relentless Myth of Darwinism* (Refuge Books, 1999).

the era of religious domination to the open social space aspired to by the challengers of tradition. The problem remained that the substitute candidates for religion tended to be dominated by the rising scientism of misplaced science, generating a series of reactions to a new fallacy of omniscience.

The question of evolution was not really clarified by the collision of science and religion that arose from the controversies of Darwinism. The errors seem to have doubled, without clarification. Beside the creationists who, alone, tended to deny the reality of evolution, the vast majority, religious and scientific, accepted the 'fact' of evolution, focusing the debate of the 'theory' of natural selection. As we have noted its status as a placeholder for a mechanism, complete with a metaphor of the 'animal breeder' in an echo of design arguments, belied its implausibility if taken to represent the whole process itself. Here the contracting mentality of scientism (which we might define as 'physics' applied to all phenomena) found a myth to its liking, as a prop for a new kind of superstition: the all-powerful magic of the disguised creator-designer, Natural Selection.⁴

Simple arguments of statistics, pointed to by first-rate scientists, like Fred Hoyle, cast severe doubt on the possibility of any of this being so, if the complexities of biochemical structure were to be manipulated by chance alterations. But the *idée fixe* soon became impossible to dislodge, and the feeling that the action of natural selection was the godsend 'law of evolution' to match the elegant simplicity of the Newtonian brand took over the thinking of even the specialists of detail, who were prone to confuse the hard science of the substrate processes of the organism with the process of evolution itself.

The theory of evolution by natural selection of randomly occurring variations is presupposed to be true because it is logical and simple. For this very reason, however, it should be regarded with suspicion: this inscrutable universe does not lend itself to facile explanations. A mechanistic approach to evolution oversimplifies thinking on an immense subject of the greatest intrinsic complexity. The hope of many biologists to base their discipline on physics, the model science is delusive...⁵

One of the hidden notorieties of the thesis of natural selection is the way

4 Soren Lovtrup, *Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth* (1987), Robert Reid, *Evolutionary Theory, The Unfinished Synthesis* (1985), Robert Wesson, *Beyond Natural Selection* (1991), Michael Denton, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis* (1985).

5 Robert Wesson, *Beyond Natural Selection* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), p. 22.

that it is proposed as science, only to proceed in a medium of disregard for the realities of scientific observation. The claims that all the processes that are revealed in the fossil record are the result of random evolutionary processes is almost extravagant as a conclusion in advance of the codification of fact. The most obvious objection, in a decided resemblance to hitting against a stone wall, is that the details of correct observation of the proliferation of species is simply impossible to track in real time. And the result would require observations over the entire interval of differentiation, which might comprise millions of years, and dispersal over a global environment hard to track. The core fact here is that, strictly speaking, this detail of observation is impossible from the first step. Thence the evident temptation or wishfulfilment to propose a simple explanation like natural selection. That or nothing.

The issue of improper observation connects with the related issue of the frequent absence of fossil forms in a given sequence of species differentiation. What must exist in theory if Darwin's formulation is correct confronts the reality that the intermediate stages are absent in the record. That this is the result of incomplete research, and that these 'gaps' in the fossil record will with time be filled is confirmed in many, but by no means all cases. And this situation has been seized on by creationists to insist that the issue of 'gaps' is one of theology, of the 'will to create' present in the stages of evolutionary emergence. In fact, the whole issue of 'common descent' begins to sound doubtful in the reckoning of those intent on seeing a designer in his garden, plying the forms of the 'evolutionary music' in a kind theistic improvisation.

But the issue of gaps tends to be an exploitation of the debate, rather than a clarification. It is not that the record of common descent might be contradicted by the action of miracles, but, once again, that the action of natural selection is not adequate to the task of explaining the differentiation of species. In fact, the whole notion of species is at risk here, if used as the universal category of analysis: the 'evolution' of bacteria, that of insects, then of animals, and finally of man, is only by assumption a common process. One of the confusions in the history of biological research is the way that its first theorists, such as Wallace and Darwin, began their work in 'jungle canopies' where the teeming differentiation of creatures, especially the insects, produced the illusion that species divergence was as simple as it seemed to the gaze taking in the struggle for survival. In reality the question of the emergence of species must be several subjects of discourse, with the 'descent of man' remaining tabled as a mystery quite other than

Timeline for the Rise of Civilization

The factor of 'ten thousand year explosions' is clearly at work in the emergence ('evolution') of civilization.

From 50,000 years ago: dawn of human culture

20,000 to 15,000 years ago: the Last Glacial Maximum, transition to interglacial

15,000 to 12,500 years ago: Bølling-Allerød Interstadial, warming

12,500 years ago: Younger Dryas, 1300 years of renewed cold

11,500 years ago: onset of Holocene

Then around 9-10,000 BCE we see the first beginnings of the agricultural revolution with the Natufians in Western Asia. Then a new 'Great Explosion' takes place.:

The period of the Neolithic beginning ca. 8000 BCE in the Fertile Crescent is still too coarse-grained to detect the 'hidden transitions' we suspect, but we can plot the basic outline very easily:

-8000 to -5500 BCE is the first phase,

-5500 to -3000 BCE is the second phase,

leading to the take-off period of 'higher' civilization

ca. -3300 we see Sumer and Dynastic Egypt crystallize

A great field of civilizations and histories arise in the diffusion fields of these two great starts, but the basic framework is in place until the Axial period:

-900 to -600 BCE: we see a synchronous parallel emergence field across Eurasia, with ambiguous data for Africa and the New World. This massive convulsion of transformed culture sets the stage for the first stage of globalization.

1500 to 1800, another rapid transition to a new age period. The lack of synchrony here in the single focus of Europe is totally misunderstood. Our analysis suggests the obvious reason: parallel transitions would collide.

This almost miraculous pattern of data, alternating between fast advance and 'medieval' middles is a dead-ringer for the term 'punctuated equilibrium', and shows a clear frequency pattern of about 2400 years, as hard as that can be to accept. But this kind of action, totally unexpected, fulfills our requirements for an 'evolutionary' driver. Almost all the great advances of civilization occur within these 'axial' intervals. DMR

the constant reiterations of insectivoid multiplicity.

A more reasonable view of the matter would be that common descent is real, but that real discontinuities of another kind are at work. There is no reason why a clear continuity of life forms might not show a genuine discontinuity in the accelerated transformations of a sequence of connected forms. And here the question of speciation remains suspicious as the field for such complex transformations of correlated but independent factors required for the passage into a new species definition.

The question of human evolution, especially, remains unsolved by biological science. Part of the reason is the inability of man to really grasp the nature of his being, which is a complex instrument he does not naturally learn to use the way that the developmental life-cycle produces the ability to walk and talk. Here science confronts its possible limits as it attempts to produce an evolutionary account of the emergence of ethics. The classic distinction of facts and values seems to defeat the effort at the first step. And the result is the impulse, in the name of science, to mechanize the result, often with twisted versions of the account by natural selection to produce theories of altruism. This strange research effort, with its peculiar bias against the implications of selfishness in the standard theory, attempts to focus on one ethical trait or nexus, to produce a causal explanation that can simply bypass the core issue of an ethical agent.

Here the inability of man to really understand his own behavior stands in the way of creating a real science. The stubborn question of free will, or some form of ethical agency, requires something Darwinian thinking could never realize: an account of the evolution of free agency. In fact, the mainline of science has consistently attempted to deny the existence of the factor of will, in the name of causal explanation. But, by definition, the medium of ethical choice requires this potential. The mystery of human ethical action is an evolutionary given, and yet its characteristics have never received any foundational description. The classic discourse of the philosopher Kant here speaks of 'common ordinary morality' as a kind of species characteristic, and the account of its nature must precede any account of its evolution, but this is very difficult to achieve.

The question of human morality resembles that of language, a faculty that is somehow innate in man, and yet subject to the immense variations of the divergence of languages. It would seem that moral action, whose explanation is confounded by the diversity of its manifestations, emerges developmentally from a core modular behaviorism that is characteristic of

the species. To produce an account of this is very difficult because man is immersed in its action, and fails in practice to really observe its functioning which is spontaneous. The requirement for science here is an empirical account of the way in which morality evolved in man, and this we lack entirely. And once again the core ideological fixation of the subject is visible in the oddity of the attempt to isolate the trait of altruism and subject it to the reductionist regime, in effect, dismissing it as an illusion. The result often seems to be centered on the account of the ‘hero as psychopath’.

As noted, the question of the human will confounds the entire effort to clarify the evolution of man, and science as now practiced is simply allergic to the whole notion, and we must retreat to the attempted clarification of figures such as the philosopher Kant who posed a set of challenges to the Newtonian framework with his delineation of science and metaphysics. The intractable issues of divinity, soul, and free will forced the realization of their not clearly soluble character, neither easily rationalized nor open to dismissal on the grounds of their metaphysical character. It is significant that the debate over evolution is really about these three questions, as the creationists demand an account of divinity and the design argument, religionists in general insist on the reality of soul, and some account of the moral dimension of freedom.

What is the ‘will’? This question is perhaps the most intractable in the evolution question, first as to an empirical depiction, and next as to an evolutionary scenario. The philosopher Schopenhauer gives another important version in the perspective of ‘transcendental idealism’.⁶

We can see that the theory of natural selection is a convenient way to eliminate any need to deal with these issues, and somehow it became the ‘new normal’ to simply bypass all the ‘hard’ questions of human evolution (which are undoubtedly directly connected to all primate evolution) with the brand of positivistic explanation that had come to dominate science. This regime is open to the charge made of ‘flatlanders’ and was the object of a warning from the sociologists Max Weber of the Iron Cage. This metaphor seems apt when we consider the loss of intuition in biologists attempting to deal with the nature and evolution of man, but with any sense of the subject trained out of them. The most recent phase of this is the obsessive focus on pop neuroscience as the standard of all explanation of mental behavior. Somehow the figure under examination, *homo sapiens*, has been lost to view.

The suspicion lingers that the subject of evolution requires an extension

6 Dale Jacquette, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

of our understanding of the nature of science, and that the phenomenon of life has a dimension beyond that of the physical substrate. This suspicion is made stronger as we examine history whose core is based on more than facts and the mechanics of objects, being in essence completely founded in the realm of values and their effects on action and behavior. Human history is more than a set of events, it is a 'story' or a set of related actions spawned in the considerations of aims and intents, and the pursuit of 'goods' in the name of the 'good'.

Notes 4.N1 A New Model of History

The discussion of world history we have proposed via a simple outline reflects a remarkable structure embedded in world history, one that is open to a set of useful interpretations, historical and evolutionary. We will give a short outline here, and refer to the larger versions in WHEE and DMR

The discovery of the pattern of axis points has forced us, remarkably, to reexamine the meaning of evolution itself, for we suspect that its current purely genetic interpretation is misleading, and fails to account for a broader component that we can only call 'macroevolution'. The term 'macroevolution' tends to refer to the process of speciation. But in the case of man we confront the ambiguity of that definition of man as man, the species Man. Perhaps that speciation is still incomplete, and history itself is an exhibit, evidence, in this process! It will turn on a question of 'evolution' becoming 'self-evolution', the passage from passive to active, as if it were an 'evolution of freedom'. It is time in any case to elaborate on our remarks about history and evolution. We have already produced the gist, and we should, at the risk of repetition, formalize our discussion with a model. Instead we will simply point to a few key idea and proceed to a short world history, reaching at the end the modern period, with a new insight into its significance and dynamics.

The simplest version of our projected model is therefore the chapter headings in a Table of Contents:

Prologue: everything from the Big Bang to the Neolithic....

1. The rise of civilization, the Neolithic, and Egypt, Sumer
2. The classic era of the Axial Age
3. The rise of the modern....

Our discussion began with a very simple question. If history and evolution are distinct, when did evolution stop and history begin? Clearly they could not turn the one into the other in an instant. Thus it would seem that man

There are three broad types of explanation for human emergence, evolutionary psychological, religious, and New Age. The religious myths have fallen by the way side, despite hints of ancient understandings in the Adamic corpus. The New Age/Indic accounts are highly suggestive. Consider:

The attempts by evolutionary psychology to explain human evolution are almost more mythological than anything in religious or New Age speculative literature. This area is a void on all sides. But the evolutionary psychologists may well have insights into the microevolutionary adaptations of already existing 'man', often inducing decline of real potential. The suggestions in *Big Brain: The Origins and Future of Human Intelligence* (Lynch and Granger) are that at some point *homo sapiens* was more intelligent than he is now. The regime of adaptational natural selection is under strong suspicion as an eroder of human intelligence.

The design argument lurks over the void of science: J. G. Bennett, in *The Dramatic Universe*, Vol. 4, gives an intetesting if near science fiction account of the emergence of man via *homo erectus/sapiens*, and is unique in its suggestion that the dimension of consciousness (beyond animal awareness), creativity, and mind, as the foundations of language, purposive action, and ethical agency, are the breakthrough stages that jumpstart *erectus* to a new speciation. And Bennett, in a unique argument about demiurgic agencies, suggests that early man could only have achieved the passage with help from evolutionary guides, appearing as 'avatars' inside the species zone. Avatars, a quite obscure category (!), are well-known in the Indic tradtion, most accounts being now myth. That the phenomenon of jump-started self-consciousness, well-known in Indic religion, resembles that relation (too often in superstitious decay) of guru and disciple, is a possible clue to the conundrum of human emergence. DMR

'evolved' toward 'history' but that something like history was coming into being while he was still evolving. And this still could be the case. So the two overlap. And this makes sense. Our evidence of 'axis points' points precisely to this possibility: the stream and the sequence of transition inside that stream correspond exactly to our prediction in this sense. We have the basis for an elaborated 'theory' complete with derivations and fundamental theorems. But a coherent chronicle would be better.

Something that doesn't happen all at once has to happen in a transition, or a series of stages. On the one hand, the control of a passive process doesn't allow any freedom. But the total freedom to begin and continue is, at the beginning, an empty possibility. Chimpanzees are free to create civilization, but it won't happen. So between underdetermination and overdetermination we have some kind of overlapping evolution/history in which the balance is shifting toward freedom. One way to balance the under/overdetermination would be a series of 'transitions' of an intermittent character: strong direction, then a stop to see something actively emerge, then more direction, then stop again, and so on. But wait, that's what we see in the eonic sequence! A series of on-off transitions! Looks familiar.

It is peculiar to bring the term 'evolution' so close to home in our own history. We tend to have romantic image of wild and primordial evolution, and like to think that we evolved into free men in a jungle somewhere, tearing raw flesh off of wild beasts, the fourth chimpanzee cooking steaks on a fire, and then after some lucky mutation we just walked away with full-blown Kantian morality to greater things from then on. But the eonic effect is a cautionary tale. Its action seems to be still coaching man at the point where he is producing his own art, so what are we to think? We underestimated what it means to be man, perhaps. And in history we detect something that is not supposed to be there, something truly stupendous, a system leapfrogging millennia, able to morph whole cultures comprehensively in short time-slices.

Most of all we see a process of directional evolution that can operate globally in selected localized regions, as seen in the ingenious placement of the zones of transition. Thus as we examine the macro effect we are confronted with something that demands to be called 'evolution', although it seems paradoxical to apply this to history. But in fact Darwinists have no monopoly on the use of the term. We speak routinely of 'cosmic evolution', 'economic evolution', the evolution of technology or religion, even the evolution of science or, indeed, of evolution as an idea. The evolution of

civilization as a concept poses no problem, save that unexpectedly we find it to be a genuine type of macroevolution in collision with Darwin's version.

So let us ask, why the emphasis on Darwin's version? Scientific evidence? As we have seen the evidence of Darwin is not adequate and our different evidence indirectly suggests that he is in fact wrong about natural selection. So, as they say, 'we are free to go', and redefine the meaning of evolution by redefining our line of attack on its mechanism. The fact of evolution, however, is quite secure, and the overall research project of the biologists remains in place as a foundation for any use on our part of the term evolution.

Thus, there can be no objection, as such, to still another use of the term for our data, especially if we qualify it, so that we don't get in the way of perfectly sound genetic usages of the word, even if those usages, as we suspect, are quite inadequate. Looking at our three successive transitions we can simply define this as the 'macro', and thus intermittent, evolution of civilization, calling our intermittent sequence of transitions the macroevolutionary sequence, keeping in mind that this itself does not fully define the totality of the evolutionary components of world history, the economic evolution(s) of world history, for example, being something different, and an important component we will address separately.

But then what is the status of everything happening in between our transitions? We suggested the possibility of defining this as some kind of 'microevolution'. Actually, our main point was simply to call this history, in contradistinction to the macroevolution of the macro driver. As crude as it is, this approach works beautifully, as a descriptive, please note, not more, not yet as a theory of evolution.

To conclude, the answer to the paradox of history and evolution is given to us empirically. We see a series of intermittent transitions. Clearly that's the form taken by our evolution-history. We can simply define the terms 'evolution' and 'history' to conform to that definition. We can speak of the Great Transition, broken into a series of smaller transitions, from evolution to history. This means that there is an overlap of the two. It is like a cornucopia, with a precession of things proceeded from a source but with a different character. The advantage of this approach is the relativity of the definition. We can say that early man in the Paleolithic was evolving, but that his history is beginning, and that the two are braided together. Furthermore, we have a natural interpretation of the distinction of macro and microevolution. We can formalize this as follows:

From evolution to history We can make the evidence of the type seen

in the eonic effect the transition from evolution to history explicit grounds for defining the overlap between evolution and history. We could call history the record of free activity rising in the wake of the passive evolution of volition.

The macroevolution of civilization We can call the evidence of our three turning points the macro or intermittent evolution of civilization, as some form of ‘macroevolution’ turning into history. Then we can keep rough track of the two levels of history we detect in the eonic effect. This will create a puzzle of two distinct forms of action, one inside the eonic pattern, one outside.

Free agency We must as we proceed create a space for discussions of freedom in history. This is already implicit in our account, please note, in the sense that the macro process does not actually carry out the effects it creates (we won’t say ‘causes’). Thus our discussion already forces the distinction of causality and creative action, a good sign we are on the right track. The question of the evolution of freedom can be deferred to our account of world history.

The Great Transition Armed with these distinctions we can call the passage from evolution to history The Great Transition, with a possible echo (or not) of The Great Explosion. However, we are immersed in this transition, and may or may not have reached the end of its clearly intermittent action, seen as a series of individual transitions.

Our exploration of historical macroevolution seems audacious, and yet there is a rightness to this approach, and furthermore it is non-dogmatically useful. And it can also give us a venue to reopen a long outstanding question, that of a science of history. And the question of such a science raises at once the issue of Big History, the many attempts to explicate some form of historical dynamics, in the search for laws of history. This has always been a controversial question, and even as the progress of science has advanced into the realm of culture and mind, the stubborn refusal of history to yield to the reductionist legacy of the hard sciences.

Note 4.N2 The Idea of MacroevoLution

Our outline is useful because it contains an implicit ‘model’ of macroevolution. We can either stay with the outline, or try to draw out some of the implications of our discovery of an historical dynamic. We can bring all our ideas together in a short summary of this macro model, which dissolves into the background as it turns into an outline of history.

If the model seems strange, keep in mind that it is designed so that theory will be segregated from action in the present. But before doing that we can bring in one wildcard notion, to remind ourselves that we are free agents, the idea of a sort of floating ‘fourth turning point’. We see a set of three transitions in our past, but the effort to autogenerate a kind of fourth is a useful idea that haunts a semi-determined system. There are many efforts in world history to try and create a ‘new age’. The phenomena of world religions, and revolutions, show this wish to ‘exit’ history into freedom. But before that is possible it is necessary to understand what we are dealing with. Nonetheless the point is that we allow many things to exist in history that are not necessary: we can change them.

Our model is very powerful and summons up a classic distinction: freedom in the macro system, and freedom from the macro system. We fulfill the macro sequence, and then we move out of it. System action yields to free action, which must self-evolve into Freedom. Our model is thus highly flexible and tuned to the key issues of the antinomies of freedom and necessity.

We can summarize all this with a simple idea:

From evolution to history The way we have set up our model, in some fashion, automatically answers all these objections. Our task is not reactive anti-modernism, but a genuine self-consciousness that can both realize and transcend the eonic sequence, as we exit evolution into history. That, however, is not so simple.

Stream and sequence We have created two levels to our model, and we can consider the history of a particular culture the stream aspect, and the intersection of that with the larger evolutionary process the sequence aspect.

Consider the example of Greece. The stream of Greek history is one thing, and proceeds as the tale of a culture or cultural complex over many millennia. But its intersection with the ‘eonic sequence’ produces a transition in a larger process. This is the characteristic Axial Greek period, issuing from the Dark Ages into the so-called Archaic, then Classical periods. This is actually a very efficient way to ‘evolve’ a whole through an isolated series of parts.

Diffusion and oikoumenes Each transition produces a diffusion field

leading to a new oikoumene. The Hellenistic is one classic example and appears almost immediately in the wake of our Greek Axial transition.

Sequential dependency This process creates a broader rubric than causality. Each successive culture in the diffusion field shows a kind of loose determination created by the transition.

The reason for this is the inability of the successors to match the creative intensity of the transitional period. People begin to look backwards and form a tradition based on the transition. Many of the seminal innovations are in fact lost as time goes on. Greek democracy fails to endure, for example. The world of empire takes over. The great flowering of Greek tragedy simply stops immediately at the end of the fifth century. To understand sequential dependency consider this case of tragic drama. To overcome this dependency effect we would have to be able to produce tragic dramas 'on demand' as it were! Clearly in this one case we are still the downfield sequence unable to freely 'transcend history'.

This approach allows us to deal in a useful way with directionality without the confusions of teleology. This model is really about two levels, and we see the stream level and the level of the eonic sequence. These two levels are braided together and this matches the dynamic driving 'macroevolution'.

Discrete-continuous models The type of model we use is a so-called discrete-continuous model because we see a discrete series of turning points overlaid on a continuous pattern of world history.

The switched off present The elegance of a discrete-continuous model where the 'system' takes the discrete series aspect, and 'free action' the continuous history aspect, is the way the character of the system changes as we enter our present. Note that we are outside the 'eonic series' and have been executives of the output of the system.

We simply take our three axis points and turn them into discrete transitions three centuries in length in a macro sequence overlaid on our streaming history, T₁, 2, 3 become:

Transition 1: birth of civilization -3300 to -3000

Transition 2: Axial interval -900 to -600

Transition 3: rise of the modern 1500 to 1800

Emergent entities, relative transforms Our observations are based on the way stream phenomena show 'relative transforms' as they become 'macro emergents'. The Axial transformation of 'monotheism' is a 'relative transform' (it existed before) and by definition thus an 'eonic emergent'.

‘System action’/‘free action’ The question of causality and freedom yields to ‘system action’ and ‘free action’, which in the eonic sequence are also called ‘eonic determination’ and ‘free action’. Evolution yields to history, as the degree of freedom increase, Freedom growing out of ‘free action’.

Self-consciousness The medium of action, and emerging freedom, is self-consciousness. This is also the medium of eonic determination. True freedom lies beyond and outside of eonic determination, which happens in the mideonic periods or at the end of the eonic sequence.

These terms allow us to efficiently describe the macro system in general terms beyond the actual content. There is nothing dogmatic or even fully derived in this matrix. It simply works if we take it that way. It is like the schedule in a school. The timing of classes is given, system action, but the content is ‘free action’. We might consider foundationalist questions and ask what foundation we can give to this model. If we set up a model, however arbitrarily, then as we enter into its implications we see in practice its basis in reality: there is an extraordinary match to the data. More generally we explore a theory of the evidence, short of a closed depiction of mechanism, which is always beyond observation, by definition, for reasons we will see. But as an approximation it encompasses the statistical regions of innovation that form the cluster effect of our pattern. Too many pieces of a puzzle fall into place for the model to be too far off the mark.

Relative beginnings The nice thing about this model is that we can start anywhere. We have, as yet, no absolute beginning to our series, although we proposed a frequency hypothesis extending it backwards. But that hypothesis is not necessary for the use of what we have. In fact, we suspect that our transitions create a net increase in complexity, information, and self-organization in a way that is not causally sequential with its antecedent periods.

End of Sequence? Note that we are outside the last transition and that this switches off in our past: our current action may or may not express the aggregate directionality shown, which is highly complex in any case, comprising multiple parallel streams. Thus the teleology, if any, inferable from the continuation of TP₃, may be quite different from that of the overall sequence. We are left with a question, have we reached the end of the sequence?

Modern unidirectionality? The puzzle of the Axial Age synchrony is matched by the mirror image puzzle of the absence of geographical synchrony in the modern transition, leading to endless confusion

about a Eurocentric Western civilization. But as we enter intensive globalization, the realization that the modern transition, with its frontier focus, is a transient interval in a greater eonic sequence resolves many paradoxes at one stroke. An Axial phenomenon in a shrinking world would have proved disastrous, and the transcultural latency of modernist universalism gives a rubric for an eonic first: a globalized oikoumene.

We have produced an 'idea for universal history', and it is important to understand it, since such histories are open to challenge on various grounds, among them ethnocentrism. It seems as if the modern transition is a form of Eurocentrism, but in fact we have bypassed that completely, at least in principle. The rise of modernity takes place in a local frontier area in a phase of transition, and begins to globalize almost immediately thereafter. The question of 'Western Civilization' never arises.

In the same vein, nothing in our model excludes the independent emergence of civilization in multiple areas. Our eonic series shows a predominance of effect, but has no monopoly on invention. Quite the contrary, we see that our eonic sequence tends to 'sift' the prior achievements of the cultures in its direct path and amplify them for 'general distribution'. The greater totality of human cultures has many latent resources inherited from the Paleolithic, and our eonic sequence performs but a selection of cultural factors from this totality. There is hardly another explanation for the way it seems to contradict itself, as it spawns two world religions in parallel, the atheist Buddhism, and the monotheistic proto-Judaism. In each case the prior stream was there, but as they intersect with the eonic sequence the latent cultural potential self-organizes into vehicles useful to the dominant theme of globalization.

Thus, there is nothing in our account to preempt the possibility of the independent emergence of civilization in the New World. And in fact, without a trace of prejudice against this magnificent zone of human cultural achievement, the fact must be admitted that these civilizations are a bit anemic and sluggish compared with the high-octane fast-paced advance occurring in the Eurasian field. We suspect that we see an example of what the independent evolution of culture without a macro driver would be like. The Eurasian landmass, with a center of gravity, or rather, diffusion, in the Middle East is clearly a more efficiently compact field of operation, giving a small investment in a series of hotspots or transitions a big payoff in the rapid spread of civilization to its far corners. Notwithstanding this view of the New World civilizations we nonetheless suspect a strong element of diffusion is at work in the emergence of the Olmec, Mayan, and other New World

cultures, a question with a considerable controversy. More on this issue later.

That's it. Our model is simply a grid on the surface of a planet, showing a sequence of transitions between different regions, sometimes with parallel connections.

Note 4.N3 Stream and Sequence: Directionality, Teleology

One of the most controversial and baffling aspects of the study of history or evolution is this question of directionality, which impinges on the questions of teleology. Our stream and sequence contrast shows at once a resolution of the paradox. We tend to lose track of directionality because the frequency period of the eonic effect divided over five thousand years only shows three steps in its sequence, and we never realized the existence of step one until the coming of modern archaeology. The scale on which to measure directionality was far greater than we had realized. Looking at the eonic effect we see strong evidence of historical directionality, the more impressive in that our sequence shows interconnection across several millennia. Clearly our system is under suspicion of being teleological, but we are not able to assess teleology, in part because we are embedded in the system in question, and don't see its end point. Teleological issues are also highly volatile ideologies already present inside the system we are studying. They are consistently in error.

Discrete progression vs teleology Any intermittent series produces an unexpected complexity to teleology: the 'system return' millennia in the future can upset the 'teleological hallucinations' that arise in the mideonic periods. This effect is especially notable in the 'bolt out of the blue', the rise of the modern and its motion against the mideonic teleological formations of monotheism (which in any case were at odds with each other). This double level completely debriefs our teleological fantasies, leaving us in ignorance of the long-range future if we can't distinguish our actions and aims in the present from the action of the eonic system, and its future, if any.

We will restrict ourselves to the directionality seen looking toward the past, keeping out of trouble with speculations about a future 'telos'. Claims of teleology show their hand too often as futile efforts to overtake the eonic effect itself, in a fight for the future, and the results have proven themselves by their violent character to have little coherence. We must devise a new kind of theory to protect our data from confusion. Directionality is a fairly weak requirement. It can be detected in the past, without making any claims on the future. Clearly the stream of continuous history drifts and meanders, and

the eonic series perks it up and sets it going into new directions. Directions! The Axial Age shows five new 'directional complexes'. Any sudden change essentially resets direction, so to speak, for however long that lasts. Note again however that the Axial period therefore sets some kind of direction in five separate areas simultaneously. Note also that in many cases the outcomes of each of the Axial exemplars are multivalent, hardly a definite setting of direction.

Sacred/ Secular Compare Greek and Judaic history: one gives birth to modern secularism while the other gives birth to religious history. This happens in parallel. We lose the distinction of 'sacred' and 'secular', and must redefine categories according to content. The term 'secular' really means a change of 'age period' or 'seculum', and begins with a religious transformation, the Protestant Reformation.

New Ages The many myths of eons and New Ages fall into place around the eonic sequence. The rise of the modern precipitates a new age of religion, which climaxes in the secular New Age of Enlightenment. The failure of the distinction between sacred and secular becomes evident in the way the evolution of religion itself shows directionality, and this sudden religious transformation beginning with the Reformation resembles both the earlier Judaic and Greek transitions simultaneously. The term secular does not refer to a philosophy but to the net effect of an entire transition.

Directionality in our sense essentially means something is interrupting a continuous stream and producing a 'non-random' patterning of effects. There is more than just historical happenstance or drift. Something starts up, does something and then stops. There is an intermittent direction setter, and it may change directions at each stage. We should call that 'evolution', while the ordinary activity of people in general is simply history.

Transtemporal sequence Despite the perception of loose directionality, we also see our 'system' resetting direction in successive steps of its sequence, sometimes in different ways (e.g. states, then religions), sometimes in a recursive restarting of some that had died out. Two outstanding cases are the birth and rebirth of science in Axial Greece, and modernity. We already noted this in the case of the idea of evolution. The other is the resetting of democracy, right on schedule, in TP2, TP3:

Discrete Freedom Sequence The most spectacular case is the birth, dying out, then rebirth of democracy, again in Greece, and modernity.

So it seems as if our system tries to recover things that died out in the periods between its transitions.

Stream and Sequence

There is no simple answer to the complexities of what we are seeing until we start to consider what the broad sequence of our turning points suggests, relative beginnings, and a reworking of the incoming stream. This means that, while many genuine novelties are appearing, by and large, we see a transformation of what is entering a period and what is emerging. The dynamic seems independent of the content. Things appear in a total cultural spectrum, with Greek philosophy and early science, dramatic tragedy, or pottery, showing the passage from one end of the spiritual to the other of art, politics, and economy. The key is that the interrupt is coming on cue, and simply creates a kind of intensity or amplitude of generative change.

We are forced at once to distinguish two different things:

the temporal ongoingness of cultural evolution, a 'this leads to that' aspect, an interrupt phase: fast action, accelerating from earlier periods.

Consider Greek history in this light. We have a people, its temporal sequence, a series of stages, nomads arriving from Asia, early Neolithic farmers, Bronze Age Mycenaeans, then suddenly the period of Archaic Greece, and its Classical ascent-vertical as a foundational period that templates a whole new age. We see this five times, at all once, to the century, in some cases to the decade. The sudden advance of the Greeks does not spring, then, from long antecedent influences, although the raw material of diffusion is there. This means that it happens suddenly without slow buildup, relative to the scale of intermediate mideonic stages, even as it must accept the antecedent influences of a long runway, whose only effect can be timbre but not the note.

Thus as we examine the macro effect we begin to see an ingenious way to do 'evolution' on the surface of a planet where many separate cultures are undergoing their own local 'evolutions', just the ordinary effects of people doing their history, never planning things on the large-scale, or in terms of long term intervals. Our eonic sequence however seems to be based on a rhythmic return at the level of millennia. This ordinary cultural evolution of the disparate parts is thus not necessarily the same as the overall development of the whole. The intermittency of the eonic series of turning points generates a sequence of alternating periods of fast advance in the midst of the greater field of cultures and civilizations. We can call this the 'stream and sequence' property of the eonic effect. Each cultural area is an historical stream, e.g. the stream of Greek history from beginning to end, and that period when it becomes part of the greater sequence, what we will call the eonic sequence. It is like a stepping stone sequence to cross a stream. Each step uses a different stone to create a crossing path. These stones are 'intermittent' stages of the sequence that reaches the other shore. The actual pattern is slightly more complex since it may use several 'stones' in parallel at each stage. Look at the Axial period. In five places simultaneously, a cultural stream crosses a (very fuzzy) temporal boundary, intersects with the macrosequence, and gets hot, producing a host of innovations.



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